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Software is big business. It has been estimated that
expenditures for software development and maintenance were 40
billion dollars in 1980, or approximately 2 % of GNP. Even
more impressive are the projections that software will be the
dominant portion of an information processing industry that
is expected to grow to 8.5 % of GNP by 1985 and to 13 % of
GNP by 1990.
The growth in the software industry has not, however,
been painless. The record indicates that the development of
software systems has been plagued by cost overruns, late
deliveries, and users' dissatisfaction. A set of
difficulties that some refer to as the "software crisis."
The problems persist inspite of the significant software
engineering advances that have been made over the last decade
in tackling many of the technical hurdles of software
production. In recent years, the managerial aspect of
software development has gained recognition as being at the
cores of both the problem and the solution. Along with this
recognition there are, however, serious and legitimate
reservations and concerns. Chief among them is the belief
that, as of yet, we still lack the fundamental understanding
of the software development process, and that without such an
understanding the likelihood of any significant gains on the
managerial front is questionable.
The objective of this research effort is to enhance our
understanding of, and gain insight into, the general process
by which software development is managed. To achieve this
objective we accomplished the following three tasks:
First, we developed an integrative system dynamics model
of software development project management. The model was
developed on the basis of an extensive review of the
literature supplemented by 27 focused field interviews of
software project managers in 5 organizations. The model
complements and buildk upon current research efforts, which
tend to focus on the micro components (e.g., scheduling,
programming, productivity, ... etc.), by integrating our
knowledge of these micro components into an integrated
continuous view of the software development process.
Second, a case-study in a sixth organization was
conducted to test the model. The model was highly accurate
in replicating the actual development history of the software
project selected (by the organization) for the case-study.
Project variables tracked included: the workforce level, the
schedule, the cost, error generation and detection, and
productivity.
Third, the model was used as an experimentation vehicle
to study/predict the dynamic implications of an array of
managerial policies and procedures. Four areas were studied:
(1) scheduling; (2) control; (3) Quality Assurance; and
(4) staffing. The exercise produced three kinds of results:
(1) uncovered dysfunctional consequences of some currently
adopted policies (e.g., in the scheduling area); (2)
provided guidelines for managerial policy (e.g., on the
allocation of quality assurance effort); and (3) provided
new insights into software project phenomena (e.g., Brooks'
Law).
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I. INTRODUCTION:
BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVE, AND APPROACH
I.1. Background:
In the brief history of the electronic digital computer,
the 1950s and 1960s were decades of hardware. The 1970s
were a period of transition and a time of recognition of
software. The decade of software is now upon us
(Pressman, 1982).
One convincing impact of software is directly on the
pocketbook. It has been estimated that, here in the U.S.,
expenditures for software development and maintenance were 40
billion dollars in 1980, or about 2 percent of the Gross
National Product (Boehm, 1981). Even more impressive, Boehm
projects that "computer software will be the dominant portion
of an (overall computer and information processing) industry
expected to grow to 8.5% of the Gross National Product by
1985 and to 13% of the GNP by 1990."
This growth in demand for software has not, however,
9been painless. Indeed, as the industry was making the
transition in the 1970s, " ... we (grew) to recognize
circumstances that are collectively called the 'software
crisis,' ... (a term that) alludes to a set of problems
that are encountered in the development of software"
(Pressman, 1982).
The record shows that the software industry has been
marked by cost overruns, late deliveries, poor reliability,
and users' dissatisfaction. [For example, see (Block, B58),
(Boehm, 1981), (Frank, 1983), (Glaseman, 1882), (Jensen &
Tonies, 1979), (Mills, 1976), - (McKeen, 1983), (Thayer &
Lehman, 1980), and (Thayer el al, 1981).]
A report to Congress by the Comptroller General, General
Accounting Office (GAO), FG MSD-80-4, November 9, 1979, cites
the dimensions of the "software crisis" within the federal
government. The report's title summarizes the issue:
"Contracting for Computer Software Development --- Serious
Problems Require Management Attention to Avoid Wasting
Additional Millions."
The report reflects the views of 163 software
contracting firms and - 113 federal government project
officers, as well as experience with specific contracts for
software development. The summarized indictment is severe:
1. Dollar overruns are fairly common in more than 50
percent of cases
2. Calender overruns occur in more than 60 percent of
cases
3. Of the nine contracts examined (eight of which were
admittedly in trouble), of $6.8 million expended, the
results were:
a. Software delivered but never used: $3.2
million
b. Software paid for, but never delivered: $1.9
million
c. Software extensively reworked before used:
$1.3 million
d. Software used after changes: $198,000
e. Software used as delivered: $119,000.
As the report concludes, "The government got for its
money less than 2 percent of the total value of the
contracts."
Big as the direct costs of the "software crisis" are,
the indirect costs can be even bigger, because software, in
many cases, is on the critical path in overall system
development (e.g., weapon systems such as the B-I bomber).
That is, any slippages in the software schedule translate
directly into slippages in the overall delivery schedule of
the system. For example:1
Let's see what this meant in a recent software
development for a large defense system. It was planned
to have an operational lifetime of seven years and a
total cost of about $1.4 billion --- or about $200
million a year worth of capability. However, a
six-month delay caused a six-month delay in making the
system available to the user, who thus lost about $100
million worth of needed capability --- about 50 times
the direct cost of $2 million for the additional
software effort. Moreover, in order to keep the
software from causing further delays, several important
functions were not provided in the initial delivery to
the user (Boehm, 1973).
The "software crisis" is, by no means, confined to
software projects developed by or for the federal government.
There is every indication that it is similarly prevalent
within private sector organizations [(Brooks, 1978), (Mclure,
1955), (McFarlan, 1974), and (Zmud, 1980)]. For example, in
his most recent book, DeMarco (1982) writes about:
some disquieting facts to be considered:
* Fifteen percent of all software projects never deliver
anything; that is, they fail utterly to achieve their
established goals.
* Overruns of one hundred to two hundred percent are
common in software projects.
(And that) So many software projects fail in some major
way that we have had to redefine "Success" to keep
everyone from becoming despondent. Software projects
are sometimes considered successful when the overruns
are held to thirty percent or when the user only junks a
quarter of the result. Software people are often
willing to call such efforts successes, but members of
our user community are less forgiving. They know
failure when they see it.
In an effort to bring discipline to the development of
software systems, attempts have been made since the early
1970s to apply the more rigorous discipline of engineering to
software production. This new discipline is called "Software
Engineering." And it encompases both the technical aspects
of software development (e.g., design, testing, validation,
etc.) as well as the managerial ones (Thayer, 1979),
(Boehm, 1980)).
However, even though both technology and management were
equally recognized very early on as parts of both the problem
and the solution [(Kolence, 1968), (Perlis, 1969), and
(Mills, 1974)], there was a huge disparity in the attention
they received from the research Community.
On the technology side, a number of methodologies have
evolved, over the last decade, that address many of the
technical problems experienced in software development. A
large number of articles addressing such topics as better
coding style "Structured programming", structured design,
testing, formal verification, language design for more
reliable coding, diagnostic compilers, and so forth, have
appeared in the literature (e.g., in the IEEE Transactions on
Software Engineering, Proceedings of the International
Conferences on Software Engineering, Proceedings of the ACM
Conferences on the Principles of Programming Languages,
... ). (See, for example, (Dijkstra, 1971), (Fagen, 1976),
(Jensen and Tonies, 1979), (Mills, 1971), (Parnas, 1972), and
(Stevens et al, 1974).)
... software engineers have progressed to the point
where many major issues relevant to the technology of
software production have been identified and
considerable progress in addressing these issues has
been made. Practical working tools to support improved
software production are commonly available, and their
design and generation have become a recognized topic for
university instruction (Thayer et al, 1981).
A comparable evolution in Management methodologies,
however, has not occured [(Cooper, 1978), (DoD, 1982),
(Gehring and Pooch, 1980), (Jensen and Tonies, 1979), (Hausen
and Mullerburg, 1982a), (McClure, 1981), (McFarlan, 1974),
(McKeen, 1981), (Reifer, 1979), (Thayer, 1979), (Weinberg,
1982), (Zmud, 1980), and (Beck and Perkins, 1983)].
In a special isssue of the IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering devoted to project management, Dr. Richard E.
Merwin (1978), the Guest Editor, pointed out that an overall
software engineering management discipline is missing. He
stated:
Programming discipline such as top-down design, use of
standardized high level programming languages, and
program library support systems all contribute to
production of reliable software on time, within budget
What is still missing is the overall management
fabric which allows the senior project manager to
understand and lead major data processing development
efforts.
And, within the same issue, Cooper, (1978) commented
that:
Although the need is apparent, there appears to be
precious little innovative activity in the area of
software management. Perhaps this is so because
computer scientists believe that management per se is
not their business, and the management professionals
assume that it is the computer scientists'
responsibility.
Three years late.r, Thayer et al, (1981) writing in the
same Journal, stated that:
Software engineering project management (SEPM) has not
enjoyed the same progress (as the technology of software
development). While it might be argued that SEPM has
been defined, it is far from a recognized discipline.
Software developers who have demonstrated competence as
developers and programmers have been elevated to project
managers without training or guidelines to help them.
The major issues and problems of SEPM have not been
agreed on by the computing community as a whole, and
consequently, priorities for addressing- them have not
been widely established. Furthermore, research in this
area has been scant.
This position is further substantiated by a survey,
reported in the same paper, of a number of leading
universities, which revealed that only a handful of the
prominent universities surveyed offered courses exclusively
on b-?M.
But what have been the consequences of this "deficiency"
in our "research repertoire?"
First, our difficulties in producing software that is on
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time, within budget, and that meets user requirements, are
obviously very much still "alive." (Refer to the many
references cited in the early part of this discussion.)-
Second, and because this continues to be the case
inspite of substantial progress in the technological
(vis-a-vis the managerial) aspects of software production,
there is a decided shift in "faith." Consider:
There are more opportunities for improving software
productivity and quality in the area of management than
anywhere else. (Boehm, 1976)
Many of our technical and managerial leaders believe
that the more effective management of a software
development project (i.e., project management) would
eliminate or reduce the severity of these software
failures (Thayer, 1979).
The basic problem is management itself (Gehring and.
Pooch, 1977).
A major barrier to the successful design and
implementation of information systems has been the
management of the software developement activity itself
(Moore, 1979).
Poor management can increase software costs more rapidly
than any other factor (Weinberg, 1982).
A comprehensive study for the U.S. Air Force found that
the problems of software productivity on medium- to
large-scale projects are mostly problems of management:
thorough organization, good contingency planning,
thoughtful establishment of measurable project
milestones, continuous monitoring as to whether the
milestones are properly passed, and prompt investigation
and corrective action in case the milestones are not
met. However, beyond these familiar concessions to
classic management theory, the study group offered no
novel approaches to finding out why they do not work for
software development. (Pooch and Gehring, 1980)
We ran into problems because we didn't know how to
manage what we had, not because we lacked the techniques
themselves (Thomsett, 1980).
Along with the growing "faith" in software engineering
project management, there are, however, serious and
legitimate reservations and concerns. Chief among them is
the belief that, as of yet, we still lack the fundamental
understanding of the software development process [(Comper,
1979), (DOD, 1982), (Fireworker, 1980), (Gehring, 1976),
(Merwin, 1978), (McKeen, 1983), (McKeen, 1981), (Oliver,
1982), and (Wesserman, 1980)], and that without such an
understanding the possibility or likelihood of any
significant gains on the management front is questionable
[(Basili, 1982), (Basili and Zelkowitz, 1978), (Brooks,
1978), (Basili, 1981), (Canning, 1978), (McKeen, 1981), and
(Mitchell, 1980)].
This is no trivial impediment ((McKeen, 1981), (Oliver,
1982)). But, if it is any solace, it is not one that is
unique to our young field:
Any worthwhile human endeavor emerges first as an
art ...
Over the centuries, management as an art has progressed
by the acquisition and recording of human experience.
But as long as there is no orderly underlying scientific
base, the experiences remain as special cases. The
lessons are poorly transferrable either in time or in
space ... (And) in time (the art) ceases to grow
because of the disorganized state of its knowledge ...
The.development of the underlying science (is then)
motivated by the need to understand better the
foundation on which the art rested ..
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When the need and necessary foundation coincide, a
science develops to explain, organize, and distill
experience into a more compact and usable form ... Such
a base of applied science would permit experience to be
translated into a common frame of reference from which
they could be transfered from the past to the present or
from one location to another, (and). to be effectively
applied in new situations ... (Forrester, 1961).
To summarize:
* The record shows that the software industry continues
to be plagued by cost overruns, late deliveries, poor
reliability, and users' dissatisfaction. A set of
difficulties that some refer to as the "Software
Crisis."
* In an effort to bring discipline to the development of
software, attempts have been made since the early 1970's
to apply the more rigorous discipline of engineering to
software production and management. The new discipline
is called "Software Engineering."
* While significant inroads have been made in tackling
the technical hurdles of software development, the
.managerial aspects of software production attracted much
less attention.
* There is a growing "faith" that the next significant
"battle" will be won on the "managerial front."
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* A necessary first step, however, is gaining a
fundamental understanding of the general nature of the
software development process.
1.2. Research Objective and Approach:
The objective of this research effort is to develop and
test an integrative system dynamics model of software
development project management which would enhance our
understanding of, provide insight into, and make predictions
about, the general process by which software development is
managed.
The
enhance
process.
first, and primary, purpose of the model is to
our understanding of the software development
In general;
What is gained in understanding through the use of a
scientific model to portray a portion of the real world
is achieved by comprehending the law or laws built into
the model. The locus of understanding in a scientific
model is to be found in its laws of iiteraction (i.e.,
the modes of interaction among the the variables of a
model) (Dubin, 1971).
There are hundreds of variables
development. Furthermore, these
independent; many of them are related
1976). So far;
that affect software
variables are not
to one another (Myres,
19
The many studies on the subject emphasize the difficulty
and complexity of the process, but have done little to
reveal a well-defined methodology or to delineate
precise relationships among project variables (Oliver,
1982).
Even though we do not de-emphasize the "difficulty and
complexity of the software development process," we feel that
the powerful formalization and simulation tools of the System
Dynamics methodology, have allowed us (as we shall explain in
more detail later in this section) to adequately manage it.
The second purpose of our model, is to make predictions
about the general process by which software systems are
developed. As such, the model would serve as a framework for
experimentation, e.g., to test out the implications of new
managerial policies and procedures. Providing such a
capability, is "especially useful for analyzing consequences
of changes in the (modeled) system where controlled
manipulation of the system itself is impossible, or at least
impractical or undesirable due to time, cost,
inaccessibility, political or moral considerations, or other
reasons" (Schultz and Sulliven, 1972).
In the remaining part of this section we will elaborate
further on the above ideas. We will do that as we argue for
the two characteristic features of our model and which
together distinguish it from most others in the software
engineering area. The two characteristic features being:
(1) It is integrative, and (2) it is a system dynamics model.
1.2.1. Why an Integrative Model:
Our model is integrative in the sense that it integrates
the multiple functions of the software development process,
including the management-type functions, e.g., planning,
controlling, and staffing, as well as the production-type
functions that constitute the software development life
cycle, e.g., designing, coding, reviewing, and testing.
A major defect in much of the research to date has been
its inability to integrate our knowledge of the micro
components, such as project management, programming, testing,
... etc., for deriving implications about the behavior of
the organization in which the micro components are embedded
((Boehm, 1976), (Thayer, 1979)). Paraphrasing Jensen and
-Tonies (1979):
There is much attention on individual phases and
functions of the software development sequence, but
little on the whole life cycle as an integral,
continuous process --- a process that can and should be
optimized.
Clearly, this "micro-oriented" type of work is a useful
beginning in helping us obtain a better understanding of the
software development activity, However, before we can say
that we have a complete understanding of any such activity,
" o.. it is necessary to show that our knowledge of the
individual components can be put togehter in a total system,
i.e., an organization can be synthesized, which allows for
the interactions of all the relevant variables and of all the
structural components" (Cohen, 1965).
The basic argument for this, is that interactions and
interdependencies are common in all social systems, e.g.,
management-type systems (Kotter, 1978), (Schein, 1980),
(Weick, 1979). Paraphrasing Cleland and King (1972):
The management system is a conglomerate of interrelated
and interdependent functions. No one management
subsystem can perform effectively without the others.
Action taken by one subsystem can be traced throughout
the entire management system and throughout the complex
environment in which the management system exists.
And, that as a result:
The behavior of an individual subsystem in isolation may
be very different from its behavior when it interacts
with other subsystems (Cohen, 1965).
It is no wonder, then, that integrative-type models are
viewed as useful and powerful aids in understanding
management-type social systems generally, and in trying to
improve their functioning (Schein, 1980). And the management
of software development is, certainly, no exception:
the solution to the (software management)
problem involves more than just finding better tools and
local optimization methods; it calls for an integrated
approach ... (Jensen and oTonies, 1979).
In addition to the benefit of helping us achieve overall
understanding, an integrative perspective can be useful in
two more "tactical" ways: problem diagnosis and solution
evaluation.
A "corollary" of the above statements by Cleland and
King (1972), is that the interactions and interdependencies
which tend to characterize our management systems generally,
will similarly characterize the problems that beset such
systems (Cleland and King, 1975). Which does indeed seem to
be the case in software development (Glassman, 1982), where "
... no one thing seems to cause the difficulty ... But the
accumulation of simultaneous and interacting factors ...
(Brooks, 1978).
An integrative perspective would, therefore, be useful
since, at worst, it would not "inhibit" our search for the
multiple, and potentially "diffused," set of factors that are
interacting to cause our software problem(s), while, at best,
actually "prompting" and "facilitating" such a search. Such
prompting should be useful since experience suggests that
more often than not people opt for a "parochial mode" of
problem solving (Ackoff, 1978), (Cleland and King, 1975). By
doing so, the problem solve, in effect, brings to the
problematic situation under study a set of ready-made
criteria of relevance. Quite a "risky" strategy when we
admittedly lack a fundamental understanding of the problem
area.
To see the second potential benefit of our integrative
perspective, we need a second "corollary," namely: the chain
of effects in going from a particular managerial intervention
(e.g., to solve a perceived problem) to immediate
consequences, and then to second- and third-order
consequences and newly created problems is another pervasive
characteristic of management-type social systems ((Cleland
and King, 1975), (Weick, 1979)).
By providing us with a comprehensive world view, the
model would help us to more fully assess such second- and
third-order consequencies of, for example, a set of
management policies and procedures we need to test. And it
would do that, again, by, at worst, not "inhibiting" our
search for such multiple, and potentially diffused, set of
consequences, while, at best, actually "prompting" and
"facilitating" such a search. Such prompting should be
useful, since often,
consequences are not given much attention, and
apparently logical solutions may prove faulty as their
consequences ramify. Furthermore, since the
consequences of a decision often occur much later than
the decision itself, it is difficult for the members to
trace backward from the disruptive consequences to
determine precisely what caused them. The members
cannot make such an analysis, simply because there are
too many competing explanations. Thus, the only thing
members can do when a new problem arises is to engage in
more localized problem-solving (Weick,1979).
Notice that Weick's statements highlight two "new"
complicating factors, namely, that the consequences are
dynamic and that they are complex. And that's quite timely,
since these are issues we address next.
1.2.2. Why a System Dynamics Model:
"System Dynamics is the application of feedback control
systems principles ,and techniques to managerial,
organizational, and socioeconomic problems" (Roberts, 1981).
The System Dynamics philosophy is based on several
premises ((Forrester, 1961), and (Roberts, 1981)):
1. The behavior (or time history) of an organizational
entity is principally caused by its structure. The
structure includes, not only the physical aspects, but
more importantly the policies and procedures, both
tangible and intangible, that dominate decision-making
in the organizational entity.
2. Managerial decision-making takes place in a
framework that belongs to the general class known as
information-feedback systems.
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3. Our intuitive judgement is unreliable about how
these systems will change with time, even when we have
good knowledge of the individual parts of the system.
4. Model experimentation is now possible to fill the
gap where our judgement and knowledge are weakest --- by
showing the way in which the known separate system parts
can interact to produce unexpected and troublesome
over-all system results.
Based on these philosophical beliefs, two principal
foundations for operationalizing the system Dynamics
technique were established. These are:
1. The use of information-feedback systems to model and
understand system structure (Premises 1 and 2).
2. The use of computer simulation to understand system
behavior (Premises 3 and 4).
In the remaining part of this section we would like to
discuss these two important concepts in more detail, e.g.,
find out what they mean and why they are useful?
(a) The use of information feedback systems:
"Feedback," is the process in which an action taken by a
26
person or thing will eventually affect that person or thing.
A feedback loop is a closed sequence of causes and effects, a
closed path of action and information. Feedback loops divide
naturally into two categories which are labelled
deviation-amplifying feedback (DAF) or positive loops, and
deviation-counteracting feedback (DCF) or negative loops. An
interconnected set of feedback loops is a feedback system
(Richardson and Pugh, 1981).
The first year of exploration (in System Dynamics)
pointed toward the concepts of feedback systems as being
much more general, more significant, and more applicable
to social systems than had been commonly realized ...
Feedback processes emerged as universal in social
systems and seemed to hold the key to structuring and
clarifying relationships that had remained baffling and
contradictory ( Forrester, 1968).
The significance and applicability of the feedback
systems concept to managerial systems has, since then, been
further substantiated by a large number of studies in the
System Dynamics field. (See for example Roberts, 1981). But
what, perhaps, is more interesting is to see "endorsements"
of the concept from outside the System Dynamics community.
For example:
The cause-effect relationships that exist in
organizations are dense and often circular. Sometimes
these causal circuits cancel the influences of one
variable on another, and sometimes they amplify the
effects of one variable on another. It is the network
of causal relationships that impose many of the controls
in organizations and that stabilize or disrupt the
organization. It is the patterns of these causal links
that account for much of what happens in organizations.
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Though not directly visible, these causal patterns
account for more of what happens in organizations than
do some of the more visible elements such as machinery,
timeclocks, ... (Weick, 1979).
Embracement of the feedback concept can even by
"spotted" in the software engineering literature. For
example:
Discussion and research into the framework of software
development and support, by dividing such efforts into
phases of work, has overemphasized.the discrete nature
of that work. Indeed such project life cycles can be
viewed, at least after the fact, as having been composed
of such segments. However, the dynamics essence, the
behavior over time, of the process is distorted. The
emphasis is upon discrete sets of activities separated
in time and lacking any base of underlying common
elements to bind them. From this it is clear, that the
fundamental systems nature of the process is ignored.
The ever-present and controlling feedback between
action, results, information, and new action is
overlooked by such an approach (Mercer, 1982).
Feedback processes in software development were also
discussed by Belady and Lehman (-in Wegner, 1980), (lehman,
1978), (Putnam, 1980), and (Zelkowitz et al., 1979).
A point which is important in particular to the
application of deviation-amplifying feedback (DAF) to
management, concerns the distinction between (1) the initial
event (from outside a loop) which starts the deviation
amplifying process in motion, and (2) the dynamics of the
feedback process which perpetuates it. While the initial
event is important in determining the direction of the
subsequent deviation amplification, the feedback process is
more important to an understanding of the system (Ashton,
1976). The initial event sets in motion a cumulative process
which can have final effects quite out of proportion to the
magnitude of the original push. The push might even be
withdrawn after a time, and still a permanent change will
remain or even the process of change will continue without a
new balance in sight. A further problem is that, after some
period of time has elasped, it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to discover the initial event. An interesting
example of this has been provided by Wender (1968):
... a fat and pimply adolescent may withdraw in
embarrassement and fail to acquire social skills; in
adulthood, acne and obesity may have disappeared but low
self-esteem, withdrawal, and social ineptitude may
remain. Social withdrawal and low self esteem are apt
to stay fixed because the DAF chain now operates:
social ineptitude leads to rejection, which leads to
lowered self-esteem, greater withdrawal, less social
experience, and greater ineptitude. What has initiated
the problem is no longer sustaining it. A knowledge of
the problem's origin would not be expected to alter the
currently operative loop unless such insight served to
motivate behavioral change ...
Finding the initial event (acne and obesity) may have
less. usefulness than understanding the current
sustaining feedback mechanism. Furthermore, in some
instances the initial event may have left no traces of
its existance and may be undiscovered.
It is no wonder, then, that "most managers get into
trouble because they forget to think in circles. I mean this
literally. Managerial problems persist because managers
continue to believe that there are such things as unilateral
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causation, independent and dependent variables, origins, and
terminations" (Weick, 1979).
(b) The use of computer simulation:
So far, we have argued for an integrative model of
software development, which in addition captures its
information feedback systems. To stop here is not enough.
We need a tool for handling the high complexity of such a
model. There are two sources of high complexity; and
computer simulation can be an effective tool to handle both:
First,
Managerial systems contain as many as 100 or more
variables that are known to be relevant and believed to
be related to one another in various nonlinear fashions.
The behavior of such a system is complex far beyond the
capacity of intuition. Computer simulation is one of
the most effective means available for supplementing and
correcting human intuition (Roberts, 1981).
And second,
The behavior of systems of interconnected feedback loops
often confounds common intuition and analysis, even
though the dynamic implications of isolated loops may be
reasonably obvious. The feedback structures of real
problems are often so complex that the behavior they
generate over time can usually be traced only by
simulation (Richardson and Pugh, 1981).
Simulation's particular advantage is its greater
fidelity in modeling processes, making possible both more
complex models and models of more complex systems. It also
allows for vicarious experimentation.
Using the simulation model as an experimentation
vehicle, should be particularly welcomed by the software
engineering community. Several authors have "complained"
about the lack of tested "ideas" in the software engineering
field (Thayer, 1979), (Weinwurm, 1970). For example Weiss
(1979) commented:
... in software engineering it is remarkably easy
to propose hypotheses and remarkably difficult to test
them. Accordingly, it is useful to seek methods for
testing software engineering hypotheses.
Unfortunately, controlled experiments in the area of
software development tend to be costly and time consuming
(Myers, 1978). Furthermore, those who try it often find that
" ... the isolation of the effect and the evaluation of
impact of any given practice within a large, complex and
dynamic project environment can be exceeding2y difficult"
(Glass, 1982).
In addition to permitting less-costly and less-time
consuming experimentation, simulation models make "perfectly"
controlled experiments possible. Which, as the following
quotation shows, addresses the difficulty expressed by Glass
above:
The effects of different assumptions and environmental
factors can be tested. In the model system, unlike real
systems, the effect of changing one factor can be
observed while all other factors are held unchanged.
Such experimentation will yield new insights into the
characteristics of the system that the model represents.
By using a model of a complex system, more can be
learned about internal interactions than would ever be
possible through manipulation of the real system.
Internally, the model provides complete control of the
system organizational structure, its policies, and its
sensitivities to various events. Externally, a wider
range of circumstances can be generated than are apt to
be observable in real life (Forrester, 1961).
Finally, the very process of constructing the simulation
can be useful in several ways (Schultz and Sullivan, 1972):
1. Confrontation --- vague generalizations crumble when
put to the test of modeling.
2. Explication --- assumptions must be made explicit,
logical, and precise in order to build a simulation
model.
3. Expansion --- the tendency to a holistic approach in
simulation forces a broadening of one's horizon, a
looking into other relevant fields for ideas.
4. Communication --- problem-oriented simulation lead
to jumping of disciplinary boundaries, less
parochialism. And,
5. Involvement --- it can be fun, the construction
process motivates the modeler to attempt to fill in the
knowledge gaps.
1.3. Research Accomplishments:
As mentioned in Section 1.2., the objective of this
research effort is to enhance our understanding of, and gain
insight into, the general process by which software
development is managed. To achieve this objective we
accomplished the following three tasks:
1. Developed an integrative system dynamics model of
software development project management.
2. Conducted a case-study to test the model.
3. Used the model as an experimental vehicle to
study/predict the dynamic implications of an array of
managerial policies and procedures.
In the remaining part of this section, we will elaborate
further on the above three research accomplishments.
Model Development:
The development of the integrative system dynamics model
of software development project management constitutes the
following set of accomplishments:
1. The mathematical formulation of a system dynamics
model forces explication, i.e., structural relationships
between variables must be explicitly and precisely
defined. As such, the model sets the foundation for the
development of a theory of software project management.
Paraphrasing Dubin (1971):
A theory is the attempt of a man to model some
aspects of the empirical worLd ... A theory tries
to make sense out of the observable world by
ordering the relationships among 'things' that
constitute the theorist's focus of attention in the
world 'out there' ... The process of putting
things or units together in lawful relation to each
other establishes the fundamental building blocks
out of which a theory is constructed.
2. The model complements and builds upon current
research efforts, which tend to focus on the micro
components (e.g., project management, programming,
testing, productivity, ... etc.), by integrating our
knowledge of these micro components into an integrated
continuous view of the software development process,
allowing us to identify and capture a richer set of
interactions and interdepencies between the variables of
software project management.
3. The model identifies feedback mechanisms, and uses
them to structure and clarify relationships in software
project management. While the significance and
applicability of the feedback systems concept to the
study of managerial systems has been substantiated in a
large number of studies outside software engineering, it
still remains largely foreign to the software
engineering project management community. We,
therefore, view our work as having an "educational"
value to the software engineering.community.
4. The high degree of explication required in the model
helped us ferret out "knowledge gaps" in the literature.
And a set of 27 interviews with software development
managers in 5 organizations helped us fill these
knowledge gaps. The model, therefore, incorporates new
findings about the management of software project
management (e.g., on manpower acquisition policies under
different scheduling considerations).
Case Study:
The model was developed on the basis of both an
extensive review of the literature and information
gathered through a set of 27 interviews in 5
organizations involved in the production of software.
After the model was developed, we then conducted a
case-study in a sixth organization to test the model.
The model was highly accurate in replicating the actual
development history of the software project selected (by
the organization) for the case study. Project variables
tested included: the workforce level, the schedule, and
the cost.
Experimentation
If "understanding" is the intellectual outcome of a
theoretical model, then "prediction" is its practical
outcome (Dubin, 1971). The model was used as an
experimental vehicle to study/predict the dynamic
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implications of an array of managerial policies and
procedures. Four areas were studied: (1) scheduling;
(2) Quality Assurance; (3) control; and (4) staffing.
The exercise produced three kinds of results: (1)
uncovered dysfunctional consequences of some currently
adopted policies (e.g., in the scheduling area); (2)
provided guidelines for managerial policy (e.g., on the
allocation of quality assurance effort); and (3)
provided new insights into software project phenomena
(e.g., "90 % syndrome").
1.4. Thesis Outline:
Each chapter of this thesis may be considered in
terms of its relationship to the model, which is the
focus of the study.
Chapters (I) and (II) serve as a background and an
introduction. In Chapter (I), we discussed the problems
and challenges of software development project
management. We also argued for the integrated System
Dynamics modeling approach, as a vehicle to address
those problems and challenges.
In Chapter (II), we conduct a survey of the
literature. The presentation is conveniently broken
into two sections. First, we survey the System Dynamics
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literature that addresses the general area of project
management. This is a particularly appropriate starting
point, since it is this research track that provided the
first stimulant to our work. The second part of the
chapter, is a survey of the software engineering
literature to see what has been proposed /done to
understand and solve the problems of software project
management.
Chapter (III) is on model development. In it we
discuss in detail the development, structure, and
equation formulation of the model. The model has four
sectors. At the heart of the model is the software
production sector, where software production activities
such as coding and testing are modeled. The project
management activities comprise the remaining three
sectors: planninag, human resource management, and
control.
In Chapter (IV) we discuss the results of a case
study conducted to test the model's ability to replicate
the development history of a completed software
development project. Project variables tracked
included: the workforce level, the schedule, and the
cost.
In Chapter (V), the model is used as an
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experimentation vehicle to study/predict the dynamic
implications of an array of managerial policies and
procedures. Four areas are studied: (1) scheduling;
(2) control; (3) Quality Assurance; and (4) staffing.
Finally, Chapter (VI) concludes the thesis with a
summary of findings and suggestions for further
research.
II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
In this chapter two bodies of literature relevant to our
research are reviewed. The first is the System Dynamics
literature that addresses the general area of project
management. This is a particularly approriate starting
point, since it is this research track that provided the
first stimulant to our work. In the second part of the
chapter, we review the software engineering literature in the
area of software development project management. Thus, while
in the first section we look at research works that share
with us our basic research approach, in the second section we
turn our attention to those'that share with us our research
objective (i.e., the understanding of the software
development process).
II.1. System Dynamics Modeling of Project Management:
Professor Edwards B. Roberts,.of MIT's Sloan School Of
Management, has been the pioneer of this research effort, as
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well as continuing to be its major driving force. His
doctoral dissertation on "The Dynamics of Research and
Development," in 1962 (which was also published as a book)
was the first scholarly effort to apply the then young System
Dynamics methodology to the project management area (within
an R&D environment). It still continues to be the most
comprehensive treatment of the subject. Since then, and
primarily in his capacity as a thesis advisor, he continues
to play an active "guiding" role in the field's advancement.
And which, as a result, continued to focus on the study of
R&D type projects. Roberts' thesis work together with that
of his MIT students, constitute the bulk of this body of
research.
It might be interesting to make a brief digression here
and explain how and why this body of research, lying at the
overlap between the System Dynamics and the Management of R&D
literatures, first attracted our attention and interest. It
was (surprisingly) while we were surveying the latter and not
the former. At the time, feeling frustrated by the lack of
innovative activity in the area of software management, we
decided to look into other more established fields for new
ideas. The management of R&D was the obvious first choice.
And for good reason. It is the area we found to be most
often likened, in the software engineering literature, to
software production. For example, paraphrasing Gehring and
Pooch (1977):
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The stages of research and development are similar in
many respects to the stages of software analysis and
design. First, the determination of what the system is
to do (specification of outputs and inputs) is very
ill-defined, making the estimation of the time and cost
of its development uncertain (like the research stage).
Second, the specification of how inputs (file
specification, programmning) is easier to estimate (like
the development state). These similarities suggest that
a good many managerial practices and procedures from the
latter may be applied to the former.
The similarity in project cost estimation, between the
two fields, was also suggested by Wolverton, in his highly
referenced 1974 paper, when he wrote: "The general
principles involved in pricing large R&D efforts of any kind
apply to large software development as well."
Also, it is interesting to note, that Putnam's
celebrated SLIM model for software cost estimation (Putnam,
1980) is based on the R&D work of Peter Norden. Norden had
showed that R&D projects have a well defined manpower pattern
of the Rayleigh form (Norden, 1963) . When Putnam "adapted"
Norden's findings (on R&D projects) to the software
environment, he found that, here too, manpower application
follows the same Rayleigh pattern.
So, with great enthusiasm and anticipation we embarked
on a survey of the R&D literature. And read Roberts'
doctoral thesis. End of digression.
While perhaps interesting as a historical perspective on
our research effort, the above digression serves an
additional purpose. For, it suggests that our stated
argument for the relevance of the System Dynamics modeling
work of R&D project management to our own, namely, their
sharing of the same research methodology and approach, is
really a conservative one. The two areas have, in fact, much
more in common. And with this in mind, we now resume our
review of the literature.
As stated above, Roberts' System Dynamics model of R&D
project management, -continues to be the most comprehensive
work published in the area. The model traces the full life
cycle of a single R&D project. And it incorporates the
interactions between the R&D product, the firm, the customer,
and the processes relating to the nature of the work itself.
Figure II.1. (from Robert's thesis) is an overview of the
model's sectors, and the interrelationships among them.
Rather than delve into a detailed discussion of Roberts'
R&D model, we will limit out discussion of his work to those
aspects of the model which we found particularly relevant to
the study of software project management. Specifically, we
will present some of his models' conceptual building-blocks
(i.e., his assumptions/ findings about R&D projects). And to
underscore the correspondance to the software production
environment, we will append the presentation with "excerpts"
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from the software engineering literature.
On project Planning
Roberts:
No unerring formula can be used to estimate the total
number of man-years required to carry out a given (R&D)
project. This kind of general statement reflects the
inherent nature of research and development: The exact
character of a specific task is indefinite, (and) the
specific technical requirements are uncertain ...
The Software Engineering Literature:
* ... quantitative software engineering has not
progressed to the point that we can even begin to
provide (software sizing) formulas. And it is not clear
that we will ever get very close to such an ideal
(Boehm, 1981).
* We lack the means " ... to provide clear, concise,
and unambiguous statements of user requirements ... The
problem here again has to do with the "absence" of a
clear understanding on the part of both software users
and developers as to what can be accomplished with
software" (DeRose and Nyman, 1979).
* The production of software is not a deterministic
activity. Product specifications are liable to be
shifted (Trichritzis, 1977).
Roberts:
Two factors significantly influence the initial estimate
of the job size: (1) the firm's previous experience;
and (2) the general over-all tendency to underestimate
the job size.
The Software Engineering Literature:
* ... when methods of estimating are ranked, the list
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is headed by the Experience Method ... This approach
takes advantage of experience on a similar job ... The
major problem in the method is that it does not work on
systems larger than the base used for comparison.
System complexity grows as the square of the number of
system elements; therefore, experience with a small
system cannot account for all the things that will have
to be done in a large system. Neither will the
Experience Method apply to systems of totally different
content" (Aron, 1976).
* The software undersizing problem is our most critical
road block to accurate software cost estimation ..
there are no magic formulas that we can use to overcome
the software undersizing problem. In the absence of any
such formula, it is important to understand the major
sources of the software undersizing problem ... A major
(reason) is a strong tendency to underestimate the size
of support software (e.g, compilers, tools, utilities),
which for large operational systems is generally three
to five times as large as the operational software
(Boehm, 1981).
On the Management of the Human Resource:
Roberts:
* Whatever the know-how developed in solving the R&D
project problems, some time is required for it to be
adequately, absorbed. Then, as the experiences
accumulate, the firms' engineers supplement their
nonproject skills with these new, more specific insights
and approaches to the task.
The Software Engineering Literature:
* Programmers become more effective during larger
programming operations because of "learning." The
programmer gains familiarity with program logic, coding
notation, testing restrictions, and other requirements
as he progresses through each major activity in the
programming methods (Shell, 1972).
Roberts:
* Above a certain level, the assignment of additional
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personnel to a large project may not only reduce total
time proportionality, but in fact may increase total
time to accomplishment.
The Software Engineering Literature:
* Increasing the size of a software team increases the
amount of software produced per unit time, up to a
point. Then the problems of communication among the
programmers begin to dominate the project and reduce the
amount of software being produced (Boebert, 1979)
And finally, on the Control of Progress:
Roberts:
(Control) problems ... result from lack of tangible,
precise measurement in R&D ..."
The Software Engineering Literature:
* Abstraction, or intangibility, is a management
challenge for such rudiments as recognizing process,
exhibiting results, and communicating between packets of
work. And compounding this is lack of hardware-like
measures ... " (Sampson).
* It is difficult to measure performance in programming
... (And) it is difficult to evaluate the status of
intermediate work such as undebugged programs or design
specifications and their potential value to the
completed project (Mills, 1983).
Roberts:
* One particular difficulty is that, during the very
early phases of a project, milestones have a tendency to
be less precisely definable, and hence less accuratily
measurable, than during later phases of the project ...
The shortcomings of the concept, "percent complete,"
were sufficiently great to negate its value. While
projects tended to make rapid progress towards
completion when work first began, it took an
inordinately long time to get from 90 percent to 100
percent.
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The Software Engineering Literature:
* In the early stages of a project, it is difficult to
distinguish between 5% completion and 10% completion,
yet the resultant projection can vary 100% based on
which number is chosen (Donelson, 1976).
* One frequent difficulty stems from an over-reliance on
individual percent-complete estimates as indicators of
project progress (Boehm, 1981).
* (This) method of estimating progress typically leads
to estimates of the fraction of work completed which
increase as originally planned until a level of about
80-90% is reached. The programmers' individual
estimates then increase only very slowly until the task
is actually completed (Baber, 1982).
It is clear from the above presentation that some of the
problems that Roberts' model was built to address do resemble
some of those we are struggling with today in the software
engineering area. It is no wonder then, that we felt (and
did find) that the approach he effectively used i.e., Systems
Dynamics Modeling, to be an effective tool for addressing the
problems of software development project management.
As we mentioned in the beginning of this discussion,
Roberts' thesis was to become the foundation for further
System Dynamics studies of the R&D project management area.
One obvious extension was to study multi-project
environments. In such an environment project competition for
company resources becomes a significant dimension. Two such
multi-project models are those of Nay (1965) (a four-project
model) and Kelly (1970) (a two-project model). In both
models the focus remained, as was in Roberts, on project life
cycle behavior. Edelman's (1975) work, however, is a
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departure from that. While building on Nay's model, he chose
to focus, instead, on the allocation and utilization of
manpower resources and the effects of the management systei
design on effectiveness.
Richardson (1982) took still a different tack. Rather
than focusing on a project, he focussed, instead, on the
development group. His model, therefore, does not trace the
life cycle(s) of one or more projects; rather, it reproduces
the dynamics of a development group over an eight year period
as a continuous stream of products are developed and placed
into production. The model focuses on the number of products
under development, the use of resources required, and the
aggregate average product development time.
Finally, several more recent models are emphasizing the
role of rework in project management. Rework can be caused
by errors committed in the earlier phases of a project (e.g.,
design errors of a VLSI circuitry) that escape detection
until later in the projects' life cycle. Of course, the
longer an error goes undetected, the more extensive the
necessary rework and the greater the cost. Changing design
specifications after development begins, also generates the
need for rework. Cooper (1980), describes a large system
dynamics study of cost overruns in a shipbuilding contract.
The study showed that the rework required by frequent design
changes imposed by the Navy were the major contributing
factor to a $500 million dollars overrun. Undiscovered
rework is also the focus of the simple R&D project models in
Roberts (1981b) and (Richardson and Pugh, 1981).
11.2. Software Engineering Project Management Literature
Review:
As we stated in chapter (I), the focus of this research
is on software development project management, and our
objective is to improve our understanding of it. In this
section we review the software engineering literature on
project management, to assess the current
"state-of-understanding," and the means/tools used to achieve
it.
We will begin by reviewing overview-type models and
frameworks. This will then be followed by separate
discussions on software project planning, human resource
management, and 'control i.e., the three project management
subsystems that together constitute the project management
activities in our model (as will be explained in chapter
III).
11.2.1. Overview Models and Frameworks:
Richard Thayer's 1979 Ph.D dissertation at the
University of California at Santa Barbara on "Modeling a
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Software Engineering Project Management System," is a fitting
starting point for this discussion. For one, it probably was
indeed ... "the first attempt to completely model a
software engineering project management system" (Thayer,
1979). But, perhaps more important, if we judge from the
number of publications it generated (one in IEEE Transaction
on Software Engineering (Thayer et al, 1981), two in Computer
(Thayer et al, 1980) and (Thayer et al, 1982), plus several
conference papers), the thesis' results did have a
significant impact on the software engineering community.
Thayer's research goal was twofold: (1) to develop and
verify "a generalized descriptive management model of a
software engineering project management system," and (2) to
"identify and verify the major issues of software engineering
project management."
To develop his model, he first identified the various
functions, actions, procedures, and tools used, or proposed
for use, in managing a software engineering project. This
was done on the basis of a literature survey as well as his
own personal experience. He then superimposed these
functions, actions, procedures, and tools on the "classic
management model," i.e., that breaks the management activity
into the five functions of planning, organizing, staffing,
directing, and controlling.
The "skeleton" of his model is shown in Figure (II.2).
Each of the shown eight model sections, i.e., "Project
Identification," "Requirements and Constraints," "Planning,"
... etc., was then expanded further. For example, his
"detailed planning Section" is shown in Figure (II.3.a),
together with the set of assumptions he used to formulate it
(in Figure (II.3.b).
As we mentioned above, in addition to developing the
model, Thayer had a second objective, namely, to "identify
and verify the major issues of software engineering project
management." And, it is interesting to note, that even
though Thayer considered the development of the model to be
the most important contribution of his work, it was his
findings here that has, in fact, generated all his above
mentioned publications.
To identify the major issues of software engineering
project management, his first step was to review the
literature for software engineering problems. Then, by using
the software engineering delivery and success model shown in
Figure (II.4) he hypothesized which of these problems can
most affect the success of software delivery. These, he
believed were the major issues.
The issues were then reworded as problems as seen by the
project manager, and classified on the basis of the "classic"
Ovcrvirt. WtNv1 of a Sortwarr iginecriat;lb
Plrcjcct Jt1-i.ageit-nL Syr.Lvam
CENI.'dAL :1*%NilM\:1ýA(';:TAINSOFTWARE I:NCGINU;ERIll NG
No IN .)i)KL lb) PIROJEC1T I.nAC ~T A.,:
IRODUCTION J2C)J)L
Projj-rt livat iica Li o-tiPrograma, lt lentification
Hiardware Identifica±tiarn
Custonmcr Jd.-tiLific.Iticn
ContraCt J dcktiticatic'n
Cost & Schf-dult, ckritificationr
Softv:art: ]d.'zatific~tion
Conalu1XiLy Idclenti i icat ion
Data I-ar3e Idt-zitific.-ttivi
StOrf j!'V
Ri rac.iz'/Tiitt:.
Coant roll i 
Deliverics J& Successes
Dorim.,rut Requirtm oo-nts~
Cm.oiLeomer Cona!Lra ia.ts
P'lanning and Scht-ddia izg
Quality A!;surance Pro7r?.aj
Preccr:eartizait ao Iula.LimLOn
P'rojectL ?IJ:a:ac;.!enL Orga.nizat: i on
Soft Lvwre ngineariat- Proj harn
Project Ifarzdgrr Staffing
Sof. ware I)evd1 ocp:acnt St.z:ff
Stafr Support
Training
Rcsponsi1i1ity ;azd AIutI:ority
Ilatmne. -itnL chTiecjique
Assignmziecnt of Work
Project Control
Ikeporting.
1Foram. i Reviews
Configuration :anafoenerit
Infonnal Reviews and Walk-
tiarougihs
Schcdule
Co-:t
MIeets Requirements
tirc-Ls lclialility StanJdrds
Nctas Mlaintainabi li Sty an.Oarth
NIects Us-ability SLandasrd.,
Figure 11.2
Cvus no, s
52
Planninjg flod.l
FLOCTIO:NS 161,17i
PROJCCT INAN!;AME'N'.T ACTIVITILS
Aria vz 1*tlt IP 1 ui redLer' t
Le Obj'i'.LvC'I
ForecasL
Set Procedures
Dev_-l " •trL P. i -s
ELrip D ol. I ~ic
Budgect and Al locate
PResour'es
Analyze inpujts arkd oitl it ,icrjruirc-
icnts, functions o ! 0a;systcm, and,
dvl iverabclvs.
Dcternizsr hardr!we and syslivn s !ft-
ware rvi..rictic,:,:,
Dctercriiw; uscr id-intieiCatiori and
type ecintract.
DCeLr·ziir. (, i'.i, Ca.n.xI ty, and uncr
or t:.paw.v constraitiL.
Drierr-iric andn e_%.tllish, sticces- cri-
teria.
Deicrmi.:e aLtri~'::ts ci dor ]ivL'rcel
sofLwzre: rclia ble-, airstajn.,lsle,
USeabliv, etc.
Doettrvria -A n eo t .n'i .n sccdu* to dr-
liver sceftware.
Select ;'3r in' and projOCe coistrol
tools and tceliniques.
Develop quality asn.uranc plan.
Select desi~rn, programning, and
testing tio , tchclnique, and isit-Li-
ods.
Same
Detcrmine priority and milestones
for events.
Budoct, locate ard scecure rcsotirces:
funds, rrograminer/arialyst, conmputecr
tirie, cir.
Figure I.3 a
_·__ __
_ C ____L
:I i`
'''
A separate organization from the development organization
would perform the planning and scheduling (this is also
an element of the organizing model)
Planning would be accomplished through the use of formal
planning guides, methods, and tools
The plan, no matter how well. accomplished by the planning
group, would be modified by either the senior manager or
the customer
Planning documentation would be prepared
The planning function would be a formal function with
time allocated for planning
Modular planning design and delivery techniques would be
used on the software development project
The planning function would include a software quality
assurance program
Each project would use some of the tools, techniques and
procedures known as "modern progranming techniques"
Software development tools, techniques and aids would be
used on the software development project
Software test tools, techniques, and methods would be used
in the software development project,
Figure II.3b
Software Development Delivery and Success Model
o Deliveries:
- Software
- Documentation
o Success Attributes:
- On time
- Within resources
- Meets requirements
- Useable
- Reliable
- Maintainable
Figure 11.4
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management model of planning, organizing, staffing,
directing, and controlling. He found that "By far, the two
dominant (problematic) activities are planning and
controlling, which together (accounted) for 80 % of the
issues, with planning alone involving ten isues." The 20
issues he identified are shown in Figure (11.5).
To verify his hypothesized issues he did two things.
First he conducted "an opinion survey with a selected sub-set
of the computer community." This included: "technical
leaders in computer science," "software engineering authors,"
"project managers," "R&D personnel," and "software
engineering educators." (Two hundred and ninety four replies
were received.) The surveyees were asked to comment on
whether or not they felt each of the hypothesized problems
was a critical problem, an important problem, not important,
not a problem at all, or lastly, disagree with the hypothesis
completely and by the way it was stated. The surveyees were,
in addition, asked to state how they would (or did) solve the
problem.
The 13 starred (*) issues in Figure (11.5) were the ones
verified on the basis of this survey, (Verification meant
that at least 70% of the respondents felt that the issue was
either "critical" or "important".)
(Note: Most of his surveyees either came from large
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Twenty hypothesized problems in SEPM
Planning
f4t + 1. Requirements: Requirement specifications are
frequently incomplete, ambiguous, inconsistent,
andlor unmeasurable.
* 2. Success: Success criteria for a software
development are frequently inappropriate, which
result in "poor-quality" delivered software; i.e., not
maintainable, unreliable, difficult to use, relatively un-
documented, etc.
*+i 3. Project: Planning for software engineering proj-
ects is generally poor.
+*C 4. Cost: The ability to estimate accurately the
resources required to accomplish a software develop-
ment is poor.
*+4 5. Schedule: The ability to estimate accurately the
delivery time on a software development is poor.
*+6. Design: Decision rules for use in selecting the
correct software design techniques, equipment, and
aids to be used in designing software in a software
engineering project are not available.
* 7. Test: Decision rules for use in selecting the cor-
rect procedures, strategies, and tools to be used in
testing software developed in a software engineering
project are not available.
8. Maintainability: Procedures, techniques. and
strategies for designing maintainable software are not
available.
A. 9. Warranty: Methods to guarantee or warranty
that the delivered software will "work" for the user are
not available.
4. 10. Control: Procedures, methods, and techniques
for designing a project control system that will enable
project managers to successfully control their project
are not readily available.
Organizing
11. Type: Decision rules for selecting the proper
organizational structure; e.g., project, matrix, func-
tion, are not available.
* 12. Accountability: The accountability structure in
many software engineering projects is poor, leaving
some question as to who is responsible for various
project functions.
Staffing
4 13. Project manager: Procedures and techniques
for the selection of project managers are poor.
Directing
14. Techniques: Decision rules for use in selecting
the correct management techniques for software
engineering project management are not available.
Controlling
I,15. Visibility: Procedures, techniques, strategies,
and aids that will provide visibility of progress (not just
resources used) to the project manager are not
available.
*. 16. Reliability: Measurements or indexes of
reliability that can be used as an element of software
design are not available and there is no way to predict
software failure; i.e., there is no practical way to show
the delivered software meets a given reliability criteria.
* 17. Maintainability: Measurements or -indexes of
maintainability that can be used as an element of soft-
ware design are not available; i.e., there is no practical
way to show that a given program is more maintainable
than another.
18. Goodness: Measurements or indexes of
"goodness" of code that can be used as an element of
software design are not available; i.e., there is no prac-
tical way to show that one program is better than
another.
1• 19. Programmers: Standards and techniques for
measuring the quality of performance and the quantity
of production expected from programmers and data
processing analysts are not available.
20. Tracing: Techniques and aids that provide an ac-
ceptable means of tracing a software development
from requirements to completed code are not general-
ly available.
Figure 11.5
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companies or obtained their knowledge from data processing in
large companies. Therefore, it can be assumed that the
viewpoint as to whether or not a given problem was critical,
important, or not important at all, was the viewpoint of the
large DP shop.)
The second verification step was through a second
separate survey of 60 software development projects in the
aerospace industry. And he checked for whether "the
condition described in the major issue existed, and (that)
the existence of the condition was a problem to the project
manager ... If the data substantiates (this) the
hypothesized issue is labelled a problem."
Nine of the 20 major issues (marked with + in Figure
(11.5)) were verified as problems, two were inconclusive, and
nine were not problems. As a result, six major issues
concerning planning and one concerning controlling were
judged conclusively as problems by both surveys.
Thayer noted with interest, though, that "there is some
disagreement between the general data processing community
and the project managers and developers." Which prompted him
to comment: "The fact that these two groups do not, in
general, agree on the major issues is in itself a fundamental
problem of project management."
In addition:
Similar to the-problem in identifying the major issues,
the computing community is divided on the solutions to
the major problems. there are no well defined software
management techniques to guarantee a successful software
delivery.
Finally, we conclude our discussion of Thayer's work
with some of his own concluding remarks:
Future research should continue to "refine" this model
... This model, as a first attempt, has many ommissions
and frequent generalizations. Similar research
projects, using a different approach, could fine-tune
this model and find more elements with a full range of
values for each element.
This research identified a number of major issues of
software engineering project management and proposed a
number of solutions. What is needed is a good
definitized experimentation method that can be used as a
test bed for validating new project management tools,
techniques, and procedures, ... etc.
There is still a long way to go, this is only the
beginning.
In another doctoral thesis, Riehl (1977) developed a
"planning and control framework to assist in the management
of computer-based information systems development in large
organizations." The general scope of the research
encompassed two basic avenues of endeavor: (1) an extensive
literature survey to compile "those concepts and practices
that are advanced by authorities in the field of
computer-based information systems and electronic data
processing management," and (2) a determination of those
policies and procedures actually employed in practice by
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companies "judged to be effective managers of computer-based
information systems."
His model, termed the "Composite-Working Model,"
consisted of some 25 "principles " and 50 "issues."
Principles are those "specific concepts, policies, and
procedures upon which general agreement was found to exist in
the literature and in the observed practices of the (5)
companies investigated." Issues, on the other hand,
"identify those proposed practicies about which
disagreement or uncertainty exists within the literature or
which are the subject of clear divergences between the
concepts advanced. in the literature and the majority
practices of the firms in the research." The principles and
issues were classified into 4 categories: strategic
planning, project planning, project control, and
organizational behavior considerations.
For purposes of reference, a summary of the major
categories of the Composite-Working Model is presented in
Figure (II.6). As an illustration, consider the "Consensus
Principle V (PP): Project Plan," within the "project
planning " category. It was included because "the importance
of a project plan is widely recognized in the source
literature ... (and) the research findings supported the
principle." Furthermore, "A single issue was generated
60
concerning the degree of detail that should be included in
the project plan. Brandon, for example, proposes a very
comprehensive scheme based on an automated system. Other
writers generally provide considerably fewer details on the
subject." A similar disagreement was observed between the
companies studied.
In his conclusion, Reihl asserts that he has met his
research goal, namely, to develop "a planning and control
framework to assist in the management of computer-based
information systems development in large organization, by
identifying those practices and procedures which are both
advocated in the literature as well as used by (selected)
large business organizations with a reputation for effective
computer-based information systems management."
Instead of focusing, as the above two pieces of research
did, on the set of issues that are common among software
development projects generally, McFarlan's (1974) research
focus was on the differences between projects. "One
conclusion from my research stands out," he wrote, and that
was:
A monolithic approach to systems and programming project
managment is unlikely to produce the most satisfactory
results. There are critical differences in project
composition ... which influence the mix of tools that
should be brought on its management.
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SUC.IARY OF THE CO;.'POSIT.E-IORKI:.G :.ODEL
Stratecic Planninr
Consensus Principle I(SP): Master Systems Planning
Issue A: Structure for Planning
Issue B: Type of Planning
Consensus Principle II(SP): .Management Involvement
Issue A: Top Mianagement Involvement
Issue B: User-:Manacement Involvement
Issue C: Chief Executive Officer involvement
Consensus Principle III(SP): Master Systems Plan
Issue A: Planning Details
Consensus Principle IV(SP): Planning Coordination
Issue A: Planning Integration
Consensus Principle V(SP): Provision for Change
Issue A: :eans for Achieving Change
Project Pianning
Consensus Principle I(PP': System Development Life Cycle
Issue A: Description of the System Development
Life Cycle
Consensus Principle II(PP): Feasibility Study and
Project Proposal
Issue A: Analysis of Alternative Designs
Issue B: Feasibility Study
Consensus Principle III(PP): Economic Analysis
Issue A: Treatment of Reliability
Issue B: Present Value Discounting
Issue C: Estimating Intangible Benefits
Issue D: Approval Criteria
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(Project Planning--Continued)
Cornensus Principle IV(PP): Project ;anagement
Issue A: Assignment of Project Manager
Issue B: Project-Status Audit
Issue C: Project Thresholds
Issue D: Project Establishment
Consensus Principle V(PP): Project Plan
Issue A: Project Plan Detail
Consensus Principle VI(PP): Project Control Reporting
Issue A: Reorted Information
Issue B: Manage.ent Review
Consensus Principle VI'I(P?): Estimation Process
Issue A: Estimating M.ethods
Issue B: Reliability of Estimates
Consensus Principle VIII(PP): Change Control
Issue A: Review of Changes
Issue B: Limiting Impact of Changes
Consensus Principle IX(PP): System Development Standards
Issue A: Form of Standards
Consensus Principle X(PP): Cost Allocat-ion
Issue A: Method of Cost Allocation
Issue B: Influence on User Behavior
Proiect Control
Consensus Principle I(PC): User-anagement Control
Issue A: Level of Manage.ent Control
Issue B: Key Check-Points
Issue C: Form of Check-Point Reviews
Consensus Principle II(PC): Information Requirements
Definition
Issue A: Methods of Requirements Identification
Issue B: Requirements Validation
Figure 11.6
(CONT,)
(Project Control-Continued)
Consensus Principle III(PC): Functional Specifications
Issue A: User Participation
Issue B: Conversion Plan
Consensus Principle IV(PC): Perfo..rmance Criteria
Issue A: Performance Criteria Specifications
Consensus Principle V(PC): Detailed Design Specifications
Issue A: User Participation
Consensus Principle VI(PC): System Implementation
Issue A: User Participation
Consensus Principle VII(PC): System Testing
Issue A: User-Management Involvement
Issue B: User Representative Participation
Consensus Principle VIII(?C): Conversion and Cut-Over
Issue A: Conversion Organization
Issue B: ,•nagement Control
Consensus Principle IX(PC): Post-Implementation Audit
Issue A: Conduct of Audit
Issue B: Documentation Audit
Orranizational Behavior Considerations
Consensus Principle I(BC): User Acceptance
Issue A: Intergroup Communications
Issue B: Personnel ,.anagement
Issue C: User-Management Involvement
Issue D: User Participation and Control of Change
Issue E: Awareness of User Attitudes
Figure 11.6
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He identified three "important" dimensions for
characterizing software development projects. These are:
(1) The degree of predetermined structure inherent in the
project (he defined a highly structured project to be "one
where the processing routines and outputs of the system are
so determined by the project's environment in advance that
there are little or no design options open to the system
architect or user"); (2) The degree of company-relative
computer technology implicit in the project (a high
"company-relative technology" project is defined as "one
which involves complex hardware-software features which have
not been dealt with previously in the organization"); And
(3) Project size in terms of man-years of effort or manpower
dollars of expenditures ( "In this context a $50,000 project
will be considered small while a $1 million project will be
considered large").
Figure (11.7) shows how, using these dimensions, a
project may be classified as falling into one of eight
different categories.
As stated above, McFarlan felt that a project's
classification should "influence the mix of tools that should
be brought on its management." To show how, he first
provided a scheme to divide project management tools into
four main groups. The four groups are: (1) Formal
integration procedures with users of the project's output,
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Classification of Systems and Programming Project Types
Degree of
Company-Rela.
tive
Technology
Degree of Structuredness
High
Low
High
I.
LARGE PROJECT
II.
SMALL PROJECT
II.
LARGE PROJECT
IV.
SMXALL PROJECT
Low
V.
LARGE PROJECT
VI.
SMALL PROJECT
VII.
LARGE PROJECT
VIII.
SMALL PROJECT
Figure !1.7
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who are located outside the EDP department (e.g., a formal
User-EDP project advisory committee); (2) Formal integration
procedures within the EDP design team and between the various
units of the EDP department (e.g., formal flow charts and
other documentation to highlight interfaces between key
systems components); (3) Formal planning tools (e.g., PERT
or CPM); and (4) Formal control tools (e.g., regular use of
formal post-audit procedures).
The final step was to put the two pieces together into
what he called a "contingency theory" of EDP systems and
programming project-management. The outcome is exhibited in
Figure (II.8).
At still a higher level of specifity are the research
efforts to delineate phase differences within the life of a.
single project. According to McKeen (1981):
The dominant organizing framework for application system
development is the life cycle concept. This methodology
apportions the total developmental effort into
identifiable stages --- each stage representing a
distinct activity characterized by a starting point, an
ending point, and deliverables in concert with an
express purpose.
The life cycle model was formally acknowledged as an
important element in systems development by its inclusion in
the information system curricular proposed by the ACM
Curriculum Committee on Computer Education for Management
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Project
TV~e
Iv
V
VI
VII
VIII
Project Description
High Structure, Low Tech., Large
High Structure, Low Tech., Small
High Structure, High Tech., Large
Hig;h Structure, High Tech., Small
Low Structure, Low Tech., Large
Low Structure, Low Tech., Small
Low Structure, High Tech., Large
Low Structure, High Tech., Small
External
Integ.
Low
Low
Low
Low
High
H:gh
High
High
Intemal
Integ. **
Medium
Low
High
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Formal
Planning
High
Medium
Medium
Low
Lowsh
Low
Formal
Control
High
High
Medium
Low
High
High
Low+
Low
* No attempt is made here to suggest how external integration may ;hift over time as the user becomes
more sophisticated through experience. My research suggests this ray te important.
This table h;hlights the importance of external integration in gettang user ,ommitmert to a project struc-
tLre. It does not explicitly address his important role in erJbling the EDP te:irrcea.s to adequately
understand the process to be automated. This appears to be important even in high:y structured situa-
lions. Thus even these projects which are ranked low in the above table in external ajrteration, may in-
volve considerable user liaison of the fact findirg sort.
Th:s does not ;centify the sharp split in the mix of the tools in internal in:terati;z, identified in the
text. Later work may split this ti.;o two categories.
Figure 11.8
(Ashenhurst, 1972). In recent years, many books and papers
on the life cycle concept have been published (e.g., (Boehm,
1981) (Gaffney, 1980) (Metzger, 1981) (Thomsett, 1980)
(Yourdon, 1982)).
According to Davis (1974), the foundation for the life
cycle concept is that application systems need to undergo a
similar process when they are conceived, developed and
implemented. Further, neglecting any portion of the life
cycle activities may have serious consequences for the end
result. The contribution of the life cycle concept to
systems development is described by Davis as follows:
Information system development involves considerable
creativity, the use of the life cycle is the means for
obtaining more disciplined creativity by giving
structure to a creative process. The life cycle is
important in planning, management, and control of
information system application development.
The steps or phases in the software development life
cycle are described differently by different authors, but the
differences are primarily in amount of detail and number of
categorizations. A common breakdown is given by Glass
(1979):
Requirements/Specifications
Design
Implementaion
Checkout
Maintenance
The mere enumeration of the phases is not, however, an
adequate model of the software life cycle because it
"conceals" the iterative nature of the software development
process (Artzer and Neidrauer, 1982) (A16). The life cycle
is not followed in 1,2,3 fashion, rather "the process is
iterative so that, for example, the review after the system
design phase may result in going back to the beginning to
prepare a new design" (Davis, 1974). Boehm's (1981)
"waterful" model, shown in Figure (II.9), emphasizes this
highly iterative nature of software development, indicated by
the feedback arrows from each phase to its predecessor(s).
In addition to the identification of the component
phases and activities in the software development process, it
is important to evaluate the relative consumption of
resources by each of these activities in order to obtain a
proper perspective of the nature of the overall process.
Numerous authors have presented figures indicating life cycle
resource consumption by phase. In Figure (II.10) a
comparison of three author's results done by McKeen (1981) is
exhibitted. Commenting on the figure, McKeen stated that:
Substantial differences do exist particularly in the
coding and testing phases of development. These
differences may be due to the inherent attributes of the
systems being developed, or to terminological
variations, or to a combination of both of these. In
the absence of a careful description of the systems and
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The waterfall model of the software life-cycle
Figure 11.9
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Comparison of Effort Breakdown by
Activity for Different Authors
Percentage Resource Allocation
Life Cycle
Phase/Activity Davis Zelkovitz Shav
Analysis • 25 202 25
Design 20 15 103
Coding 25 454 30
System Test n/a5  20 5
Implementation 15 n/a6  19
Notes: 1. Analysis encompasses all development activity prior to
detailed design.
2. The analysis effort is probably understated. If, as
speculated, this data is derived from system developments
in a =ilitary environment, then initial activity such as
feasibility analysis and prelim•nary systems study has
been excluded.
3. Using the authors definitions, the activities of system
specifications and technical requirements constitute
4etailed design activities as used here.
4. Coding effort and module test effort were combined.
Programmers are typically responsible for unit, or
module, testing each portion of the system they have
coded.
5. This activity has been subsumed within the conversion
stage by Davis.
6. This activity is not reported.
Figure Il. 10
the environment in which they were developed o.l the
generalization of results beyond the immediate
environment in not possible.
The above views are shared by others in the literature.
For example, Kustanowitz (1977) supports the notion that
system size effects the life cycle resource distribution as
shown in Figure (II.11). While Myers (1978) reported on a
study in Boeing which showed that "the costs were shifted
into earlier stages (of the life cycle) by the use of modern
programming practices."
The life cycle resources distribution issue plays an
important role in the estimation of resource allocation for
software development. This role will be discussed in some
detail, within our review of the literature on project
planning next.
11.2.2. Planning:
In his IEEE Tutorial on Software Management, Reifer
(1979) defined planning as follows:
It is deciding in advance what to do, how to do it, when
to do it, and who is to do it. It is setting
objectives, breaking the work into tasks, establishing
schedules and budgets, allocating resources, setting
standards, and selecting future courses of action. It
bridges the gap from where we are to where we want to
be.
SMALL INTERMEDIATE LARGE
PROJECT SIZE
SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE VARIES WITH
PROJECT SIZE
Figure I1.11
100
L
0
E-
DESIGN DESIGN DESIGN
10-20% 20-30% 30-45%
TEST TEST TEST
10-20t 20-30t 30-45t
CODE · I CODE CODE
60-80t ' 40-60t 10-40%
Li)
=50
r-
L-
There is abundant support in the software engineering
literature for the import of planning in the management of
software projects (McGowan, 1978) (Thayer, --1979).
Unfortunately, however, there is as ample an evidence for its
poor standing (Boehm, 1980), (Jones and McLean, 1970),
(Keider, 1974), (Metzger, 1981), (Pressman, 1982), (Thayer et
al, 1981). Gehring and Pooch (1980) support both assertions
in a single "breath:"
One universal management principle, for example, has
been called the "principle of the primacy of planning."
In other words, planning has primacy over the other
managerial functions of organizing, staffing, directing,
and controlling. Thus, the degree of control over a
programming project can be no greater than the extent to
which adequate plans have been made for the project .
Inadequate planning is the primary reason for loss of
control on many computer programming projects. It is
not the comparative newness of the computer programming
process, difficulties with programmers, or technical
factors --- It is simply that programming projects are
not adequately planned in the first place.
When Thayer (1979) surveyed the software engineering
literature to identify the "major problems of software
engineering project management," he ended up with 20
"hypothesized" problem areas. Of these, a full fifty percent
(or 10 problems) were identified as being planning-type
problems (see Figure 11.5). And when he proceeded to verify
his list, the dominance of planning-type problems was even
more "impressive:" of the seven problem-areas that were
verified, six were planning-type problems (the seventh was in
the control area).
75
In addition, Thayer's work, which incorporated a survey
of 60 software projects (in the aerospace industry), shed
some light on the planning activity. For example, he
reported that:
* The primary tools or techniques used in planning a
software development project were workload charts, work
break-down structure (WBS), and the subdivision of the
software development into phases or tasks.
* About one-fourth of the (planning) time was spent in
developing an overall project plan. An equal amount of
time was devoted to planning for the (project)
organization, planning on how to staff the organization,
and developing control procedures.
* (Contrary to his initial. assumption) a separate
planning group does not normally perform the planning
and scheduling funct-ons. The data showed that in 92%
of the cases, planning was done by the future manager of
the project.
* The predominant estimation method was "estimation
based on a similar project" (used in 67% of the
projects), followed by "use of a formula" (40%), "expert
opinion" (17%), and "crystal ball" (12%). [Note: Some
projects combined methods.]
A further analysis of the data suggested that " ... it
makes little differnce what type of technique is used in
estimating delivery schedule and project cost. None of the
used techniques significantly improved the project manager's
ability to deliver the project on time and within cost"
(Thayer, 1979).
Software estimation historically has been, and continues
to be, .a major difficulty associated with the management of
software development (Devenny, 1976), (Distaso, 1980),
(Mills, 1976), (Pooch and Gehring, 1980), (Yourdon, 1982),
(Zelkowitz et al., 1979), (Zmud, 1980). Farquhar (1970),
articulated the significance of the issue:
Unable to estimate accurately, the manager can know with
certainty neither what resources to commit to an effort
nor, in retrospect, how well these resources were used.
*The lack of a firm foundation for these two judgements
can reduce programming management to a random process in
that positive control is next to impossible. This
situation often results in the budget overruns and
schedule slippages that are all too common today.
A number of reasons for the difficulty have been
suggested in the literature:
1. Software development is a process, that is not yet
fully understood by "estimators." (Myers, 1972),
(Oliver, 1982), (Gehring and. Pooch, 1980), (Synnott,
1981), (Pietrasanta, 1968). This often leads to the
overlooking of significant cost factors (Myers, 1972),
Canning, 1977), (Boehm, 1981).
2. The phases and functions which comprise the software
development.process are influenced by a large number of
ill defined variables (Gehring and Pooch, 1980),
(Devenny, 1976), (Aron, 1976), (Distaso, 1980),
(Pressman, 1982), (Oliver, 1982).
3. Most of the activities within the process are still
primarily human rather than mechanical, and therefore
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prone to all the subjective factors which affect human
performance (Gehring and Pooch, 1980), (Pressman, 1982),
(Oliver, 1982).
4. The lack of a historical data base of cost
measurements (Clapp, 1976), (DeMarco, 1982), (Fox,
1976), (Myers, 1972), (Oliver,' 1982), (Zelkowitz, 1979).
5. Little penality is often associated with a poor
estimate (Zmud, 1980).
Over the years, estimation of project size and
development time and cost has been an intuitive process.
Experience and the prevailing industry norms have been used
as a basis to develop estimates for any given project
(Oliver, 1982),.(McKeen, 1981), (Auerbach Inc.), (Gehring,
1976). Myers (1972) has identified several "traps" in the
experience mehtod (i.e., basing estimates on actual costs of
similar past projects), namely:
1. The relationship between cost and system size is not
linear. In fact, cost increases approximately
exponentially as size increases. Therefore, the
experience method should only be applied when the sizes
of the current project and past projects are equivalent.
2. Products with similar names are normally very
78
dissimilar. For instance, chances are slim that two
products titled "Payroll System" have the same
development costs.
3. Frequent budget manipulations by management in order
to avoid overruns makes historical cost data
questionable. For example, the movement of cost from an
over-budget account to an under-budget account disguises
the real costs and makes future use of this data very
dangerous.
In the last two decades, several quantitative software
estimation models have been developed. They range from
highly theoretical ones, such as Putman's model (1978), to
empirical ones, such as the Walston and Felix model (1977),
and Boehm's COCOMO model (Boehm, 1981). An empirical model
uses data from previous projects to evaluate the current
project and derives the basic formulae from analysis of the
particular data base available. A theoretical model, on the
other hand, uses formulae based upon global assumptions, such
as the rate at which people solve problems, the number of
problems available for solutions at a given point in time,
etc.
However,
Even today, almost no model can estimate the true cost
of software with any degree of accuracy. (Furthermore,)
it is highly unlikely, that any two will produce the
same cost estimate for a given project ... The
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variations in cost estimations are influenced by both
the many factors involved and the quantization of these
factors by the users of the models. Therefore, in order
to estimate a software project and develop appropriate
manpower guidelines, it is essential to know the factors
that influence the software development process at a
given facility (Auerbach Inc.).
Finally, we conclude this discussion by Pietrasanta's
(1968), frequently quoted, insights into the estimation
problem and its solution:
Many of the problems of resource estimating
are symptoms of an underlying ignorance of the program
system development for which the estimates are being
made. The serious student of estimating must first be
willing to probe deeply into the fascinating and complex
system development process, to uncover the phases and
functions of the process, to highlight the subtle
interrelationships of the program system being developed
and the project organization doing the developing ...
examining the influence variables and their causal
relationships is precisely what is required if estimates
are ever to be improved. Only then can we do meaningful
quantitative research and scientific analysis of
resource requirements.
11.2.3. Management of the Human Resource:
People and organizational issues have gained
recognition, in recent years, as being at the core of
effective software development project management
(Semprevivo, 1980). For several reasons:
Personnel costs are skyrocketing relative to hardware
costs. Chronic problems in software development and
implementation are more frequently traced to personnel
shortcomings. Information systems staff sizes have
mushroomed with little time for adequate selection and
training. It is little wonder that Information Systems
(IS) managers find themselves focusing increasing
amounts of attention on human resource issues (Bartol
and Martin, 1982).
In this section we will review the human resource issues
of software project management at two levels: (A)
Individuals (e.g., selection, motivation, ... etc.); and
(B) Groups (e.g., organization, communication, ... etc.).
(A) Individual Dimensions:
On Motivation: One of the major challenges to managers
is to motivate employees to high levels of performance. The
few studies that have focused on motivational issues among
data processing personnel have mainly concerned themselves
with rankings of various job factors (Bartol and Martin,
1982).. And the findings have been generally supportive of
the notion that the work, achievement, and growth are
important job factors for data processing personnel (Couger
and Zawcki, 1980).
For example, Fitz-enz's (1978) study provides rankings
of the job factors considered most important by the 1500 data
processing professionals who participated in the study. The
items' rankings were as follows: (1) Achievement, (2)
Possibility for growth, (3) Work itself, (4) Recognition, (5)
Advancement, (6) Supervision, technical, (7) Responsibility,
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(8) Interpersonal relations, peers, (9) Interpersonal
relations, subordinates, (10) Salary, (11) Personal life,
(12) Interpersonal relations, superior, (13) Job security,
(14) Status, (15) Company policy and administration, and (16)
Working conditions.
A motivation mechanism which is attracting interest in
the software engineering field is "goal setting" (Boehm,
1981). An experiment by Weinberg and Schulman (1974)
investigated the motivational value of setting clear goals in
a programming environment. In the experiment, five teams
were given the same programming assignment, but each team was
given different directions about what to optimize while doing
the job. One team was asked to complete the job with the
least possible effort, another team was to minimize the
number of statements in the program, another was to minimize
the amount of memory required by the program, another was to
produce the clearest possible program, and the last team was
to produce the clearest possible output. When the programs
were completed and evaluated, the researchers found that each
team finished first (or, in one case, second) with respect to
the objective they were asked to optimize. They also found
that none of the teams performed consistently well on all of
the objectives.
On Selection: Programmer aptitude tests are available,
but their effectiveness is widely questioned (Schneiderman,
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1980). Instruments such as the IBM Programmer Aptitude Test
(PAT) or the Test on Sequential Instructions (TSI) for
measuring programming ability and the Strong Vocational
Interest Blank (SVIB) for measuring interest or motivational
level have at best produced very weak correlations with
analyst capability or programmer capability (Weinberg, 1971)
(Boehm, 1951).
On Performance Appraisal: The general literature on
performance appraisal suggests that overall, global
judgements regarding individual performance constitute
inferior means of measuring and appraising performance
(Bartol and Martin, 1982). Instead, performance in most jobs
consists of a number of different dimensions (e.g., quality
versus quantity or efficiency of program execution versus
ease of alteration by another programmer).
Gilb (1977) has suggested a number of possible metrics
of performance. Jones (1978) has pointed to the difficulties
in using certain standard measures, such as lines of code per
programmer-month, and has suggested other approaches, such as
separating quality measurements into measures of defect
removal efficiency and defect prevention.
On Turnover: Turnover continues to be a chronic problem
for software project managers. Willoughby (1977) estimates
that annual turnover in the DP field ranged between 15 and
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20% during the 1960s, declined to about 5% in the early
1970s, and began to rise again by the end of the decade.
More recent studies place the annual turnover rate at 25.1 %
(Tanniru et al, 1981), 30 % (Richmond, 1982), and even as
high as 34 % (Bott, 1982). As McLaughlin (1979) points out,
at such rates the equivalent of a work unit turns over every
three to four years --- no minor matter in a profession where
it frequently takes 12 to 18 months before a new employee
makes significant work contributions.
There are few predictive studies of DP turnover. In one
such study, Bartol (1979) investigated the relative
importance of two individual factors, personality and
professional attitude, versus two organizational factors,
professional reward system and tenure, in predicting turnover
among computer professionals. Only the professional reward
system and tenure variable were found to be significantly
predictive for the turnover variable, both in the expected
negative direction.
(B) Group Dimensions:
There are two basic issues involving the use of groups
in software development. One relates to structural factors
(i.e., how the groups are formulated), and the second
.involves process factors relevant to the ongoing operations
and interrelationships of group members.
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On Structure Factors: Software development projects are
structured in one of three basic organizational forms: (1)
Functional form; (2) Matrix form; or (3) Project form
(Daly, 1982) (Thayer, 1979). Youker (Y2) suggests that these
three organizational forms may be represented as a continuum
ranging from functional on one end to project on the other
end, with matrix falling in between and including a wide
variety of structures from weak matrix near functional to a
strong matrix near project. Several authors have presented
proposed guidelines or checklists for choosing the
"appropriate" organizational form. (e.g., see Green (1982),
Youker (Y2), and Daly (1982)).
In a survey of 60 software development projects in the
aerospace industry, Thayer (1979) found that "the matrix
organization is predominant, with 58% of the projects using
this type of organization, 38% of the projects using a
project organization, and 4% using a functional
organization." He also found that very small projects were
split between project and matrix organizations, medium priced
projects (between 1 and 5 million dollar) were slightly
biased in favor of project organization, while expensive
projects (5 million to 50 million) are almost always matrix
organization. A comparison of organizational form to "on
time" and "within budget" delivery of the software showed
that "it made little difference as to what kind of project
(organization) type is used."
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Thayer's data also showed that the team concept is much
in use. About 95% of the projects were handled by teams
under the direction of technical leaders of some sort.
Two philosophies for organizing programming teams have
achieved a moderate amount of popularity in the data
processing field. These are the egoless programming team
proposed by Weinberg (1971), and the chief programmer team
proposed by Mills (1971) and implemented by Baker (1972).
Little experimental work on programming team and task
interaction has been carried out (Mantei, 1981). Weinberg's
suggestions are anecdotal and Baker's conclusions are
confounded by the team personnel and the programming methods
selected.
On Process Factors: The attention here has focused on
the communication processes between members of a programming
team. In what is probably the most cited reference on the
"topic, Brooks (1978) suggests that human communication in a
software development project is a significant overhead. And
that the overhead is made up of two parts, training and
intercommunication. Each worker must be trained in the
technology, the goals of the effort, the overall strategy,
and the plan of work. This training cannot be partitioned,
so this part of the added effort varies lineary with the
number of workers. Intercommunication, Brooks further
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suggests, is worse. It increases as n(n-1)/2 (where n is the
number of team members).
The implications of this, is that increasing the size of
a software team increases the amount of software produced per
unit time, only to a point. Then the problems of
communication among the programmiiers begin to dominate the
project and reduce the amount of software being produced
.(Boebert, 1979). Or in Brooks' words (1978),
"Oversimplifying outrageously, we state Brooks' Law: Adding
manpower to a late software project makes it later."
The relationship between human communication and
programmer productivity was investigated by Scott and
Simmons. First, while using the Delphi survey technique to
identify project variables that influence programmer
productivity, they found that "effect of project
communication" to be one of the "eight consensus variables
which have an important influence on productivity" (Scott and
Simmons, 1974). And in a later study (1975), they used
computer simulation to evaluate the communication overhead as
a function of a team's communication structure.
Finally, taking a different tack, Parnas (1971)
considered the impact of human communication on the product
of software development. He suggests that too much
communication between the members of a programming team could
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negatively affect modularity, because team members would tend
to use informal information to bypass structured interfaces.
II.2.4. Control:
Once a plan becomes operational, control is necessary to
measure progress, to uncover deviations from plan, and to
indicate corrective action (Koontz and O'Donnel, 1972).
While in most production environments, control is a standard
business practice (Mills, 1983), in the production of
software control is a "perilous activity" -(Arseven, 1975),
(Boehm, 1976), (Fox, 1976), (Gehring, 1977), (Gansler, 1976),
(Gehring, 1976), (Lehman, 1979), (Metzer, 1981), (Miller,
1955), (Pooch and Gehring, 1980), (Thayer, 1979).
Paraphrasing Mills (1983):
It is difficult to measure performance in programming.
It is difficult to diagnose trouble in time to prevent
it. It is difficult to evaluate the status of
intermediate work such as undebugged programs or design
specification and their potential value to the complete
project.
Such a state of affairs has stirred, not only
self-criticism within the profession [(Lehman, 1979), (DeRose
and Nyman, 1979), (Metzger, 1981), and (Jensen and Tonies,
1979)] but open criticism from the user community as well:
You software guys are too much like the weavers in the
story about the Emperor and his new clothes. When I go
out to check on a software development the answers I get
sound like, 'we're fantastically busy weaving this magic
cloth. Just wait a while and it'll look terrific.' But
there's nothing I can relate to, no way to pick up
signals that things aren't really all that great. And
there are too many people I know who have come out at
the end wearing a bunch of expensive rags or nothing at
all.
(A U.S. Government Spokesman quoted in (Gehring and
Pooch, 1980).)
The manifestation of poor software project control
has more than one form. For example:
1. The "90% Syndrome," (Baker, 1982), (Boehm,
1981), (DeMarce, 1982), (Donelson, 1976).
2. The production of inadequate software e.g.,
that doesn't meet user requirements (Tansworthe,
1977), (Glass, 1982).
3. Building systems
expensive (McKeen, 1981)
due to unconstrainted
1974), (Boehm, 1981),
1982).
that are inordinately
(Wolverton, 1974) e.g.,
goldplating (Wolverton,
(Kirby, 1982), (Radice,
4. Lack of historical software cost data bases
(Boehm, 1981) (Thayer, 1979).
Why is it difficult to control software development
projects? Two classes of factors have been proposed in
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the literature: (1) product-type; and (2) people-type
factors.
Product-Type Factors
1. Software is basically an intangible product
during most of the development process, and for
which there are no visible milestones to measure
progress and quality like a physical product would
(Wegner, 1980), (Corbato, 1979), (Miller, 1955),
(Jones and Mclean, 1970), (Boebert, 1979),
(Wolverton, 1974), (Reynolds, 1970), (Gehring,
1976), (Boebert, 1979), (Hales, 1982a). "This
invisibility is compounded for large software, for
which logical complexity cannot be maintained in
one person's mind, and for which development must
be partitioned into a number of tasks assigned to
different people" (Zmud, 1980).
2. High complexity (McKeen, 1981), . (Corbato and
Clingen, 1979). "In an overly ambitious project,
managers who do not understand the details of what
they are managing are easily blustered and misled
by subordinates. Conversely, low-level staff may
be unable to appreciate the significance of details
and fail to report serious problems" (Corbato and
Clingen, 1979).
3. Volatility of requirements (Distaso, 1980),
(Metzger, 1981), (Tsichritzis, 1977), (Toellner,
1977), (Zmud, 1980). "Since software system
modules are not visibly connected, in contrast to
hardware systems, the impact of a change is often
not readily apparent even to the designers of the
system" (Gehring, 1976).
People-Type Factors:
1. The "software wizard syndrome" (Boebert, 1979).
This occurs when management abdicates its
responsibility to some highly trusted software
specialist, whose pronouncements are viewed as
correct by definition. The trouble with the
syndrome is that software wizards, unlike the
mythical kind,.are both fallible and mortal.
2. Inaccurate reporting (Boebert, 1979), (Jones,
1979), (Gehring, 1977). In software development,
"The employee has control of the resource, his
time, and he accounts for the resource on his time
sheet. The employee knows that his time sheet is a
performance evaluation factor and is a written
record. He knows the estimated time for the
project serves as a recorded budget. This
combination of written records makes a pressure
device and 'adjusted amounts' often result" (Reed,
1979), e.g., to hide problems or embarassing
situations (Jones, 1979). Another explanation was
given by Boebert (1979): "Programmers are paid to
program, not to pay attention to progress ...
Management should not expect to get progress or
status information by asking programmers, the
typical programmer doesn't know or care, and will
usually give whatever answer is needed to end the
meeting and get back to programming."
3. Optimism, (Corbato, 1979), (Oliver, 1982),
(Jones and McLean, 1970), (Snyder, 1976), (McKeen,
1981), (Gunther, 1978). "All programmers are
optimists," Brooks (1978) remarked, always
unjustifiably assuming that "'This time it will
surely run' or 'I just found the last bug'"
(Brooks, 1978).
The persistence of the industry's difficulties in
controlling software development does not seem to be the
result of either a scarcity of "advice" from the
research community, or a reluctance, on the industry's
part to "heed" that advice.
Numerous techniques, often adapted from other
industries, have been proposed in the literature. These
include: Work Break Structure (WBS) (Tausworth, 1980),
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PERT (Boehm, 1981), Gantt Charts (Knutson, 1980), Formal
Reviews (Freedman and Weinberg, 1982), Unit Development
Folder (UDF) (Ingrassia,1979), and Automated project
Management Systems (Canning, 1976).
Furthermore, evidence indicates that most of these
"proposed solutions" have been disseminated into the
industry (Glass, 1982), albeit at varying degrees. For
example, Thayer's survey of software projects in the
aerospace industry showed the following:
Technique % of Projects Using it
Formal Reviews 97 %
WBS 60 %
Automated Project
Management System 57 %
PERT 38 %
Gantt 32 %
Thayer further investigated whether the utilization
of the above "state-of-the-art" techniques was effective
in resolving the control-type difficulties in those
aerospace firms surveyed. (Note: Thayer (1979), as
well as others (e.g., Lehman (1979), believe that the
aerospace industry is the most advanced and experienced
in employing software project management techniques.)
His results indicated that they, in fact, did not.
Results reported by Lehman (1979), on a survey of
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software development projects also in the aerospace
industry, were more surprising:
17% of the projects had no project control
mechanism. And more surprisingly yet, that group
fared better than average relative to on-time
delivery ...
A similar finding was reported by (Powers and
Dickson, 1973). In a study of 20 MIS-type projects they
found that:
With respect to the project control techniques used
for the projects in the study, they tended to be
dysfunctional to project success. The use of
project control methods was not significantly
related to any criterion of success, and, indeed,
had a negative relationship to the reported quality
of project documentation ...
In general, project leaders appeared to feel an
implicit pressure from tight project reporting
requirements, to which they responded by cutting
corners on documentation and preparations for
implementation.
So, what is the prognosis on the status of software
project control? Bauer (1980) put it this way:
We are able to identify the sources of our
troubles, but in many cases we have nothing to
offer but good advice. We are in the situation of
a physician who keeps trying out different pills on
his patient in the hope that some will finally cure
him (Bauer, 1980).
III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT
III.1. Introduction:
As stated in Chapter I, the objective of this research
effort is to develop and test an integrative system dynamics
model of software development project management which would
provide us with understanding and insight about the general
process by which software development is managed.
A system dynamics model of software development can
increase our understanding of the process through both the
formulation of the model's structure and the analysis of its
behavior. Experimentation and analysis of model behavior
will be the focus of the next two chapters. In this chapter,
on the other hand, our objective is to enhance our
understanding of the software development process through
model formulation.
Model formulation can enhance understanding in several
ways (Schultz and Sullivan, 1972):
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1. Confrontation --- vague generalizations crumble when
put to the test of modeling.
2. Expansion --- the tendency to a holistic integrative
approach in modeling forces a broadening of one's
horizon, a looking into other relevant fields for ideas.
3. Communication --- problem-oriented models lead to
jumping of disciplinary boundaries, less parochialism.
4. Organization --- organizing data and structuring
experience.
In addition, the formulation of the model forces
explication i.e., structural relations between variables must
be explicitly and precisely defined. This, in Dubins (1971)
view, is the "locus of understanding" of a theoretical model:
A (theoretical model) tries to make sense out of the
observable world by ordering the relationships among
"things" that constitute the (modeler's) focus of
attention in the world 'out there' ... What is gained
in understanding ... is achieved by comprehending the
law or laws built into the model. The locus of
understanding in a scientific model is to be found in
its laws of interaction. (That is, the modes of
interaction among the variables of the model).
Before relationships are defined, however, one has first
to choose the "things" or variables whose relationships are
of interest. That is, one has to define the model's
boundary. Models have a boundary within which they are
expected to "mirror" the empirical world. Beyond that
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boundary it may be problematic as to whether the model holds.
Our model's boundary is discussed in Section 111.3. below.
This is then followed by a detailed description of the
model's structure and equation formulation in Section III.4.
In the section immediately following this, we discuss
the sources of information, on software development project
management, we used to construct the model.
111.2. Sources of Information:
To build the model, we went through three information
gathering steps:
First, we conducted a series of ten interviews with
software development project managers in three organizations.
The purpose of this set of interviews was to provide us with
a first hand account of how software projects are currently
managed in software development organizations.
The system dynamics approach starts with the concepts
and information on which people are already acting
(Forrester, 1979).
In general sufficient information exists in the
descriptive knowledge possessed by the active
practitioners --- to serve the model builder in all his
initial efforts (Forrester, 1961).
The information collected in this phase, complimented
with our own software development experience, were the basis
for formulating a "skeleton" system dynamics model of
software project management.
The second step was to conduct an extensive review of
the literature. The "skeleton" model served as a useful
"road-map" in carrying out this literature review.
A model should come first. And one of the first uses of
the model should be to determine what formal data need
to be collected (Forrester, 1961).
When this exercise was completed, many knowledge gaps
were filled, giving rise to a second much more detailed
version of the model.
In the third, and final step:
The model is exposed to criticism, revised, exposed
again and so on in an iterative process that continues
as it proves to be useful. Just as the model is
improved as a result of successive exposures to critics
a successively better understanding of the problem is
achieved by the people who participated in the process
(Roberts, 1981C).
The setting for this was a series of 17 interviews
conducted between October 7,1982 and July 7,1983 with
software project managers at Digital Equipment Corporation,
MIT, and General Motors.
In the remaining part of this section, we explain the
above three information gathering steps in more detail.
Step (1):
As stated above, this step constituted a "formulative
study." The objective was to increase our familiarity with
the software development process, in particular, "the
concepts and information on which software project managers
are already acting," in order to formulate an initial
skeleton system dynamics model of the process.
The technique we used was the "focused interview." In
the focused interview, as described by Selltiz, Wrightsman,
and Cook (1976),
.the main function of the interviewer is to focus
attention upon a given (list of topics). Interviewers
know in advance what topics, or what aspects of a
question, they wish to cover. This list of topics or
aspects is derived from a formulation of the research
problem ... This list constitutes a framework of topics
to be covered, but the manner in which questions are
asked and their timing are left largely to the
interviewer's discretion.
This type of interview, according to Green and Tull
(1978), " ... is useful in obtaining a clear understanding
of the problem and determining what areas should be
investigated (further)."
Before each interview, two things were done. First the
interviewee was briefed, in a telephone conversation, about
the objectives of the research. The interviewee was also
told that the primary objective of the interview is to find
out how - software projects are managed in his/her
organization. The list of topics shown in Exhibit III.1.
was read to each interviewee. The second thing we did, was
to mail each interviewee a copy of our internal report titled
"The System Dynamics Approach to Designing Software Project
Planning & Control Systems: A Research Proposal." The
report, written in January 1982, constitued the first "rough"
version of our research proposal, and it provided, in
addition, a non-technical introduction to the system dynamics
methodology.
Ten interviews were conducted in the period between
February 5,1982 and April 30,1982. Each interview was, on
the average, two hours long. The names of the interviewees,
their organizations, their titles, and the dates of the
interviews are shown in Exhibit 111.2.
All ten interviewees were reached through contacts,
primarily those of Sloan faculty members. Each one of the
interviewees was currently managing one or more software
development projects, had been a software project
manager/leader for at least two years, and had managed at
least two completed software projects. This, we felt, would
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Environment:
Software Production:
Planning:
Control:
Human Resources:
Project types, sizes
Hardware environment
Organizational structure
Software tools
Standards
Error rates
QA policy
Estimating
Effort Distribution
Control tools
Milestones
Reporting frequency
Hiring/firing policies
Training
Turnover
Overtime policy
EXHIBIT iII, I
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Interview # Date Interviewee Title Organization
'2/5/82 John James
2/10/82 William Stein
3/5/82 Clement McGowar
3/15/82 Glen Gage
3/15/82 Joanne Riccardi
3/22/82 Dave Griffin
3/22/82 Jim Doyle
3/29/82 Bonnie Donahue
4/7/82 Wayne Babich
10 4/30/82 Francis O'Conne
Group Leader
Member of Technical Staff
1 Principal Consultant
Project Manager
Project Leader
Project Leader
Project Manager
Project leader
Lead Designer & Technical Mgr.
Softech Federal System Div.
!r Group Leader
EXHIBIT III.2
MITRE
MITRE
MITRE
DEC
DEC
DEC
DEC
DEC
Softech
MITRE
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provide a level of managerial experience and maturity that
would be adequate for gaining insights into -the management of
software projects.
As is shown in Exhibit 111.2., three organizations were
represented, namely, Digital Equipment Corporation (5
interviewees), MITRE (3 interviewees), and SofTech (2
interviewees). This provided us with an exposure to three
quite different software development environments. In DEC,
all five interviewees were involved in developing software
for in-house use (e.g., order administration systems). In
MITRE, the projects involved the development of
embedded-s.ftware for the Air Force. And in SofTech, the
projects involved a wide range of systems developed on
contract for client organizations, both private and public.
The outcome of the above exercise was, as mentioned
above, the formulation of an initial simple system dynamics
model of software project management. The model is discussed
in detail elsewhere (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1982b). This
initial model, in addition to serving as a road-map for the
succeeding literature reviewing step, was also the "skeleton"
for developing our final more detailed version. Which,
therefore, means that the information gathered here is also
incorporated in the formulation of our final model. This
will become more evident when we discuss that model's
structure and equation formulation in Section III.4. In
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those discussions we will, in many occasions, make reference
to the interviews of Exhibit III.2. Such references will
always be in the form: (interviewee-name, interview number).
Step (2):
Starting the extensive review of the literature with the
initial model serving as the road-map had several important
advantages. It was helpful, for example, in organizing the
findings, as well as in integrating them. In addition, the
integrative nature of our model "prompted" us to broaden our
horizon, and look into other relevant fields for ideas.
Examples of these "ventures" include: Management Control
(e.g., Anthony (1979), and Lawler (1976)), Cybernetics (e.g.,
Ashton (1976)), Organizations (e.g., Kotter (1978), Schein
(1980), and Weick, (1979)), Project Management (e.g,
Maciariello (1978)), and Psychology (e.g., (Ingham el al,
1974), Leavitt (1978), and Steiner (1966)).
In discussing the final model's structure and its
equation formulation in Section III.4., we will make
extensive use of the massive amount of information gathered
in this literature review. And, it will then become evident,
how effective such a model truly is in organizing and
integrating the various bodies of knowledge mentioned above.
104
Step (3):
The written record has (a major shortcoming) compared to
the mental data from which the written data were taken
the written record usually cannot be queried.
Unlike the mental data base, the written record is not
responsive to probing by the analyst as he searches for
a fit between structure, policy, and behavior
(Forrester, 1979b).
That was one reason to conduct the second set of
interviews, which constitued our third information gathering
step. That is, there were still unanswered questions that
had to be addressed.
The second reason, was to expose the more detailed model
that emanated at the end of Step (2) above, to, in Roberts'
(1981c) words, "criticism, revise it, expose it again and so
on in an iterative process that would continue as long as it
proves to be useful."
As a result of these two objectives, the model's
structural components became a core around which the
interviews were built. The interviews were, thus, more
structured in terms of content than those in Step (1).
However, the interviews were unstructured in the sense that
no standardized set of questions was used. Such a format,
according to Isaac and Michael (1971), allows the interviewer
to adjust the interview so as to take advantage of an
interviewee's personal areas of expertise.
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As in Step (1), before each interview, interviewees were
contacted by telephone and briefed on the objectives of the
research. The topics covered were basically the same as
those in the Step (1) telephone briefings, except for an
additional brief discussion of the Systems Dynamics
methodology. Interviewees were then mailed copies of: (1)
"A Model of Software Project Management Dynamics"
(Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1982b); and (2) "System Dynamics
--- An Introduction" (Roberts, 1981c).
It was necessary that this group of interviewees have
some understanding of the Systems Dynamics methodology, since
one of our objectives was to expose the model to their
critique. This was not a major hurdle, however. What was
needed was basically an understanding of the feedback
concept, and its representation in terms of causal loop
diagrams. Both of which are adequately covered in the
Roberts' introductory paper. In the interviews, references
were made only to "pieces" of the model, and these were
always in the form of causal loop diagrams. An example
"conversation piece," on the effects of "schedule pressure"
on "productivity" and "error generation," is shown in Figure
III.1.
Seventeen interviews were conducted in the period
between October 7,1982 and July 7,1983. The names of the
interviewees, their organizations, their titles, and the
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PRESSURE
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Figure III. 1
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dates of the interviews are shown in Exhibit 111.3. below.
A comparison of Exhibits 111.2. and 111.3. would show
that none of the interviewees of Step (1) were .mong those
interviewed later in Step (3). This, we feel, had two
positive results. Firstly, it provided us with a larger and
more varied pool of experiences and ideas to draw upon, and
secondly, it decreased the possibilities for bias in the
interviewees' critique of the model.
Except for Mr. Sheldon of MIT who was reached through
the personal contacts of an MIT faculty member, this group of
interviewees was reached through MIT's Center for Information
Systems Research (CISR). Both GM and Digital are CISR
sponsors, and occasionally serve as field sites for research
in the MIS area. Again, each of the interviewees was
"currently managing one or more software development
projects," "had been a software project manager/leader for at
least two years," and "had managed at least two completed
software projects."
Because the discussions at this stage were at a more
detailed level than those of Step (1), we needed more time
per interviewee. On average, we conducted three
two-and-half-hour-long interviews per interviewee.
This battery of seventeen interviews constituted the
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Interview # Date Interviewee Title Organization
11 10/7/82 Mike Landolfi
12 11/3/82 Garrett Sheldon
11/4/82
11/11/82
11/11/82
11/16/82
11/23/82
11/23/82
11/24/82
12/15/82
12/15/82
1/17/83
1/17/83
2/16/83
2/18/83
6/29/83
7/7/83
Mike Landolfi
Al Chan
Sam Hisamune
Frank Lombardi
Frank Lombardi
Barbara Nichols
Garrett Sheldon
Al Chan
Sam Hisamune
Mike Landolfi
Frank Lombardi
Garrett Sheldon
Barbara Nichols
Sam Hisamune
Barbara Nichols
Mrg. of Planning, Analysis
& Control ,Finacial&Admin
Infosystem
Mrg. of Business Systems
Development
(see above)
Proj. Laeder,NAVO Fin.Syst.
Sr. Supervr. Syst. Devt.,CANISCA
Mrg. Revenue Disbursement Syst.
(see above)
Syst. Mrg. Export Services Group
(see above)
(see above)
(see above)
(see above)
(see above)
(see above)
(see above)
(see above)
(see above)
EXHIBIT III.3
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
DEC
MIT
DEC
GM
Gm
DEC
DEC
DEC
MIT
GM
GM
DEC
DEC
MIT
DEC
GM
DEC
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third and final information gathering step. And it lead to
the formulation of the final model ... which we discuss in
the next two sections.
111.3. Model Boundary:
(Models are) analogues of existing or conceivable
systems, resembling their referent systems in form but
not necessarily in content. In some way they exhibit,
display, or demonstrate structural relationships among
elements found in the referent system. At the same
time, they are abstractions and idealizations, omitting
some aspects of the referent systems and duplicating
only those that are of interest for the purposes at hand
(Schultz and Sullivan, 1972).
A clear understanding of the purpose of a modeling
effort helps to answer questions relating to the system
boundary --- i.e., what should be included and what should be
excluded.
As was stated in Chapter I, the primary purpose of our
model is to "provide us with understanding and insight about
the process by which software systems are developed and
managed."
Notice that our focus is confined to the development
phases of software production. Our model's boundary will
thus extend only until the last phase of software
development, namely, the testing phase. Not included in our
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model are, therefore, the subsequent maintenance activities.
It was also indicated that the model would integrate the
managerial functions of planning, controlling, and
human-resource management as well as the software production
activities of design, coding, and testing. Notice that the
model's boundary extends from the beginning of the design
phase of the software life cycle, excluding the requirements
definition phase. There were two reasons for this. First,
Analysis to determine requirements is ... distinguished
as an activity apart from software development.
Technically, the product of analysis is non-procedural
(i.e., the focus is functional) while the prime
development is the basis for mutual agreement between
the customer and the developer as to what the system
must accomplish (McGowan and McHenry, 1979).
Secondly, our focus in this study is on the software
development organization, i.e., project managers and software
development professionals, and how their policies, decisions,
actions, ... etc., affect the success/failure of software
development. -- The definition of user requirements is
therefore excluded from the model's boundary for the
additional reason that it lies beyond the control of the
software development group.
Such arguments have also been the bases for excluding
the. software requirements phase from the "boundaries" of
quantitative-type software cost estimation models such as
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COCOMO (Boehm, 1981).
Together with excluding the requirements definition
phase, we will make the simplifying assumption that once
requirements are fully specified (outside the boundary of the
model), and the architectural design phase is initiated
(within the model's boundary), there will be no significant
subsequent changes in the users' requirements. We do realize
that changes in users' requirements are frequently blamed for
cost/budget overruns in software projects (Aron, 1976)
(Boehm, 1980) (Zolnowski and Ting, 1982), and for which the
users are often "charged" and found "guilty" (Distaso, 1980),
(Thayer, 1979), (Toellner, 1977). However, let us reiterate
that our focus in this study is on "the software development
group members and their policies, decisions, actions, ...
etc." And we suggest that investigating those policies,
decisions, and actions which can cause cost/budget overruns
inspite of stable user requirements is a more interesting and
challenging research endeavor than to answer the question "do
changes in users' requirements negatively impact the
development process."
Looking within a model's boundary (e.g., at the actions
of the software development team) for the causes/cures of
problematic behavior rather than outside it (e.g., the
actions of the users) is a characteristic of the system
dynamics approach. Richardson and Pugh (1981), called it the
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"Endogenous Point of View," and elaborated on it as follows:
the system dynamics approach tends to look within
a system for the sources of its problem behavior.
Problems are not seen as being caused by external agents
outside the system ...
The internal view creates a dramatically different
problem focus. The external view places an individual,
a firm, a city, or whatever, at the mercy of exogenous
events ... The external view is frequently predisposed
to search for blame: "instabilities in our workforce
and inventory are caused by errotic and seasonal
customer orders" (or software projects overrun schedules
merely because of changes in user requirements) ...
The internal view searches (instead) for structures
within (the system), which can create or exacerbate the
system's problem behavior.
As we mentioned above, our model's focus is on the
decisions and actions of the software development group
including both project management as well as software
development professionals (e.g., designers and programmers).
In addition to excluding users (as indicated above), it,
therefore, also excludes computer center operators, personnel
department personnel, secretaries, higher management,
janitors, and so on.
Finally, this model is not a model of small
one-programmer-type projects, nor of super-large projects
involving hundreds of software professionals over a period of
several years. Instead, our domain is that of medium sized
projects. Jones (1977) defined "medium-sized" software
projects as follows:
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(they) range between 16K and 64K lines in size,
(and in which) development teams or departments are the
norm ... Below the "medium" size range, programming as
a business endeavor is often successful: at least the
programs tend to work fairly well and insurmountable
problems are not often ecountered. At the "medium" size
and above, cost and schedule overruns pop up more
frequently, and are more serious when they do occur.
III.4. Model Structure:
This section describes the structure of our integrative
system dynamics model of software development project
management. An overview of the model is first presented,
highlighting the four major subsystems of the model, namely,
human resource management, planning, controlling, and
software production, together with the various flows which
connect them. Next, each of the four subsystems, will be
described in more detail, in terms of its basic components
and relationships. The various assumptions and propositions
comprising the model are supported by reference to the
literature and to the interviews of section III.2. The
outline of the presentation will be as follows:
III.4.1. Model Overview
111.4.2. System Dynamics Schematic Conventions
111.4.3. Human Resource Management
III.4.4. Software Production
III.4.5. Controlling
111.4.6. Planning
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A documented listing of each subsystem's DYNAMO
equations is included in Appendix (A). DYNAMO is the
computer simulation language used. It is a language
specifically designed to handle non-linear feedback models of
the sort associated with the system dynamics method. (For an
introduction to DYNAMO see (Pugh, 1976).)
III.4.1. Model Overview:
Figure 111.2. is an overview of the model's four
subsystems, namely: (1) The Human Resource Management
Subsystem; (2) The Software Production Subsystem; (3) The
Controlling Subsystem; and (4) The Planning Subsystem. The
figure also illustrates the interrelatedness of the four
subsystems.
The Human Resource Management Subsystem captures the
hiring, training, assimilation, and transfer of the project's
human resource. Such actions are not carried out in vacuum,
they, as Figure 111.2. suggests, both affect and are
affected by the other subsystems. For example, the project's
"hiring rate" is a function of the "workforce needed" to
complete the project on a planned completion date.
Similarly, the "workforce available," has direct bearing
on the allocation of manpower among the different software
production activities in the Software Production Subsystem.
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The four primary software production activities are
development, quality assurance, rework, and testing. The
development activity comprises both the design and coding of
the software. As the software is developed, it is also
reviewed e.g., using structured-walkthroughs, to detect any
design/coding errors. Errors detected through such quality
assurance activities are then reworked. Not all errors will
be detected and reworked, however, some will "escape"
detection until beyond the end of development e.g., until the
testing phase.
As progress is made, it is reported. A comparison of
where the project is versus where it should be (according to
plan) is a control-type activity captured within the
Controlling Subsystem. As was indicated in Chapter II,
determining where a software project really is e.g., in terms
of % of tasks completed, is not always possible. (E.G.,
because software is basically an intangible product during
most of the development process, and for which there are no
visible milestones to measure progress and quality like a
physical product would.) Once an assessment of the project's
status is made (using available information), it becomes an
important input to the planning function.
In the Planning Subsystem, initial project estimates are
made to start the project, and then those estimates are
revised, when necessary, throughout the project's life. For
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example, to handle a project that is perceived to be behind
schedule, plans can be revised to (among other things) hire
more people, extend the schedule, or do a little of both.
With this overview of the model's subsystems, and their
interrelationships, we are almost ready to proceed to a more
detailed description of each of the four subsystems. Because
all the subsystem diagrams will be in terms of the schematic
conventions used in system dynamics, we feel it would be
useful to preface the discussion of the model's subsystems
with an introduction to these conventions.
III.4.2. System Dynamics Schematic Conventions:
From a System Dynamics perspective all systems can be
represented in terms of "level" and "rate" variables, with
"auxiliary" variables used for added clarity and simplicity.
A level is an accumulation, or an integration, over time
of flows or changes that come into and go out of the level.
The term "level" is intended to invoke the image of the level
of a liquid accumulating in a container. The system
dynamicist takes the simplifying view that feedback systems
involve continuous, fluid-like processes, and the terminology
reinforces that interpretation.
The flows increasing and decreasing a level are called
118
rates. Thus, a manpower pool would be a level of people that
is increased by the hiring rate and decreased by the firing
and/or quit rate.
Rates and levels are represented as stylized valves and
tubs, as shown below, further emphasizing the analogy between
accumulation processes and the flow of a liquid.
RATE RATE
The flows that are controlled by the rates are usually
diagramed differently, depending on the type of quantity
involved. We will use the two types of arrow designators
shown below:
INFORMATION
FLOWS
OTHER FLOWS
(e.g., PEOPLE, SOFTWARE)
Flows will always, of course, originate somewhere and
terminate somewhere. Sometimes, the origin of a flow is
treated as essentially limitless, or at least outside the
model-builder's concern. In such a case the flow's origin is
called a source. Similarly, when the destination of a flow
is not of interest, it is called a sink. Both sources and
sinks are shown as little "clouds."
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SOURCE SINK
All tangible variables are either levels or rates i.e.,
they are either accumulations of previous flows or are
presently flowing. But there is one more type of information
variable, which is called an auxiliary. Auxiliary variables
are combinations of information inputs into concepts e.g.,
"desired workforce," or policies e.g., "training policy."
Auxiliaries are represented by a circular symbol.
A few other symbols will complete the designation of
items included in formal system dynamics diagrams. In
addition to the variable symbols shown above, models also
0 ý- or- I
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.611A.
- - 'OUTPUT
OUTPUT
include constant terms, i.e., parameters of the model whose
values are assumed to be unchanging throughout a particular
computer simulation. Constants are pictured as is shown
below, the name of the constant being underlined, with an
information arrow going to the variable that is affected by
the constant.
CONSTANT
Finally, because complex models are often diagramed in
multiple displays, situations arise in which variables
pictured on one diagram are used in another diagram. These
variable cross-references are.shown by including the name of
the other diagram's variable in parentheses as shown below.
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INFLUENCING VARIABLE BEING
VARIABLE THAT IS INFLUENCED ON
ON OTHER DIAGRAM OTHER DIAGRAM
III.4.3. Human Resource Management:
The Human Resource Management Subsystem is depicted in
Figure III.3. As the figure indicates, a project's total
workforce is comprised of two workforce levels, namely,
"Newly Hired Workforce" and "Experienced Workforce."
Disaggregating the workforce into these two categor.ies of
employees was done for two reasons.
First, newly hired project members pass through an
"orientation phase" during which they are less than fully
productive (Canning, 1977), (Cougar and Zawacki, 1980),
(Weil, 1981), (Wolverton, 1974), (Chrysler, 1978), (Tanniru
et al, 1981), (James, 1), (Lombardi, 16), and (Hisamune, 26).
(Remember, a reference citation in the form (name, i) where
"i" is a number between 1 and 27, refers to one of the 27
interviews of Exhibits 111.2. and 111.3.) The orientation
process has both technical as well as social dimensions. On
the technical side,
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(newly hired) personnel often require considerable
training to become familiar with an organization's
unique mix of hardware, software packages, programming
techniques, project methodologies and so on (Winrow,
1982).
And paraphrasing Schein (1980) on "social orientation:"
... (it) refers to the processes of teaching the new
recruit how to get along in the organization, what the
key norms and rules of conduct are, and how to behave
with respect to others in the organization. The new
recruit must learn where to be at specified times, what
to wear, what to call the boss, whom to consult if he or
she has a question, how carefully to do a job, and
endless other things which insiders have learned over
time.
Of course, not all new project members are necessarily
recruited from outside the organization, some might be
"recruited" from within e.g., transferred from other
projects. For this type of employee, there will still be a
"project orientation" period (Brooks, 1978) e.g., to learn
the project's ground rules, the goals of the effort, the plan
of work, and all the details of the system (GRC, 1977),
(Thayer and Lehman, 1977). Although obviously less costly
than the "full orientation" needed by an out-of-company
recruit, project orientation can still be a significant drag
on productivity, especially when a project lacks adequate
documentation (Canning, 1977). In a GRC (1977) report it was
noted that when workforce additions are made to "rescue" a
project e.g., that is behind schedule, it is often the case
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that such a project also suffers from sparse and outdated
documentation.
The important point to be made here is that, because of
the "orientation phase," "Newly Hired Workforce" are, on the
average, less productive than the "Experienced Workforce."
Later, in our discussion on "Productivity" within the
Software Production Subsystem in Section III.4.4., we will
take another closer look at this issue in order to quantify
this productivity differential.
This productivity differential was the first reason to
disaggregate the workforce. The second reason was to capture
the training overhead involved in adding new members to a
software development project. This training of newcomers,
both "technically" and "socially," is usually carried out by
the "oldtimers" (T7), (Corbato and Clingen, 1979), (GRC,
1977), (Winrow, 1982), (Bott, 1982), (Lombardi, 16), (Thayer
and Lehman, 1977). This is costly, because "while (the
oldtimer) is helping the new employee learn the Job, his own
productivity on his other work is reduced" (Canning, 1977).
The determination of the amount of effort to commit to
the training of new employees is made, we found, on the basis
of managerial intuition and organizational custom. There are
no proposed formulas in the literature, nor did we find any
in the organizations we interviewed in. We did find,
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however, rules-of-thumb, and these ranged from committing 15%
of an experienced employee's time per new employee (Hisamune,
21) to a 25% commitment (Nichols, 18). In the model, the
value of the parameter "Trainers per New Hiree" is set to
0.20 i.e., on the average each new employee consumes in
training overhead the equivalent of 20% of an experienced
employee's time for the duration of the training or
assimilation period.
Estimates for the average assimilation period vary
between 2 months (Lombardi, 16) and 6 months (Corbato and
Clingen, 1979) (Brandon, 1970). In the model, the "Average
Assimilation Delay" is set to 80 days. (Note: "Days" in the
model represent working days. One week is five working days,
and one year is 48 working weeks.) The assimilation delay is
formulated in the model as a first-order exponential delay.
Such delays are primary building-blocks of system dynamics
models, and they are extensively used in this model. In
Exhibit III.4., we show how a first-order exponential delay
looks schematically, how it is formulated mathematically, and
how it behaves over time.
Thus, if a number say L(0) of project members are
recruited at time (0), they will be assimilated into the
experienced workforce pool at a rate similar to the one shown
in the figure of Exhibit III.4. That is, some will be
assimilated quickly e.g., those recruited from within the
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company, others will take a much longer time e.g., new hirees
fresh from school, while the average new employee will be
assimilated at the "Average Assimilation Delay" i.e., in 80
days.
On deciding upon the "Total Workforce" level (i.e.,
newly hired plus experienced workforce) desired, project
management considers a number of factors. One. important
factor is the current scheduled completion date of the
project. As part of the planning function (see Section
III.4.6. for details), management determines the workforce
level that it believes is necessary to complete the project
tasks perceived to be remaining within the scheduled
completion time. In addition to that, consideration is also
given to the "stability of the workforce." Thus, before
hiring new project members, management tries to contemplate
the duration of need for these new members. Different firms
weigh this factor to various extents. In general, however,
the relative weighing between the desire for workforce
stability on the one hand and the desire to complete the
project on time, on the other, changes with the stage of
project completion. For example, toward the end of the
project there could be considerable reluctance to bring in
new people, even though the time and effort perceived
remaining imply more. people are needed. It would take too
much time to acquaint new people with the mechanics of the
project, integrate than into the project team, and train them
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in the necessary technical areas.
" As will be further explained in the "Planning
Subsystem," based on the above two considerations, management
determines the "Workforce Level Needed." This level,
however, still does not automatically translate into a hiring
goal for the human resource management function. A further
consideration is given to the project's ability to absorb new
people into, to train them and make them an integral part of
a productive team (Brooks, B23). We shall here recognize a
policy, formal or more usually implicit, that the rate of
hiring of new project members be restricted to that number
which project managment feels its fully integrated staff can
handle (Landolfi, 22) (Chan, 20).
This restriction is formulated in the model using the
variable "Ceiling on New Hirees." Which simply equals the
"Full-Time-Equivalent Experienced Workforce" level multiplied
by the most number of new hirees that a single full-time
experienced staff can be expected to effectively handle. In
the model, the value of "Most New Hirees per Full-Time
Experienced Staff" is set at 3.
Because in some organizations software developers are
assigned to more than one project (i.e., the "Average Daily
Manpower per Staff" per project would be less than 1
man-day), the "Full-Time-Equivalent Experienced Workforce"
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level can be less than the "Experienced Workforce" level.
So, for example, if there are only 2 experienced project
members, each of which assigning 50% of his/her time to the
project (i.e., "Average Daily Manpower per Staff" = .5) then
we'll have .5 X 2 = 1 "Full-Time-Equivalent Experienced
Staff." And in that case the "Ceiling on New Hirees" will be
1 X 3 = 3.
The summation of "Ceiling on New Hirees" and the value
of the current "Experienced Workforce" level establishes the
"Ceiling on Total Workforce." The value of this variable
constitutes a ceiling on the number of employees sought i.e.,
to be hired. That is, "Workforce Level Sought" would be set
to the value of "Workforce Level Needed" as long as this is
less than or equal to the "Ceiling on Total Workforce."
Otherwise, "Workforce Level Sought" is set to the value of
the latter.
Thus, the three factors: (1) schedule completion time;
(2) workforce stability; and (3) training requirements, all
affect management's determination of the "Workforce Level
Sought." Once the determination is made, management will
face one of three possible situations. First, the "Workforce
Gap" between the "Workforce Level Sought" and the current
"Total Workforce Level" could be zero i.e., the two levels
are exactly equal. In that case no further action is
necessary.
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A second, more likely, situation would be one where the
"Workforce Level Sought" is larger than the current "Total
Workforce Level." In this case, new employees will be hired.
This, of course, takes time. The delay in hiring software
professionals, is on the average, on the order of several
months (McLaughlin, 1979). Some recruits are generally
available in a short period from elsewhere in the
organization, whereas others (especially when the project
management is seeking special skills, or new college
recruits) will not be available for a much longer time.
After averaging these variables, the "Hiring Delay" is set to
40 days (McLaughlin, 1979) (Babich,9) (Hisamune, 26).
The third, and final, possibility would be for the
"Workforce Level Sought" to be less than the current "Total
Workforce Level." In this case, project members will be
transferred out of the project. We will assume that if there
are new recruits still in training i.e., in the "Newly Hired
Workforce" level, then these will be the first to be
transferred out. If still more transfers are needed, they
would then be made from the "Experienced Workforce" pool.
Those who are being transferred out require some period
of time e.g., for paper work and transfer arrangements,
before they actually leave the project. The average transfer
delay is set in the model to 10 days (Landolfi, 22).
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Finally, there is the effect of turnover on the
project's workforce. Turnover continues, of course, to be a
chronic problem for software project managers. Willoughby
(1977) estimates that annual turnover in the DP field ranged
between 15 and 20% during the 1960s, declined to about 5% in
the early 1970s, and began to rise again by the end of the
decade. More recent studies place the annual turnover rate
at 25.1% (Tanniru et al, 1981), 30% (Richmond, 1982) and even
as high as 34% (Bott, 1982).
Turnover is captured in the model, through the "Quit
Rate" of "Experienced Workforce." That is, we are assuming
no turnover among the "Newly Hired Workforce," since it is
quite unlikely for a new recruit to quit within 80 days of
joining the project (i.e., during the assimilation period).
The annual turnover rate. is set in the model to 30%.
This translates into an "Average Employment Time" of 673
days. To see why, first notice from Figure 111.3. that the
"Quit Rate" is (as was the "Workforce Assimilation Rate") a
first-order exponential delay. So, we can use the equation
of Exhibit III.4.,
L(t) = L(0)*e -t/T
where,
L = Experienced Workforce (men)
t = time (years)
T = Average Employement Time (years)
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For a 30% annual turnover rate,
0.70L(O) =L(0)*e 'I/T
Thus,
T = 1/-ln(.70) = 2.8 years
Which translates into 673 days, since one year is 240 working
days.
III.4.4. Software Production:
There are four primary activities in the Software
Production Subsystem, namely, development, quality assurance,
rework, and system testing. The development activity
comprises both the design and coding of the software. As the
software is being developed, it is also reviewed e.g., using
structured-walkthroughs, to detect any design/coding errors.
Errors detected through such quality assurance (QA)
activities are then reworked. Not all errors will be
detected during the development phase, however, some will
"escape" and remain undetected until the testing phase.
This subsystem is too complex to diagram and explain as
one piece. We will, therefore, break it into four sectors,
namely:
(A) Manpower Allocation
(B) Software Development
(C) Quality Assurance & Rework
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(D) System Te~sting
These sectors iill be connected, not only through
information-type variables, but also through flows e.g.,
software will flow f om the "Software Development" sector to
the "QA & Rework" sector and from there to the "System
Testing" sector. To diagram such inter-sector flows we will
make use of a new s mbol, a "sector-symbol.." The symbol was
proposed by Morecro t (1980), and is shown below:
I
The shape of the symbol has been selected to avoid any
ambiguity or ov rlap with the standard system dynamics
symbols. Figure II.4. shows how, for example, the symbol
.. I 9 I .- ..- -A A - ! - . A -- CI -.. -C - -CA --- ,PI - P.. - 92 - .-L. -
will e used to
the "QA & Rework"
(A) Manpower Allo
The "Total D
aepict the flow or software into and out or
sector.
:ation:
aily Manpower" available for the project is
I
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simply a function of the "Total Workforce" level and the
"Average Daily Manpower per Staff." In some organizations,
software professionals are assigned to one project at a time.
In such a case the "Average Daily Manpower per Staff" would
be 1 man-day i.e., each staff member contributes 1 man-day
every day on the project. In other organizations, however,
software professionls are assigned to more than one project.
So, for example, if on the average each staff member is
assigned to say two projects on a 50-50 basis, then the
"Average Daily Manpower per Staff," for each of the projects,
would be 1/2 man-day.
Part of the available manpower will be consumed in
training overhead, as was explained in Section 111.4.3. The
"Daily Manpower Available after Training Overhead" is what is
then allocated to quality assurance, rework, software
development and testing.
Quality assurance is defined in Pressman (1982) as a set
of activities "... performed in conjunction with (the
development of) a software product to guarantee the product
meets the specified standards. These activities reduce
doubts and risks about the performance of the product in the
target environment." Several techniques are used including
walkthroughs, reviews, inspections, code reading (a process
where code logic and code format is scrutinized by a
programmer other than the original designer), and
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integration-testing (Jones, 1982) (Daly, 1977). Not included
in this activity is unit or module testing, which is commonly
considered to be part of the coding process (Mckeen, 1979).
There is a lack of data in the literature on actual
quality assurance effort expenditures. There are, instead
estimates, e.g., 6% of development effort (Knight, 1979), and
15-20% (Boehm, 1981).
In the organizations we interviewed in, estimates for
the QA effort included 10% (Nichols, 27), 15% (Landolfi, 22),
and in one case as high as 25% (Hisamune, 26).
In the model, the "Planned Fraction of Manpower for QA"
will be set to a uniform 15% level. Notice, though, that in
Figure III.5. the variable "Planned Fraction of Manpower for
QA" is shown to be a function of "% of job worked." This
will allow us to experiment with other QA policies i.e., ones
in which the QA effort is not uniformly distributed
through-out the life cycle.
As indicated in Figure 111.5., the "Actual Fraction of
Manpower for QA" can be different from the "Planned Fraction
of Manpower for QA" because of schedule pressures. Several
authors have observed that as schedule pressures mount,
quality assurance activities are often relaxed (Mitchell,
1980) (Shooman, 1983) (Devenny, 1976) (Ergott, 1979). For
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example, paraphrasing Glass (1982):
Modules and changes were initially inspected in depth
but with less severity as work pressure increased and
greater risks were taken to meet delivery schedules.
Walkthroughs and inspections are usually the larger
casualities. Under schedule pressures, they are not only
relaxed, but often they are altogether suspended (Fagan,
1976). Hart (1982) provided an explanation:
As the project progressed, there were the usual
pressures to meet the project deadline. The
walkthroughs were a natural area of concern in the
schedule, since they represented a significant time
commitment before their effectiveness was obviously
demonstrated...
As the deadline neared, there were pressures to hurry
the walkthrough and, eventually, to 'temporarily
suspended' them.
In the model, "Schedule Pressure" is formulated as
follows,
Schedule Pressure = (TMDPSN - MDRM) / MDRM
where,
TMDPSN = Total Effort Perceived to be
still needed to complete the
project (Man-Days)
MDRM = Total Effort remaining
current plan (Man-Days)
Thus, when the project is perceived as being completely
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on target i.e., effort still needed is exactly equal t'o the
effort actually remaining in the project's budget, schedule
pressure will be zero i.e., no schedule pressure. But, if
the effort perceived still needed is say 150 man-days, while
in the project's budget there is only 100 man-days left, then
schedule pressure is 0.5. Conversely, if what is perceived
to be still needed is less than what is remaining, than
schedule pressure will be less than zero i.e., there is a
slack.
The effect of schedule pressure on "Actual Fraction of
Manpower for QA" is assumed to be as shown in Figure 111.6.
Such a graph i.e., that depicts a relationship (usually
nonlinear) between two variables in a system dynamics model,
is called a "Table Function." Table functions are used
extensively in system dynamics modeling.
Table functions would be based on measurements, if such
measurements are available. In many cases (including this
one), however, measurements are not available i.e., there are
no published data on the effect of schedule pressure on the
QA effort.
There seems to be a general misunderstanding to the
effect that a mathematical model cannot be undertaken
until every constant and functional relationship is
known to high accuracy. This often leads to the
omission of admittedly highly significant factors (most
of the 'intangible' influences on decisions) because
these are unmeasured or unmeasurable. To omit such
variables is equivalent to saying they have zero effect
141
% Adjustment to
"Planned Fraction of
Manpower for QA"
.4 .5
.4 .5
.8
.8 Schedule
Pressure
Figure 111.6
-98-
-20-
-40-
-60
-80
-100
0 .1
.2 .3
.2 .3
-- li~L
142
... probably the only value that is known to be
wrong
A mathematical model should be based on the best
information that is readily available, but the design of
a model should not be postponed until all pertinent
parameters have been accurately measured. That day will
never come. Values should be estimated where necessary
... (Forrester, 1981).
Because of the lack of published measurements, it was
necessary to estimate the relationship between schedule
pressure and the QA effort. To give the reader a flavor of
how both judgement and available information are used to
formulate a Table Function, we will go through the
formulation of Figure 111.6. in some detail.
There are three potential considerations in formulating
a table function: Slope, one or more specific points, and
shape.
The slope of the relationship between schedule pressure
and adjustments to QA effort is easy to determine. It must
be negative, since, as the above quotes indicate, as schedule
pressure increases, QA effort decreases.
We can also identify at least one point on the graph
quite straight forwardly. It is the point (0,0) i.e., in the
absence of any schedule pressure (i.e., "Schedule Pressure"
is Zero), the % adjustment to the planned fraction of
manpower effort for QA will be zero i.e., actual QA effort
will be equal to the planned effort.
143
As schedule pressure mounts, quality assurance
activities are relaxed i.e., cuts are made into the planned
QA effort. QA activities are not, however, eliminated
completely e.g., while walkthroughs might be decreased or
even temporarily suspended, integration testing might not.
In the judgement of the project managers we interviewed,
planned quality assurance activities could be cut by as much
as 50% under severe schedule pressures, which were defined as
situations in which "Schedule Pressure" is equal to or
greater than .5 (Gage, 4) (Babich, 9) (Nichols, 25)
(Hisamune, 26). On the basis of these judgements (the best
available information), the point (.5, -50) of Figure 111.6.
is identified.
The final step was to figure out the shape of the
negatively sloping curve connecting the two points (0,0) and
(.5, -50).
It is reasonable to expect the curve flattens out at the
two extreme points. As schedule pressure starts to rise,
people react, not only by cutting conners, they also start
working harder (Boehm, 1981). This absorbs some of the
effects of schedule pressure on QA effort allocations at the
vicinity of point (0,0). Also, as indicated above, as
schedule pressure increases it gradually reaches a saturation
point at which it ceases to affect further adjustments to the
QA effort i.e., the curve flattens at (.5, -50). And
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finally, these two extreme flat parts of the curve are
connected by a negatively sloping smooth curve. "Any sharply
bent or kinked curve is probably not realistic. A bend or
kink implies something special about the exact conditions at
which the bend or kink occurs" (Graham, 1980).
Now, we resume our discussion of this section's. main
topic, namely, the allocation of the project's manpower
resource. So far we have accounted for manpower resources
consumed in training and quality assurance activities. The
remaining bulk of the manpower resource, labelled in Figure
111.5. as the "Daily Manpower for Software Production," is
to be allocated to software development (i.e., design and
coding), testing, and rework.
As software errors are detected through the quality
assurance activities, manpower effort is allocated to correct
them. The amount of daily effort allocated is a function of
both the "Desired Error Correction Rate" i.e., the daily rate
at which these discovered errors are to be corrected, and the
"Perceived Rework Manpower Needed per Error." In other
words, the effort is allocated on the basis of the rework job
to be done, and the perceived rework productivity.
The "Perceived Rework Manpower Needed per Error" is
diagramed in Figure 11.5. as a special kind of a level,
namely, one with an input that is not a rate. This is a
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"shorthand notation" for an exponential smoothing operation.
That is, "Perceived Rework Manpower Needed per Error" is the
exponential" smooth of its input, the "Actual Rework Manpower
Needed per Error." (Because smoothing or averaging of
information accumulates that information, a smoothed variable
is represented by a level's rectangular symbol.)
Why smooth? Because, "Full and immediate action is
seldom taken on a change of incoming information (e.g., on
the sudden drop in yesterday's rework productivity) ...
(There is a) tendency to delay action until the change is
insistent ... " (Forrester, 1961).
A full schematic representaion of the smoothing
operation is shown in Figure 111.7., together with its
mathematical formulation. (Readers familiar with smoothing
formulations may want to observe that the equation for a
smoothed variable can be written in the familiar
weighted-average form for exponential smoothing.) In Figure
111.7., we also show the behavior of the "smoothed variable"
in response to a spike in the "variable to be smoothed."
Thus, a sudden change (e.g. increase) in the "Actual
Rework Manpower Needed per Error," will not initially affect
the project member's rework-manpower allocation decisions.
If, however, the increase persists over a period of time, the
change will be perceived as permanent (i.e., "Perceived
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Rework Manpower Needed per Error" catches up with the actual)
and thus incorporated in the allocation decision making
process. The smoothing time is set in the model at 10 days.
As mentioned above, the amount of daily effort allocated
for rework activities is a function of not only the
"Perceived Rework Manpower Needed per Error," but also the
"Desired Error Correction Rate," i.e., the daily rate at
which the discovered errors are to be corrected. For
example, if it is desired to correct one error a day, and if
it is perceived than one Man-Day is needed on the average to
correct an error, then one Man-day will be allocated daily
for rework activities.
The "Desired Error Correction Rate" is the value of the
total number of discovered errors divided by a "Desired
Rework Delay." When an error is detected, it, usually, is
not immediately corrected. Some time elapses before a
software professional "deals" with it. In a TRW study
(Thayer et al, 1978) this delay was found to be in the range
of 8-19 days. The "Desired Rework Delay" is set in the model
to 15 days (James, 1) (Lombardi, 16).
As is shown in Figure 111.5., after manpower is
allocated to rework activities, the remaining (often larger)
portion of the "Daily Manpower for Software Production" is
devoted to the development (i.e., design and coding) and
testing activitiei
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. These activities are discussed in detail
B) and (D) respectively.
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asks are perceived to be completed, the
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value of the "Fraction of Effort for System Testing" becomes
a 1, i.e., 100% of the effort available for software
development/testing is utilized in system testing activities.
The switch is not abrupt, however. There is, usually, some
overlap between the development and testing phases (Thibodeau
and Dodson, 1980) (Daly, 1977) (Hartwick, 1980). For
example, the design of test cases usually commences towards
(not at) the end of the software development phase (Adrion et
al, 1982). This overlap of the phases is captured in Figure
111.9. It shows the assumed gradual increase in the value of
the "Fraction of Effort for System Testing" as a function of
the fraction of development tasks perceived remaining.
During the software development phase, the rate at which
the software will be developed will be a function of not only
how much manpower is utilized, but in addition, it will also
depend on'the productivity of the software developers (as is
shown in Figure 111.8.).
"Software Development Productivity" is a function of a
complex set of factors, and as such it comprises a
significant portion of the model. We are, therefore, using a
separate figure, to provide a detailed depiction of its
formulation.
Our formulation of the productivity of the software
development group is based. on a model of group productivity
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in the Psychology literature proposed by Ivan Steiner (1966).
The model can be simply stated as follows:
Actual Productivity = Potential Productivity -
Losses Due to Faulty Process
Where Losses due to faulty process refer basically to
communication and motivation losses
Potential productivity is defined as the maximum level
of productivity that can occur when an individual or
group employs its funds of resources to meet the task
demands of a work situation. It is the level of
productivity that will be attained if the individual or
group makes the best possible use of its resources (that
is, if there is no loss of productivity due to faulty
process)... Potential Productivity can be inferred from
a thorough analysis of task demands and available
resources, for it depends only upon these two types of
variables.
Actual productivity, what the individual or group does
in fact accomplish, rarely equals potential
productivity. Individuals and groups usually fail to
make the best possible use of their available resources.
Problems of coordination and/or motivation are
responsible for inadequacies in process, and for
consequent losses in productivity (Steiner, 1966).
The three pieces of Steiner's model, namely, actual
productivity, potential productivity, and
communication/motivation losses are all incorporated in the
formulation of Figure III.10. Their structures fall in the
middle part, the left part, and the right and bottom parts of
the figure, respectively.
According to Steiner, potential productivity is a
function of two determinants, the nature of the task and the
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group's resources. The effects of these two sets of factors
on the productivity of software development has been
investigated in the software engineering literature.
However, because the idea of distinguishing between actual
and potential productivity didn't take root in the software
engineering literature (yet), in all such studies the
dependent variable is always the actual productivity of
software development.
For example, Scott and Simmons (1974) used the Delphi
technique "to determine what programming project variables
have the greatest impact on programmer productivity." They
identified three resource-type variables including, the
availability of programming tools, the availability of
programming practices, and programmer experience, as well as
two task-type variables, namely, the programming language and
the quality of external documentation, as all having
significant influence on productivity.
Boehm's COCOMO software cost estimation model (1981),
incorporates the following determinants of productivity:
(1) Task-type Variables: Product complexity, required
reliability, memory constraint, and database size.
(2) Resource-type Variables: Software tools available,
turnaround time, and personnel experience.
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Finally, Chrysler (1978) mapped several research
findings into a model that categorizes the determinants of
software productivity into 6 categories. Three of the
categories were of the task-type, they were "programming
problem characteristics," "Source Language," and "Computer
Hardware Characteristics." The other three categories
included resource-type factors, and they included "Programmer
Characteristics," "Organizational Characteristics," and
"Programming Mode."
Notice that most of the above factors, while they would
vary from organization to organization (e.g., availability of
software tools, personnel capability, and computer-hardware
characteristics) and from project to project within a single
organization (e.g., programming language, database size, and
product complexity) they would, however, remain constant
within a single project. From our modeling viewpoint, this
observation is quite-significant. It means that, in modeling
the behavior of a single software development project, most
of the above variables would remain constant and can,
therefore be simply captured by a single constant parameter
in the model. Such a parameter would then need adjustments
only when modeling different projects and/or different
organizations.
This is achieved in the model through the formulation of
the "Nominal Potential Productivity" parameter. It
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represents the maximum level of software development
productivity that can occur when an individual employs
his/her fund of resources to meet the task demands for the
specific work situation modelled i.e., a specific project
within a specific organization.
The value of the "Nominal Potential Productivity"
parameter will be defined in terms of a number of
"Tasks/man-day." Which, of course, means that its value
depends on what we define a "Task" to be. This provides us
with two options in modeling di-fferent project situations in
which the nominal potential productivity differs e.g., due to
differences in the degree of complexity of the project. We
can either fix in the model what a "Task" is defined to be,
and change the value of the "Nominal Potential Productivity"
parameter, or we can do the reverse, that is, fix the value
of the "Nominal Potential Productivity" parameter to say (X)
tasks/man-day, while changing the value of what a "Task" is.
We opted for the second alternative. We will,
therefore, define "Nominal Potential Productivity" to be a
certain number, (X) (to be specified shortly) of
tasks/man-day, and formulate "Task" as a parameter in the
model that can be set at different values to reflect
different project and resource characteristics.
A "Task" is essentially some unit for sizing up a
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software product. In principle, a "Task" can be any
arbitrary unit by which we can measure a software project's
size e.g., it can be defined in terms of lines of code,
function-points, modules, input/output files, ... etc. From
a practical point of view, though, the "lines of code" unit
is the most attractive alternative. Defining our sizing
measure, the "Task", in terms of "lines of code" provides us
with direct access to most published results on software
productivity measurements.
A "Task" is, therefore, defined in terms of a number of
Delivered Source Instructions (DSI). The definition of
Delivered Source Instructions (DSI), as provided by Boehm
(1981), is as follows:
Delivered. This term is generally meant to exclude
nondelivered support software such as test drivers.
However, if these are developed with the same care as
delivered software, with their own review, test plans,
documentation, etc., then they should be included.
Source Instructions. This term includes all program
instructions created by project personnel and processed
into machine code by some combination of preprocessors,
compilers, and assemblers. It excludes comment cards
and unmodified utility software. It includes job
control language, format statements, and data
declarations. Instructions are defined as lines of code
or card images. Thus, a line containing two or more
source statement counts as one instruction; a five-line
data declaration counts as five instructions.
Let us provide an example to further clarify the
concepts of "Normal Potential Productivity" and "Task."
Assume two different software development organizations,
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(ORG-i) and (ORG-2), have each just completed the development
(i.e., design and coding) of a software project. The two
projects, (PROJ-1) and (PROJ-2), are two completely different
projects (e.g., one is an embedded piece of software for a
military satellite and the other a payroll sj
that they are both exactly 8000 DSI in size.
assume that in (ORG-1) the development effi
total of 400 man-days to design and code
(PROJ-1), while in (PROJ-2) the development 4
man-days. If for purposes of simplification,
the communication and motivation losses in both
i.e., assume that actual productivity
productivity, we could then conclude that I
productivity in (ORG-1) is half that of
distiction would be realized in the model as
"Nominal Potential Productivity" parameter woi
in both runs of the model at the same
ystem), except
Now, let us
ort consumed a
the 8000 DSI
effort was 200
we disregard
organizations
= potential
the potential
(ORG-2). This
follows: The
uld be defined
value, say 1
Task/Man-day, but in the (PROJ-1) run we would define a Task
to be 20 DSI, while in the (PROJ-2) run a "Task" would be set
at 40 DSI. That is, the 8000 DSI project (PROJ-1) will be
defined in the first run as a 400 Task project, while the
8000 DSI project (PROJ-2) would be defined as a 200 Task
project.
We have thus far only addressed one set of factors that
affect the potential productivity on a -software development
project, namely, those factors which remain constant
t
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throughout a particular project. While most of the factors
listed in the literature are of this variety, at least two
are not, namely, workforce experience level (Chrysler, 1978)
and increases in project familiarity due to learning-curve
effects (Crowley), (Shell, 1972), (Weinberg, 1982).
To capture the effect of experience, we will formulate
two nominal potential productivity parameters, one to
represent the nominal potential productivity of the average
experienced staff member, and the second represents that of
the average newly hired employee. And at any point in time
in the project the "Average Nominal Potential Productivity"
for the workforce as a whole would be the weighted average of
the two parameters, (in which each parameter is weighted by
the fraction of its corresponding employee-type in the total
workforce).. Thus, while the two nominal potential
productivity parameters for the two types of employees
remains constant throughout a project, the project's "Average
Nominal Potential Productivity" may not, since the mix of
experienced and new employees could (and probably would)
change.
We will take the nominal potential productivity of an
average experienced staff member to be our reference point,
and define it to have a value of 1 Task/Man-day. The value
of the nominal potential productivity of the average employee
within the newly-hired workforce pool is then determined
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relative to that 1 Task/Man-day reference point. In the
literature, estimates for the productivity of a newly hired
staff member relative to that of an experienced staff member
included 0.45 (Weiss, 1973), 0.5 (Okada, 1982), 0.6
(Toellner, 1977), and 0.64 (Boehm, 1981) (Benbasat and
Vessey, 1980). Estimates provided from interviews ranged
from 0.33 (Hisamune,26) to 0.5 (Lombardi, 16). It should be
noted, however, that all these estimates are for actual
productivities and not potential productivities. But since
there is no evidence to suggest that there are significant
differences in the communication and motivation losses
between the two types of employees, we will accept the above
estimates as a "reasonable" approximation for the ratio
between the potential productivities of the two groups of
employees. The value of the nominal potential productivity
for the average newly hired employee is, accordingly, set in
the model to 0.5 Task/Man-day.
The second factor affecting potential productivity, in
the model, is the increased project- know-how due to the
learning-curve effect (Crowley) (Shell, 1972) (Weinberg,
1982). "As a project proceeds, the implementers learn their
job better. The 'learning curve' is the rate of improvement"
(Aron, 1976). Several authors have suggested that an
S-shaped type learning-curve characterizes this "rate of
improvement" in the software development environment
(Crowley) (Weinberg, 1982). Reflecting on his experience at
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IBM, Aron (1976) estimates that the total improvement for a
medium sized project (e.g.., 12-24 months long) would be a 25%
improvement in productivity.
In the model the learning curve effect is formulated as
the variable "Multiplier to potential Productivity Due to
Learning." It is, as is shown in Figure III.11, S-shaped and
it is a function of progress in the project, starting with a
value of 1 at the beginning of the project, and peaking at a
value 25% higher (i.e., at 1.25) towards the end of the
development period.
As defined above, potential productivity is the level of
productivity that will be attained if the individual or group
makes the best possible use of his/its resources (that is, .if
there is no loss of productivity due to faulty process).
However, due to losses caused by communications and
motivation problems actual productivity, i.e., what the
individual or group does in fact accomplish, rarely equals
potential productivity (Steiner, 1966).
In the model, "Software Development Productivity" is
formulated as the product of "Potential Productivity" and the
"Multiplier to Productivity Due to Communication and
Motivation losses." In the absence of any communication and
motivation losses the. multiplier assumes a value of 1, in
which case actual productivity would be equal to potential
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productivity. However, losses will occur, and these will
drive the multiplier to values that are less than 1, thus
depressing the val'ue of actual productivity to levels below
that of potential productivity.
The "Multiplier to Productivity Due to Communication and
Motivation Losses" has the following interpretation. It
represents the average productive fraction of a Man-Day. In
other words, if the nominal man-day for a full-time employee
is 8 hours, because of communication and motivation losses,
the daily contribution by the average employee to the project
will be less than 8 man-hours. For example, if the
communication and motivation losses amount to a 4 man-hour
loss per day (for the average employee) i.e., half the
nominal 8 man-hour value, then the value of the multiplier
would be a 0.5.
The effects of communication and motivation are
multiplicative. Motivation factors first determine the
fraction of a man-day devoted to project work. This fraction
will usually have a value less than 1, since time is often
lost on personal matters, coffee-breaks, and other
miscellaneous non-project related activities. Communication
losses refer to project-type communication losses, and are
thus formulated as a fraction of "project hours" i.e., the
hours devoted to project work, hence the multiplicative
formulation of the two components of productivity loss. The
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detailed formulation of the effects of both communication and
motivation losses on productivity are shown in Figure III.10.
In considering the effects of motivation losses on
productivity we need to make the same distinction we made
while formulating the "potential productivity" structure,
that is, between those factors that would remain constant
during a single project (while possibly varying between
projects and between organizations) and those that could
change throughout the life of the single project. A
reference back to our review of the literature on motivation
(in Chapter II) would indicate that most of the motivational
factors identified and studied e.g., possibility for growth,
advancement, responsibility, salary, company policy and
administration, ... etc., are of the former variety i.e.,
factors that tend to characterize the overall organizal
setting and climate. Such invariant factors would therefore
be "implicitly" incorporated within the definition of the
potential productivity parameters.
"Another motivation approach which is particularly
appropriate to the data processing area is goal setting"
(Bartol and Martin, 1982). The authors further suggest that
project goals and schedules can play a significant
motivational role throughout the life of a software
development project.
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Boehm (1981) went a step further and provided the means
to "operationalize" this idea. He suggests that the
motivational role of schedule pressures and project deadlines
is to expand or contract the project members' "slack time."
The slack time being the fraction of project time lost on
off-project activities, e.g., coffee-breaks, personal
business, non-project communication, ... etc.
The motivation mechanism in the model is designed to
capture this motivational impact of schedule pressures on
"slack time." That is why, motivation losses are formulated,
as indicated above, in terms of man-hour losses.
In the absence of schedule pressures, which can be
either positive (i.e., when the project.is perceived to be
behind schedule) or negative (i.e., when the project is
perceived to be ahead of schedule), the fraction of daily
hours allocated to project-related work by the average
full-time team member is defined by the parameter "Nominal
Fraction of a Man-Day on Project." In designating a value
for this parameter, we were able to draw upon the experiences
of our interviewees as well as that of a large number of
authors. And we found that most of the estimates were
clustered within the 50-70% range, e.g., 50% (Brooks, 1978)
(Nichols, 25), 50-60% (Gehring and Pooch, 1977) (Pooch and
Gehring, 1980), 60% (Basili and Zelkowitz, 1979), and 70%
(Boehm, 1981). In addition, Stalnaker (1968) reported on the
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results of a large study that investigated how software
professionals utilize their time. The findings indicated, on
the basis of over 7000 observations of a group of production
programmers, that 35% of the time was lost on "Personal
activities," "being away or out," and other "miscellaneous"
non-project related activities. Furthermore, within the
remaining 65% of the available working time, there were
further losses e.g., time spent on mail, company business,
... etc.
On the basis of the above findings, the value of the
parameter "Nominal Fraction of a Man-Day on Project" was set
to 60% i.e., in the absence of schedule pressures, a
full-time employee would allocate, on the average,
0.6 X 8 = 4.8 hours to the project (assuming an 8-hour day).
Under these nominal conditions, therefore, the "contribution"
of motivation losses to the "Multiplier to Productivity due
to Motivation and Communication Losses" amounts, in effect,
to a 40% cut in potential productivity.
The loss in productivity due to motivational factors,
does not, of course, remain constant at the 40% level
throughout the life of the project. The motivational effects
of schedule pressures can push the "Actual Fraction of a
Man--Day on Project" to both higher (under positive schedule
pressure) as well as lower (under negative schedule pressure)
values i.e., leading to motivation losses that would be lower
166
than the 40% level in the former case, but higher in the
latter.
As shown in Figure 'III.10, the "Actual Fraction of a
Man-Day on Project" is formulated in the model as a level
variable. Its value is set, at the initiation of the
project, to the value of "Nominal Fraction of a Man-Day on
Project" i.e., at 60%. And it maintains that nominal value
at the absence of any schedule pressures. To see how
schedule pressures influence the "Actual Fraction of a
Man-Day on Project," let us first consider the effects of
positive schedule pressures. /
Schedule pressure was previously defined as,
Schedule Pressure = (TMDPSN-MDRM)/MDRM
where,
TMDPSN = Total Effort perceived to be
still needed to complete the
project (Man-Days)
MDRM = Total Effort remaining in
current plan (Man-Days)
Positive schedule pressures arise whenever the project
is perceived to be behind schedule. That is, whenever the
total effort still needed to complete the project is
perceived to be greater than the total effort actually
remaining (i.e., when the numerator in the schedule pressure
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equation is positive). Such a difference represents a
perceived shortage in man-days on the project.
When confronted with such a situation, software
developers tend to work harder, i.e., allocate more man-hours
to the project, in an attempt to compensate for the perceived
shortage and bring the project back on schedule (Larkin)
(Ibrahim, 1978) (McGowan, 3) (Babich, 9) (Lombardi, 16)
(Nichols, 18) (Sheldon, 19) (Chan, 20) (Hisamune, 21). In
one experiment, Boehm (1981) found that the number of
man-hours increases by as much as 100%. And he asserts that
most of the gains are achieved by "reallocating (i.e.,
compressing) peoples' slack time." In other words, under
schedule pressure, people tend to spend less time on
off-project activities such as personal business and
non-project communication. This then decreases the man-hours
lost per man-day, while increasing the daily man-hours
allocated to the project.
Recall that the value of the "Nominal Fraction of a
Man-Day on Project" was set to 60%, which translate into 4.8
hours of project work per man-day. This would seem to
indicate that, at most, another 3.2 hours per man-day can be
gained under schedule pressure (assuming an 8-hour day),
i.e., a 67% increase. And since it is quite unlikely that
people would in fact allocate every minute of their 8-hour
working day to project work, the attainable increase will be
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even less than 67%. How then could we explain the 100%
increase reported by Boehm?
A 100% increase is attainable because workers, in
addition to partially compressing their slack time, may also
work overtime hours. For example, by working 12 hours a day
at 80% efficiency, a team member would be allocating 9.6
hours to the project i.e., double the nominal 4.8 hours.
In fact, by further compressing the slack time (say to
10 or 15%) and/or increasing the overtime hours, an increase
of more than 100% could be achieved. But this would cause
actual productivity to be larger than potential productivity,
which by definition should not be possible. That is, by the
current definitions. To accomodate this situation, we,
therefore, amend the definition of potential productivity to
be "the level of productivity that will be attained if the
individual or group makes the best possible use of its
resources under regular working conditions," and define
"regular" to exclude overtime working conditions.
To recapitulate, when a project is perceived to be
behind schedule, people tend to work harder to bring it back
on schedule. They do that by compressing their slack time
and/or working over-time, and thus allocating more man-hours
to the project. But what if such a situation persists ...
would workers be willing to work harder indefinitely? The
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answer, according to our interviewees, was overwhelmingly no
[(McGowan, 3), (Babich, 9), (Lombardi, 16), (Nichols, 18),
(Sheldon, 19), (Chan, 20), and (Hisamune, 21)]. There is, it
was indicated, a threshold on how long employees would be
willing to work at an "above-normal" rate.
We refer now to Figure III.10. to explain how the above
set of findings is implemented in the model.
When the project is perceived to be behind schedule
i.e., when the total effort still needed to complete the
project is perceived to be greater than the total effort
actually remaining in the project's plan, two factors
determine the level to which the "Actual Fraction of Man-day
on Project" is boosted. The first is the value of the
"Perceived Shortage in Man-days" i.e., the value of the
difference between what is needed and what is remaining. If
this difference is below some "threshold," then it will all
be handled, i.e., the employees will boost the hours they
allocate to the project (e.g., by compressing their slack
time) to what they perceive is necessary to handle all the
"Perceived Shortage in Man-days." (How they determine this
will be explained shortly.) The 'second factor is the
"Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be Handled," and it
constitutes the "threshold" mentioned above. Thus, if the
"Perceived Shortage in Man-Days" is greater than the maximum
which the employees are willing to handle, we will assume
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that they would be motivated to work harder to handle that
maximum value, while arranging with management to extend the
schedule so as to handle what exceeds the "Maximum Shortage
in Man-Days to be handled." (Such extension to the schedule
will be explained in the Planning Section.)
As employees work harder to handle shortages in
man-days, their tolerence for working harder decreases i.e.,
the value of the "Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be handled"
decreases. For if this were not true, e.g., if this maximum
value was a constant parameter, then a persistent man-days
shortage at moderate levels (i.e., at levels below the
maximum value) would lead to an above normal work rate
throughout the life of the project. And this, would
contradict our finding that "there is a threshold on how long
employees would be willing to work at above normal rate."
At any point in the project, the value of the "Maximum
Shortage in Man-Days to be handled" is determined by the
product of three variables, the "Overwork Duration
Threshold," the "Full-Time Equivalent Workforce," and the
"Maximum Boost in Man-Hours." For example, if at a point in
time the workforce of 10 full-time people on the project is
willing to work at an above normal rate for a maximum of 10
days, and they figure that they can boost their work rate by
as much as 100% (e.g., allocate 9.6 hours per man-day to the
project instead of the normal 4.8 hours) then they would
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conclude that during this 10 day period it is possible to
handle 10 X 10 X 1 = 100 Man-days worth of backlogged work,
over and above the regular work planned for that period.
In the model, the value of the "Maximum Boost in
Man-Hours" is set, as in the exampld above, at a value of
100% (Lombardi, 16) (Nichols, 27).
Estimates by the interviewees for a nominal value for
the "Overwork Duration Threshold" ranged from 8 weeks (Chan,
20) to 12 weeks (Nichols, 27). In the model we set the
nominal value for the "Overwork Duration Threshold" to 50
working days (i.e., 10 weeks). Once people start working
harder, their "Overwork Duration Threshold," which at any
point in time would represent the maximum remaining duration
for which they would be willing to continue working harder,
would decrease below the nominal value. Thus the "Overwork
Duration Threshold" is formulated as a nominal value (i.e.,
of 10 weeks) that is adjusted downwards by.a multiplier. One
option for the multiplier was to have it be a function of the
calendar time during which the project members, have been
working harder. This option was rejected, though, because it
would not differentiate between say a ten day period during
which the staff were working 10% harder, and another ten day
period in which they worked 100% harder. We wanted the
formulation of the multiplier to induce a cut in the
"Overwork Duration Threshold" that would be greater at the
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end of the latter case.
This was accomplished by formulating the "Multiplier to
the Overwork Duration Threshold due to Exhaustion." Where
"Exhaustion" is simply a level whose value reflects the level
of exhaustion of the workforce due to overwork. The rate at
which this level increases needs, therefore, to be a function
of some measure of overwork. Such a function is shown in
Figure 111.12.
Before interpreting Figure III.12., let us first refresh
our memories about some assumptions we've made so far.
First, we are assuming that a full time employee allocates,
on the average, 60% of his or her time to the project (i.e.,
NFMDPJ = 0.6), which for an 8-hour day amounts to 4.8 hours.
Under schedule pressure, more time will be allocated to the
project (i.e., AFMDPJ > 0.6). This would be achieved by
first compressing the slack time, and then if needed, by
working overtime. Furthermore, we are also assuming that
there is a "Maximum (Possible) Boost in Man-Hours" of 100%
i.e., AFMDPJ can attain a maximum value of 0.6 X 2 = 1.2.
The first thing to note about Figure 111.12. is that
when AFMDPJ is less than or equal to NFMDPJ (i.e., when X is
greater than 1) the value of RIEXHL is zero. That is, when
people are working at their normal pace (or slower) there
will be no rise in their exhaustion level. This must be so
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Y= RIEXHL
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by definition, since the "Exhaustion level" in the model is
defined to be that of exhaustion due to overwork.
Second, note that the exhaustion rate is really a
function of (1-AFMDPJ), since the denominator of (X) i.e.,
(I-NFMDPJ), is a constant term. Also note that the value of
(1-AFMDPJ) is a measure of the average "Slack Time." What we
are saying, therefore, is that the exhaustion rate of the
workforce is a function of the. compression in the average
slack time. And the reason is this: the exhaustion of
working harder is mostly "psychological," rather than
"physiological." That is, pe'ople enjoy their slack time
(e.g., coffee breaks, social communications, personal
business, ... etc.), and they would not tolerate prolonged
deprivation of such "breathers." Thus a compressed slack
time exhausts them in the sense that it cuts into their
tolerance level for continued hard work since that would mean
a continued "deprivation" of their slack time.
However, when the value of (1-AFDPRD) approaches zero
and moves into negative territory, people would, not only be
compressing their slack time, but they would in addition be
working overtime. At those values, in addition to the
psychological component to exhaustion, there will also be
"physiological" exhaustion. And that is why, the curve
increases at a faster rate for negative.values of (X).
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The effects Of exhaustion on the "Overwork Duration
Threshold" is formulated as the "Multiplier to the Overwork
Duration Threshold due to Exhuastion." As we explained
previously, the nominal value of the threshold is 50 days.
And as people start working harder, i.e., at a rate above
their normal rate, that threshold is cut down, until possibly
it reaches a value of zero. But notice that setting the
nominal value of the "Overwork Duration Threshold" to 50 days
is not enough. It is also necessary to specify at what level
of overwork, since people might be willing to work for 50
days at a rate 50% above their normal rate, while not willing
to do so at a 100% increase. We thus amend our definition of
the nominal value or the "Overwork Duration Threshold" to be
50 working days a a rate of 8 hours per man-day (i.e., when
AFMDPJ is approxim tely 1). Notice that when AFMDPJ is
approximately 1, RIEXML in Figure 111.12. would be also 1
i.e., at such a work rate, each man-day contributes 1 to the
Exhaustion level. And after 50 such days, the Exhaustion
level reaches a level of 50, which should be enough to drive
the "Overwork Duration Threshold" to zero. That level- of
Exhaustion is terlned the "Maximum Tolerable Exhaustion"
level. That leve of exhaustion could of course be reached
in less than a 50 dly duration if people are working even
harder (i.e., if AFMDPJ is greater than 1), and conversely,
if the work rate is less than 8-hours per man-day, it would
be reached in more than 50 days.. But once reached, it drives
the "Overwork D ration Threshold" to zero. This is
176
accomplished by the formulation of
Overwork Duration Threshold due
Figure 111.13.
the "Multiplier to the
to Exhaustion," shown in
Once a period of overwork comes to an end, either
because the threshold has been reached and/or schedule
pressures cease, and the workforce returns to a normal work
rate (i.e,, when AFMDPJ = NFMDPJ), the workforce's
"Exhaustion level" depletes. The "Rate of Depletion of the
Exhaustion level" is modeled as a first order exponential
delay, with a time delay equal to 4 weeks. The 4 weeks delay
time was chosen on the basis of discussion with (Lombardi,
23) and (Nichols, 25).
During the "de-exhausting" period, the workforce remains
unwilling to "re-overwork" (Lombardi, 23) (Nichols, 25).
This is achieved in the model through the formulation of the
variable "Willingness to Overwork." This is a SWITCH
variable that can attain one of two values, namely, zero or
one, and is multiplied into the formulation of the "Maximum
Shortage in Man-Days to be Handled." Whenever the maximum
exhaustion level is reached and the "Overwork Duration
Threshold" is driven down to zero, the "Willingness to
Overwork" variable is switched to zero. The "Willingness to
Overwork" variable will remain at that zero level until the
workforce is "de-exhausted" i.e., until the "Exhaustion
Level" is depleted. And as long as the "Willingness to
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Overwork" is zero, the "Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be
Handled" will also be zero i.e., the worforce remains
unwilling to handle any (further) man-day shortages through
overwork. When the "Exhaustion Level" is eventually
depleted, the "Willingness t. Overwork" is switched back to a
value of one i.e., the workforce would again be willing to
overwork (if and when the need arises).
Recall that determining the value of the "Overwork
Duration Threshold" was necessary in order to determine the
value of the "Maximum Shortage in Man-days to be Handled."
The latter, in turn, is necessary to determine the value to
which the "Actual Fraction of Man-days on Project" is
boosted. When the project is perceived to be behind schedule
i.e., when the total effort still needed to complete the
project is perceived to be greater than the total effort
actually remaining in the project's plan, indicating a
shortage in man-days, the staff members would then seek to
boost their work rate to what they perceive is necessary to
handle either all the "Perceived Shortage in Man-Days" or the
"Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be Handled," which ever is
smaller. The smaller of the two values would then constitute
the "Handled Man-Days." The "% Boost in Work Rate Sought" to
handle these man-days is determined by dividing the value of
"Handled Man-Days" by the product of "Full-Time Equivalent
Workforce" and "Overwork Duration Threshold." For example,
if 100 man-days are to be handled by a 10 person team in 50
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days, the % Boost would be 100/(10X50) = 0.2. That is the
workers would figure that by increasing their work rate by
20% they can handle the 100 man-days of backlogged work in
addition to the regular work planned for the 50 day period.
Notice our assumption that the backlogged work will always be
stretched over the full period defined by the "Overwork
Duration Threshold." This should be a good approximation in
cases when the value of "Handled Man-Days" is close to the
"Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be handled." When the
"Handled Man-Days" is much smaller, though, the team might
decide to handle it in a shorter "spurt" of overwork e.g.,
"to get it over with." However, we will simplify and use a
single formulation for all cases (i.e., one in which the
backlog is stretched over the "Overwork Duration Threshold"
period).
Once the "% Boost in Work Rate Sought" is determined, it
defines a work rate goal in terms of the man-hours to be
allocated to the project. Such a goal is not achieved
instantaneously, since workers take time to adjust their work
habits. There is, therefore, a delay before the "Actual
Fraction of Man-Days on Project", in fact attains the level
sought. The average delay is set in the model to 2 weeks.
So far we have been discussing the effects of positive
schedule pressures on productivity. To both complete and
conclude this discussion on the effects of motivational
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factors on productivity, we turn our attention next to
(probably rare) situations in which the project is per!
to be ahead of schedule i.e., the case of negative scl
pressures.
those
:eived
iedule
Such a situation exists whenever the total maI-aays
remaining in the project's plan exceed what the p oject
members perceive to be needed to complete the project. This
could happen, for example, if management over-estimates a
project's scope. The question we are interested in addessing
here is what effects would a perception of such "excelsses"
have on productivity, if any?
Recall, in the case of positive schedule pressures, the
shortage in man-days was handled first by adjustmen:s in
productivity and then if needed by additional adjustment; in
the schedule. Analogous behavior occurs in the neg tive
schedule pressure situation. That is, when project menbers
perceive some "excesses" in the schedule parts, if not all,
of those excesses will be "absorbed" by the workers, in the
form of "under-work," before downward adjustments are made in
the project's schedule (Ibrahim, 1978) (Boehm, 1381)
(Griffin, 6) (Babich, 9) (Lombardi, 16) (Sheldon, 19). For
example, paraphrasing Boehm (1981):
. if the software cost or schedule estimate !for
meeting a milestone is higher than the ideal,
Parkinson's Law indicates that people will use the extra
time for ... personal activities, catching up on :he
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mail, etc.
Again, analogous to the positive schedule pressure
situation where there was a limit on how much backlog could
be handled, there are limits on how much "fat" employees
would be willing, or allowed, to absorb. And beyond those
limits, excesses would be translated into cuts in the
project's schedule.
The above ideas are captured in the table function of
Figure 111.14. The dashed 450 line represents full
disclosure of schedule excesses, and thus the complete
translation of any excesses into schedule cuts. A more
realistic project behavior is the one depicted by the Solid
Curve. At the upper right corner excesses are small i.e.,
"Man-Days Perceived Still Needed" is slightly less than
"Man-Days Remaining" in the plan. Under such conditions most
of the slack will be absorbed (not reported) i.e., reports
will show that the project is on (not ahead of) schedule
i.e., "Man-Days Reported Still Needed" will be equal to
"Man-Days Remaining." As we move towards conditions of
larger and larger.excesses those large excesses will be only
partially absorbed, and the balance translated into cuts in
the project's schedule.
Absorbed excesses will mean, as was indicated above, a
larger slack time, which in turn means a lower "Actual
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Fraction of a Man-Day on Project." This is brought about in
the model through the same mechanism used to increase the
"Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on Project" under positive
schedule pressure, namely, through an adjustment to the value
of the variable "% Boost in work Rate Sought." In this case,
however, the % boost will be a negative value.
There are, in addition, two more differences between the
two cases. In calculating the % boost, we will assume that
the workers will stretch their absorption of the perceived
excesses over the remaining life of the project. That is,
instead of a short lived and drastic dip in their work rate,
workers are assumed to adjust to what they perceive would be
a stable, albeit comfortably lower, work rate.
Once the "% (DIP) in work rate Sought" is determined, it
defines a work rate goal in terms of the man-hours to be
allocated to the project. As in the positive schedule
pressure situation, such a goal is not achieved
instantaneously, since workers take time to adjust their work
habits. It is reasonable to expect, though, that the delay
to adjust one's habits to a more comfortable state would be a
smaller delay than that of adjusting to a less comfortable
state. We, therefore, will assume that the average delay in
adjusting to a "% Dip" is 7.5 days i.e., 25% lower than that
of adjusting.to a "% Boost" under positive schedule pressure.
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The value of the "Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on
Project," once determined under various schedule pressure
conditions, becomes an important determinant of the actual
software development productivity. It represents, as
indicated above, the losses in productivity due to
motivational factors. It is not the only determinant,
though. Additional losses in productivity are incurred due
to the communication overhead.
As is shown in Figure III.10., "Software Development
Productivity" is formulated as the product of "Potential
Productivity" and the "Multiplier to Productivity Due to
Communication and Motivation Losses." The multiplier
represents the average productive fraction of a Man-Day,
i.e., that fraction of the "Actual Fraction of a Man-Days on
Project" that remains after accounting for communication
overhead. For example, if the "Actual Fraction of a Man-Day
on Project" is 0.6 i.e., a full-time -employee allocates on
the average .6 X 8 = 4.8 hours to the project, and if the
project communication overhead consumes 25% of that, then the
average productive fraction of a Man-Day would be
0.75 X 0.6 = 0.45 i.e., 3.6 hours.
What is communication overhead? There are those who
might argue that human communication is an essential
component of any software development effort, and is,
therefore, actually part of the "job" ... not an overhead.
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Even though human communication is indeed an essential (and
even useful) component of software development, it does
constitute an overhead. To see why, let us examine what
happens when a software system rather than being developed by
a team is instead developed by one person.
Two things usually happen. First, time lost in human
communication is avoided. When a team is developing the
software,
0.. it is necessary that each individual spend part of
his time communicating with each of the other team
members. For example, the designer must confer with the
coder to resolve any questions the coder may have about
the design; both of these must talk to the individual
testing the code to give him the benefit of their
experience with the program; each of these must talk to
the documentor to assure that the documentation is
proper and complete; and so on (Tausworthe, 1977).
Such human communication is, obviously, unnecessary when
the software is developed by a single person.
Second, the amount of work itself usually increases when
software is developed by a team, vis-a-vis a single person.
This increase in the work load takes two forms. The first,
and obvious one, is that the amount of - documentation
increases e.g., in a one-person environment the programmer
could get away with sketchy notes to merely augment his
"mental documentation" (Tausworthe, 1977). The second less
obvious increase is in the form of an increase in the size of
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the software product itself (Gagliardi, 1980) (Conway, 1968).
For example, when a program is developed by two people
instead of one, it might be designed as a two-module program
instead of a single-module program necessitating an
inter-module interface that has to be agreed upon and
developed.
On the basis of the above observations, we can now
answer the question we posed above; namely, "what is
communication overhead?" The answer: It is the drop in the
productivity of the average team member below his nominal
productivity due to team communication. Where communication
includes verbal communication, documentation, and any
additional workload e.g., due to interfaces.
It is widely held that communication overhead increases
in proportion to n2 , where n is the size of the team (Brooks,
1978) (Shooman, 1983) (Mills, 1976) (Zelkowitz, 1978) (Scott
and Simmons, 1975). Such a relationship is shown in the
table function of Figure 111.15. Thus, communication
overhead, as is formulated in the model, is zero when the
software is developed by one person, but as the workforce
size (n) increases, communication overhead increases in
proportion to n2. For example, at n=30, the communication
overhead is approximately 50%. This means that if the
"Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on Project" is 0.6, i.e., 4.8
hours are allocated daily, on the average, by the full-time
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team member, 50% of these, or 2.4 hours, will be effectively
lost due to communication overhead. In other words, the
"Multiplier to Productivity Due to Motivation and
Communication Losses" would be 0.6X0.5=0.3. Which means that
"Software Development Productivity" would be 30% of the value
of "Potential Productivity." For example, if the latter is 1
Task/Man-Day, then "Software Development Productivity" would
be 0.3 Tasks/Man-Day (after accounting for motivation and
communication losses).
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:e and Rework:
of software systems involves a series of
:tivities where the opportunities for
)f human fallibilities are enormous.
.gin to occur at the very inception of the
:he objectives of the software system may
or imperfectly specified, as well as
!r design and development stages where
yes are mechanized. The basic quality
:ware is that it performs its functions in
was intended by its architects. In
.eve this quality, the final product must
ium of mistakes in implementing their
well as being void of misconception about
themselves. Because of human inability
.th perfection, software development is
a quality assurance activity (Deutsch,
:y assurance is approached by two distinct
methodologies. The first is that of
quality is initially built into the
ves emphasis on the early generation of a
unambiguous, and nonconflicting set of
as the product is designed and coded,
review and testing f the product, the second quality tool,
are encountered (Deutsch, 1979).
In this secti n we will discuss the generation,
detection, and cor ection of errors during the development
phase. As we ind cated in Section 111.3. (on "Model
Boundary") the devel ment phase includes both the design and
coding activities, ut excludes the requirements phase. It
was also indicated t en, that we will be assuming that
__
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software design commences (within the model's boundary) at
the "successful completion" of a software requirements review
(outside the model's boundary), and that there would be no
subsequent changes or modifications in the system's
requirements.
In this section, therefore, our concern is with the
generation of design and coding errors, and with the second
quality tool above, namely, the review and testing of the
product.
Errors come in many different, "flavors." Summarized
below are what Nelson (1974) delineated and described as the
most prominent software design and coding errors:
* Misinterpretation of specifications
* Errors in developing the logic to solve the problem
* Algorithm approximations that may provide insufficient
accuracy or erroneous results for certain input
variables
* Data structure defects either in the data structure
design specification or in the implementation of the
specification
* Singular or critical input values to a formula that
may yield an unexpected result not accounted for in the
program code
* Misinterpretation of language constructions by the
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programmer
In a system dynamics model such as ours, it is quite
feasible, from a technical point of.view, to disaggregate a
variable such as errors into different error types. However,
it is not always necessary or useful.
There are two (and only two) considerations for
reformulating a level (variable) as a sequence of two or
more levels: policy analysis and model behavior.
First, is the disaggregation required in order for the
model to be able to address particular policy
issues? ...
The second reason for disaggregating a level involves
the dynamics of the system. Does the disaggregation of
a level into two or more levels have the potential to
change significantly the behavior of the model? ...
The final arbiter should be model-based policy analysis.
If the change in behavior has the potential to alter
policy conclusions, then the disaggregation is essential
(Richardson and Pugh, 1981).
Since our model's policy focus is on the managerial-type
policies of software development, as opposed to say the
technical issues of software reliability, an explicit
disaggregation of errors into more than one type is, on the
basis of the policy analysis criterion, clearly unnecessary.
On the other hand, there are significant behavioral
differences among error types that had to be accounted for.
For example, findings in the software engineering literature
indicate that errors are generated at different rates at
different points in the life cycle e.g., design errors, in
the earlier design phase, are generated at a higher rate than
are coding errors (Martin, 1982). Such a factor is obviously
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of dynamic significance. For example, it could have a direct
bearing on the allocation of the manpower resource.
Such differences will be implicitly captured in the
model. That is, while errors will be formulated as a single
type, "Errors," the generation, detection, and correction
characteristics of errors will be allowed to vary throughout
the development life cycle. For example "Errors" will be
generated at a higher rate in the earlier portions of the
life cycle (as design errors do) and they will, on the
average, be "harder" to detect and correct (as design errors
are).
Figure 111.16. depicts how the generation, detection,
and correction of errors are formulated in the model.
What factors affect the "Error Generation Rate" in a
software project? There are two sets of factors. The first
set includes: organizational factors e.g., the use of
structured techniques (Alberts, 1976), the quality of the
staff (Belford et al, 1977), ... etc., and project-type
factors (Shooman, 1983) e.g., complexity, size of system
(small, medium, or large), language, ... etc. Notice that
even though such factors can differ from organization to
organization and from project to project, they do, however,
remain invariant during the life of a single project. The
cumulative effect of all such factors can, therefore, be
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captured in the model in the form of a single nominal
variable, namely, the "Nominal Number of Errors Committed per
Task." The nominal error generation rate would then simply
be the product of the "Software Development Rate," i.e., how
much tasks are developed per unit of time, and that "Nominal
Number of Errors Committed per Task." However, since this
single nominal variable is modeling the generation of
different error types (within the single project that is
within a particular organization) it is not formulated as a
constant number, but rather as a variable that changes over
the project's life,
The formulation of the "Nominal Number of Errors
Committed per Task" is, therefore, serving two purposes:
First, its shape over the project's life reflects our own
modeling assumptions about the relative generation rates of
different error types throughout the life of a project.
These assumptions, as all others in the model, are expected
to apply to all project situations to which the model is
applied. Hence, this shape will always remain the same, even
when modeling different project situations. The second
purpose of the formulation, namely, its absolute value,
reflects the different error generation characteristics of
different project situations (i.e., the software product's
characteristics as well as those of the organization in which
it is developed). This, obviously, would generally change
when modeling different projects.
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The formulation of the "Nominal Number of Errors
Committed per Task" used in the base model is shown in Figure
III.17. Notice that the number of errors is defined in terms
of KDSI i.e., "thousand delivered source instructions" rather
than "Tasks." Both definitions are, of course, equivalent
since a "Task" is itself defined in terms of DSI. However,
it is more convenient to represent error generation in terms
of KDSI since most published data on error rates are in terms
of KDSI.
The error rates range in value from 25 errors/KDSI to
12.5 errors/KDSI, with an average value for the project of
approximately 19 errors/KDSI. [Published error rates in the
literature include: 10-20 errors/KDSI in (Thayer et al,
1978), 15-25 errors/KDSI in (Boehm, 1981), 30-35 errors/KDSI
in (Jones, 1978).]
As we mentioned above, the shape of the curve over the
project's life reflects the relative generation rates of
design-type errors versus coding-type errors. Thus, before
we can specify the shape of the curve we need first to
delineate design versus coding activities within the
development life cycle. We will assume in the model that the
development phase will be equally divided between design
(including architectural and detailed design) and coding
activities. [This approximates data reported by (Boehm,
1981), (Gaffnery, 1982), and (Zelkowitz, 1978).] The diagram
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at the bottom of Figure 111.16. is meant to indicate that
the transition between the two activities is not abrupt i.e.,
there will be a period over which both activities will
overlap (McKeen, 1981) (Thibodeau and Dodson, 1980).
Estimates for relative generation rates of design versus
coding errors were provided by several authors. For example,
Design : Coding Errors Reference
3.8 : 1 (Martin, 1982)
2.0 : 1 (Alberts, 1976)
1.8 : 1 (Jones, 1981)
1.7 : 1 (Boehm, 1981)
1.6 : 1 (Thayer et al, 1978)
As shown in Figure 111.17., the ratio assumed in the
model achieves a maximum value of 2:1 i.e., at the beginning
of design the nominal number of errors committed is 25
errors/KDSI, while towards the end of coding it drops to 12.5
errors/KDSI. The average rates for the design and coding
phases are approximately 23 and 14.5 errors/KDSI respectively
i.e., a 1.6:1 ratio.
The formulation of the nominal error generation rate
captures, as we mentioned above, the cumulative effect of one
set of factors effecting error generation, namely, the
organizational and project-type factors. Such factors remain
invariant during the life of a single project. There is a
second set of factors, however, which do play a dynamic role
during software development. These include the workforce-mix
and schedule pressures.
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As was stated in the discussion on Human Resource
Management, the workforce in the model is disaggregated into
two types of employees, newly hired and experienced. It was
also indicated that new hires pass through an "Orientation
Phase" during which they are less than fully productive. The
orientation process brings them "up to speed' through
training that covers both the social as well as the technical
environments of the project. For example, on the technical
side, newly hired project numbers "often require considerable
training to become familiar with an organization's unique mix
of hardware, software packages, programming techniques,
project methodologies, and so on" (Winrow, 1982).
While not yet fully trained (during this orientation
period) newly hired employees are, not only less productive
on the average, but also more error-prone than their
experienced counter-parts (Endres, 1975) (Myers, 1976). We
will assume in the model that a newly hired employee is twice
as error-prone as an experienced employee would be (Chan, 20)
(Nichlos, 25). To model the effect 'of this factor on error
generation we formulate the "Multiplier to Error Generation
due to Workforce Mix" as a function of the "% of Workforce
that is Experienced." When the workforce value is comprised
of only experienced staff, the value of the multiplier is set
to 1 i.e., it would have a neutral effect on the nominal
error generation rate. In other words, what we are defining
to be nominal, is defined with respect to the average error
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generation rate of the experienced-type employee. And as the
fraction of new hires increases, the multiplier increases in
a linear fashion, as shown in Figure III.18., until it
attains a maximum value of 2 , if the workforce is comprised
of only new hires.
The second factor that can drive the error generation up
is schedule pressure (Putman and Fitzsimmons, 1979) (Mills,
1983) (Radice, 1982) (James, 1) .(Riccardi, 5) (Doyle, 7)
(Nichols, 18) (Sheldon, 19) (Chan, 20).
People under time pressure don't work better, they just
work faster...
In the struggle to deliver any software at all, the
first casualty has been consideration of the quality of
the software delivered. (DeMarco, 1982).
Two explanations have been proposed in the literature
for why schedule pressures cause more errors to be generated.
First, Shneiderman (1980) suggests that schedule pressures
increase the "anxiety levels" of programmers. A high anxiety
level, then
interferes (with performance),- probably by
reducing the size of the short-term memory available.
When programmers become more anxious as deadlines
approach, they (therefore) tend to make even more
errors...
Another explanation was provided by Thibodeau and Dodson
(1980). They suggest that schedule pressures often result in
the "Overlapping of activities that would have been
accomplished better sequentially." and this can
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significantly increase the chance of errors. For example,
When coding has begun before the completion of design,
the designers are required to communicate their results
to the programmers in a raw, unqualified state, hence
significantly increasing the chance of design errors...
This is not to suggest that systems cannot be developed
with overlapping activities. Many systems have distinct
parts that can be coded before the entire design is
completed ... We are concerned here with the situation
where the press of the development schedule or the
slippage of preceding activities results in overlapping
activities that would have been accomplished -better
sequentially.
The effect of schedule pressure on error generation is
formulated in the model as shown in Figure III.19. Under
nominal conditions there would be no schedule pressures, and
the multiplier assumes a value of 1. As schedule pressures
increase, the multiplier increases exponentially leading to
higher error-generation rates. As shown in the Figure,
error-generation can increase by as much as 50% under severe
schedule pressures. Notice also, that we are assuming that
errors will be generated below the nominal rate under the
"relaxed" conditions of negative schedule pressures.
Thus, as software tasks are developed, errors are
committed within those tasks. Errors within a developed task
remain as "Potentially Detectable Errors" until the task is
reviewed and tested, at which point some of the errors do get
detected, and those are then reworked. Usually, however, not
all errors will be detected, some will "escape" and pass
undetected into the subsequent phases of software
development. In the next section we will see how those
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errors are eventually "caught," albeit at a relatively high
cost.
The detection of errors is the objective of the Quality
Assurance (QA) activities. Quality Assurance is defined in
Pressman (1982) as:
(A set of activities) performed in conjunction with the
(the development of) a softwa're product to guarantee the
product meets the specified standards. These activities
reduce doubts and risks about the performance of the
product in the target environment.
Several techniques are used including walkthrouighs,
reviews, inspections, code reading (a process where code
logic and code format is scrutinized by a programmer other
than the original designer), and integration testing (Jones,
1982) '.(Daly, 1977). Not included in this activity is module
or unit testing, which is commonly considered to be part of
the coding process (McKeen, 1979).
The "QA Rate," of Figure III.16., has a
non-characteristic type of a formulation, namely, that of a
third order delay. The "characteristic" way to formulate a
rate of doing something, e.g., the rate of developing
software or reworking errors, is as a product of the effort
allocated and its productivity. However, what we found, and
what the third order delay formulation actualizes, is that
the QA Rate is independent of the QA effort and its
productivity! What we found happening [based on discussions
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with (Gage, 4) (Landolfi, 13) (Chan, 14) (Lombardi, 16)
(Nichols, 18)] is this: QA effort is planned and allocated,
usually in the form of a fixed schedule of periodic
group-type functions (Mitchell, 1980). For example, a 2-hour
walkthrough for the 5 members of team (A) is scheduled for
every Friday. During these periodic "QA Windows," all tasks
developed since the previous one are supposed to be
processed. And what we were surprised to find was that, in
an almost perfect realization of Parkinson's Law,
irrespective of how much tasks need to be processed within
the specified "QA Window" they almost always do. No
backlogs, therefore, develop in the QA pipeline. Even when
QA activities are relaxed or suspended because of schedule
pressure (as we indicated they might in Sector (A)), no
backlogs develop. That is, when walkthroughs are suspended
for a while on a project, the requirement for a "walkthrough"
is also suspended, not postponed (Hart, 1982).
We can propose an explanation for how and why this
happens. Since the objective of the QA activity is to detect
invisible errors, invisible that is until they are detected,
it becomes almost impossible to tell whether the QA job was
completly done (i.e., that all those invisible errors were in
fact detected). By the same token, it is as difficult to
tell that the job has not been completely done (except much
later in the life cycle). Under such circumstances it
becomes quite easy to rationalize both to oneself and to
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management that the QA job that was possible to do, was not
insufficient. Furthermore, the QA effort that is possible to
expend (i.e., in terms of available time and effort), is
usually what is expended and not more (e.g., even if called
for due to a larger than expected workload of developed
tasks) because there seems to be no significant incentives to
do otherwise. Firstly, at the psychological level, there are
actually dis-incentives for working harder at QA, since it
only "exposes" more of one's mistakes (Weinberg, 1971). And
secondly, at the organizational level there are seldom any
reward mechanisms in place that promote quality
quality-related activites (Cooper and Fisher, 1979).
The formulation of the "QA Rate" as a third order delay,
provides, we feel, a good approximation of the "Parkinsonian"
execution of the QA activity as described above. (In Exhibit
111.5., we show how a third-order delay looks schematically,
how it is formulated mathematically, and how it behaves over
time.) That is, software tasks that are developed will
always be QAed (or considered QAed) after a certain delay,
and which is (assumed to be) independent of the QA effort
allocated. In the model, the "Average QA Delay" period is
set to 2 weeks (i.e., 10 working days) (Nichols, 25).
However, while the rate at which tasks are QAed (or
considered QAed) can proceed under QA policies and procedures
independently of the actual. QA effort allocated, the
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effectiveness of QA will, obviously, depend on that effort.
That is, the amount of errors detected will be a function of
how much QA effort is allocated for error detection.
In the model (see Figure 111.16.) we define a variable
called "Potential Error Detection Rate." It represents, the
maximum number of errors that could be detected at a point in
time, and is determined by dividing the value of the QA
effort allocated by the value of the QA effort that is
needed, on the average, to detect an error. That is, if say
5 man-days are allocated per week to QA, and the "QA Manpower
Needed to Detect an Error" is, on the average, 1 man-day,
then the "Potential Error Detection Rate" would be 5 errors
per week.
What are the determinants of the "QA Manpower Needed to
Detect an Error?" First and foremost, it is a function of
error-type i.e., whether an error is a design or a coding
error. Thus, even if a project proceeds under some invariant
set of nominal conditions, the QA manpower that would be
needed, on the average to detect an error would change simply
because the errors to be detected change from design-type
errors to coding-type errors.
The value of the QA effort needed per error as a
function of the project's phase and hence of error-type i.e.,
design errors versus coding errors, are shown in Figure
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111.20. Design-type errors are not only generated at a
higher rate (as we saw in Figure 111.16), they are also, as
Figure 111.20. indicates, more costly to detect (Myers,
1976) (Alberts, 1976) (Boehm, 1975). Alberts (1976)
estimates that design errors are 2.5 times more costly (i.e.,
to detect and correct). In the formulation of Figure
111.20., we are assuming that, on the average, a design error
is 1.6 as costly to detect as a coding error. Furthermore,
in terms of absolute values, the average detection effort per
error is 0.3 man-days. Thus, on the average it would take
approximately 2.4 man-hours (30% of an 8-hour man-day) to
detect an error. In the case of walkthroughs and
inspections, this effort would include,, not only the effort
expended during the walkthrough/inspection itself, but also
the effort expended in preparation for it (e.g., reviewing
documentation and gaining familiarity with product).
Estimates in the literature for the error detection effort
per error include: 3 man-hours (Mitchell, 1980), 2.36
man-hours (Shooman, 1983), and 0.5-1.25 man-hours
(Shneiderman, 1980).
The actual QA manpower needed to detect an error, in
addition to being a function of error-type, must also depend
on the efficiency of how people work. In our discussion on
productivity we indicated that a full-time employee's work
.day does not translate into an 8 man-hour input to the
project. Man-hours are lost on communication and other
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non-project activities (e.g., personal business). These two
types of losses are captured in the "Multiplier to
Productivity Due to Communication and Motivation Losses,"
which simply represents the average productive fraction of a
man-day. In other words, if the communication and motivation
losses amount to a 4 man-hour loss per day (for the average
employee) i.e., half of the nominal 8 man-hour value, then
the value of the multiplier would be a 0.5. Under such
circumstance, the actual QA manpower needed to detect an
error becomes twice what is nominally needed. That is, if a
design error requires, under nominal conditions (i.e., under
conditions of no losses), 0.4 man-days to be detected, it
would actually require (under the above conditions)
0.4 X 2 = 0.8 man-days.
Finally, evidence suggests that "In any sizable program,
it is impossible to remove all errors" (Shooman, 1983).
Thus, even when generous effort allocations are made to QA,
it would still be unlikely that all errors will be detected
-(Boehm, 1981). One reason, for example, is that "... some
errors manifest themselves, and can be exhibited only after
system integration" (Shooman, 1983). At any point in time,
one could, therefore, view the collection of "Potentially
Detectable Errors" as constituting a hierarchy of errors, in
which some are more subtle, and therefore more expensive to
detect than others. Empirical results reported by Basili and
Weiss (1982), suggest that the distribution is pyramid like,
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with the majority of errors requiring approximately a few
hours to detect, a few errors requiring approximately a day
to detect, and still fewer errors requiring more than a day
to detect. Notice that the results show that those few
subtle errors are an order of magnitude more expensive to
detect.
We will assume in the model, that as QA activities are
performed, the more obvious errors will be detected first.
And as these are detected, it then becomes more and more
expensive to uncover the remaining more subtle (although less
predominant) errors. This is realized in the model through
the formulation of the "Multiplier to detection Effort due to
Error Density," shown in Figure II1.21. At moderate to large
error densities, the multiplier assumes a neutral value of 1.
But as those "obvious" errors are all detected, and a few
"subtle" errors remain, the multiplier increases in an
exponential fashion, such that at a density level of 2-4
(subtle) errors per KDSI, it becomes an order of magnitude
more expensive to detect an error.
To recapitulate, the "QA Manpower Needed to Detect an
Error" is a function of error-type, work efficiency and error
density. As the value of this needed effort increases, e.g.,
due to a decrease in error density, the number of errors that
can be detected, at some level of QA effort, decreases. At
any point in time, the "Potential Error Detection Rate"
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(determined by dividing the value of the QA effort allocated
by the value of the "QA Manpower Needed to Detect an Error"),
represents the maximum possible number of errors that could
be detected. Because manpower allocations to QA are often
"modest," this maximum value is seldom large enough to secure
the detection of all errors generated. And even when effort
is allocated generously to QA, a few subtle errors will be so
prohibitively expensive to detect, that whatever the effort
allocated, it will not be quite enough to detect all errors.
As a result, as shown in Figure 111.16., some errors will
"escape" and pass undetected into the 'subsequent phases of
software development. In the next section we will deal with
those errors, and show how they are eventually "caught."
On the other hand, those errors that do get detected
through QA activites, are then reworked. The rework rate is
a function of how much effort is allocated to rework
activities, and the rework manpower needed per error. For
example, if the project members commit 10 man-days per week
to rework detected errors, and the "Actual Rework Manpower
Needed per Error" is, on the average, 1 man-day, then errors
will be reworked at the rate of 10 per week.
The "Actual Rework Manpower Needed per Error" has two
components. The first is the "Nominal Rework Manpower Needed
per Error." As in the case of error detection, this nominal
component is a function of error-type i.e., design versus
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coding errors.
The values of the nominal rework effort needed per error
as a function of the project's phase, and hence of
error-type, are shown in Figure 111.22. Design-type errors,
in addition to both being generated at a higher rate and
being more costly to detect, are also more costly to rework
(Myers, 1976) (Alberts, 1976) (Boehm, McClean, and Urfrig,
1975). As the formulation of Figure 111.22. indicates, we
are assuming that, on the average, a design error is
approximately 1.5 more costly to correct than a coding error.
Under nominal conditions, a design error would require, on
the average, 0.54 man-days to be corrected, while the average
correction effort for a coding-type error is assumed to be
0.36 man-days. For the nominal 8-hour working day, these
averages translate, into 4.3 man-hours/error and 2.9
man-hours/error, respectively. These values were chosen on
the basis of the empirical results reported in (Weiss, 1979)
and (Basili and Weiss, 1981), which suggest that the average
rework effort (for all errors) is in the range of 0.25 to 1.0
man-days per error.
The actual rework man-power that would be needed to
correct an error, in addition to being a function of
error-type, must also depend on the efficiency of how people
work. That is, we need to account for the communication and
motivation losses incurred. For example, if the "Multiplier
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to Productivity due to Communication and Motivation Losses,"
which represents the average productive fraction of a
man-day, is 0.5, then the actual rework manpower needed to
correct an error becomes twice what is nominally needed. A
design error that would have required under nominal
conditions (i.e., under conditions of no losses), 0.5
man-days to be corrected, would actually require (under the
above condition) 0.5 X 2 = 1 man-day.
To recapitulate, as errors are detected through the QA
activities, they are reworked. The rate at which errors are
reworked is a function of the manpower committed to the
rework activity and the rework effort needed per error. The
"Actual Rework Manpower Needed per Error" is, in turn, a
function of two things, error-type (i.e., design versus
coding errors) and work efficiency.
The reworking of software errors is not, itself, an
errorless activity:
Human tendency is to consider the "fix," or correction,
to a problem to be error-free itself. Unfortunately,
this is all too frequently untrue in the case of fixes
to errors found by inspections and by testing (Fagan,
1976).
The problem of "bad-fixes" is widely documented in the
literature (e.g., (Jones, 1978) (Shooman, 1983), (Myers,
1976), (Endres, 1975), (Fagan, 1976), and (Thayer et al,
1978)). Shooman and Natarajan (1977), suggested some of the
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ways in which bad-fixes may be generated:
1. The correction is based upon faulty analysis, thus
complete bug removal is not accomplished.
2. The corrections of a bug may work locally only
(i.e., the global aspects of the error still remain).
3. The correction is accomplished, however, it is
accomplished by the creation of a new error.
Thus, as detected errors are reworked, some fraction of
the corrections will be bad-fixes. Unfortunately, there are
no published data on how large that fraction is. However,
there are results that indicate that bad-fixes constitute
6.5 - 10% of all errors caught at the system testing stage
(Jones, 1981) (Fries, 1977). The balance of the errors is
comprised of those errors that escape detection, through QA,
during development. If we assume that 50-60% of errors are
detected and reworked during development, and that most of
the remaining errors together with bad-fixes are later
detected at the system testing phase, then the above findings
on bad-fixes imply that between 4.5-11% of corrections will
be bad-fixes. The "% Bad-Fixes" is, therefore, set in the
model to 7.5%.
The detection and correction of bad-fixes *as well a
those errors that escape QA detection, is the topic of the
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next section.
(D) System Testing:
We will assume that undetected errors i.e., those that
QA activities (e.g., walkthrough, inspections, code reading,
... etc.) fail to detect while the software is being
designed and coded, as well as those bad fixes created as a
result of faulty rework, will all remain undetected until the
system testing phase. Further, we will assume that all such
errors will get detected and corrected at the system testing
phase. Thus, even though in practice some errors often
remain in a software product after system testing is
completed (i.e., as the product becomes operational), e.g ,
because system testing activities fail to detect them, or
they result from bad fixes at the system testing phase, all
such errors will be excluded from our formulation. The
primary reason for their exclusion is that the generation,
detection, and correction of these errors are all issues of
maintenance of the operational system, which are, -as we
previously stated, beyond the boundary of our model and thus
the focus of this study.
The second justification for their exclusion, is that
errors that escape detection at the system testing phase are
generally a "small" fraction of all the errors handled at
that phase (Deutsch, 1979). This assertion might sound
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surprising to many, since it is common to assume that the
maintenance activity is as costly as it is primarily because
of the costs incurred in'handling such "lingering" errors.
What empirical results have shown, however, is that
corrections of such errors consumes only a relatively small
portion of the software maintenance activity (Lientz and
Swanson, 1978). The major portion of the software
maintenance effort is, instead, devoted to software updates
(e.g., enhancements for users, adaptation to new data or
hardware, ... etc.) (Parikh and Zvegintzov, 1983).
The System Testing Sector is shown in Figure 111.23. As
shown in the figure, this sector models two sets of
processes, namely, the growth processes of the undetected
error populations and the processes of system testing, i.e.,
the detection and correction of those errors.
The population of undetected errors is comprised, as we
said, of errors that escape the detection of the QA actions
as well as those bad fixes created as a result of faulty
rework. This group of errors does not remain dormant
awaiting detection and correction at the system testing
phase. They, instead, lead an "active existence" reproducing
more and more errors in the system. For example, a design
error that remains undetected until the system testing phase
often instigates further errors in the code, user and
maintenance manuals, training material, ... etc., (Boehm,
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1981).
In a-study by Shooman reported in McClure (1981), it was
determined that detecting and correcting a design error
during the design phase (i.e., through the QA activities) is
one-tenth the effort that would be needed to detect and
correct it later during the system testing phase because of
this additional inventory of specifications, code, user and
maintenance manuals, ... etc., that would require correction
in the later case. This 10:1 ratio was also supported by
data in Boehm (1981), but only for larger projects. For
smaller projects, the escalation in cost-to-fix was in the
range of 4:1, because, Boehm argued, "The smaller size meant
that there was a relatively smaller inventory of items to fix
in later phases."
But, besides such static estimates on cost-to-fix
escalations at different points in the software life cycle,
no data are available in the literature to describe the
dynamics of these "error-reproduction" processes. That is,
even though we do know that an undetected design error
reproduces enough errors in code, documentation, ... etc.,
to become 4 to 10 times more expensive to fix at the system
testing phase, we still do not have the data that explain
exactly how and when these reproduction processes occur.
When the dynamic relationships are not well understood
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(that is, when theory is not well developed), as it is in
this case, then "the best one can do is attempt to imitate
the change process itself in the hope of learning more about
such relationships. Thus the model becomes an aid to theory
development" (Schultz and Sullivan, 1972). Our "proposed
theory" of the error reproduction process is depicted in
Figure 111.23.
As shown in the figure, we are assuming that errors that
escape QA detection, together with those generated due to
faulty rework, will develop into either "Active Errors" i.e.,
active in reproducing more errors, or "Passive Errors."
Because design specs are the blue prints of the system's
code, any errors in design will get translated into coding
errors. Thus, all undetected design errors should be of the
active type. As development moves into the coding stage, a
mixture of active and passive errors would be expected. If
we assume, for example, that the system is coded in a
top-down fashion, then in the early parts of the coding stage
most of the errors committed (i.e., in the high-level
modules) would be of the active type. As development
proceeds to the lower level modules, the reverse should be
true, since the errors become more and more localized in
nature. These assumptions on how the mixture of active and
passive errors changes over the project's life are realized
in the model through the formulation of the variable "%
Active Errors" shown in Figure III.24.
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"Undetected passive errors," as Figure I.23.
illustrates, remain in a dormant state until they become
detected and corrected in the system testing phase. The
"Undetected Active Errors," on the other hand, provide a
greater cause for concern, since they reproduce more and more
errors into the system. This error reproduction process is a
continuous one that keeps "feeding" on itself, that is, an
error reproduced will itself reproduce further errors, and so
on. For example, an undetected design error could lead to
errors in the code, which in turn could lead to errors in the
system's documentation and/or user manuals. This continuous
reproduction process is formulated in the model through the
"classic" positive feedback loop in which an increase in the
"Undetected Active Errors" level leads to an increase in the
"Active Error Regeneration Rate," leading to further
increases in the level, and so on.
We now take a closer look at this positive feedback
loop. First, notice that the "Active Error Regeneration
Rate" is a function of the "Software Development Rate," since
errors can only be generated as new tasks are developed. And
if the development activity stops, no errors can be
generated. Second, the regeneration rate is a function of
the "Active Error Density," which is simply the number of
existing active errors divided by the tasks developed so far.
More precisely, the generation rate is a function of the
SMOOTH of the "Active Error Density." This is because when
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errors are committed in one part of the system, they would
not, in general, affect other parts that are being developed
in parallel. Errors, instead, propagate through the
succeeding tasks that build on one another e.g., coding tasks
developed on the basis of the design specs. Thus, there is a
delay before an error would reproduce further errors. This
average delay is set in the model to three months.
As was indicated by the studies cited above, a design
error could be 4 to 10 times more costly when left undetected
until the system testing phase. And, as was also indicated,
this escalation in cost-to-fix results because of an
additional inventory of various error types that would be
reproduced and that would require correction. In the model,
though, we do not disaggregate errors into different explicit
types, e.g., errors are not disaggregated into errors in data
structures, syntax, logic, ... etc. There is only one
explicit error-type, namely, "Error." (This aggregation, as
opposed to disaggregation, of error-types, has been justified
elsewhere.) As a result, the escalation in the cost-to-fix
of an undetected "Error" is realized in the model only
through the number of "Errors" that the "Error" reproduces.
For example, if an "Error" at the early phases of the
project, reproduces (over several generations) a total of 9
more "Errors," then at testing time instead of dealing with
one (the original) "Error," it would now be necessary to deal
with 10 "Errors," i.e., a 10 fold escalation in cost.
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The escalation in the number of active errors is
achieved in the model through two mechanisms. Firstly, it is
partially achieved through the "feeding on itself"
characteristic of the reproduction positive feedback loop we
explained above. This mechanism ensures that the earlier the
undetected-error is, the more "generations" of errors it will
reproduce, and thus the more costly it will end up being.
Secondly, escalation is achieved through the "Multiplier
to Active Error Regeneration due to Error Density." The
interpretation of this multiplier is a simple one, it
represents the average number of new errors that a single
active error reproduces in one generation. (That is, it is a
measure of "Error Fertility!") The multiplier is formulated
as a table function, and is shown in Figure III.25.
First, notice that the multiplier's value will always be
greater than one. That is, an undetected error will always
generate more than one more error (in a single generation).
*Second, the value of the multiplier increases as the density
of active errors increases. Studies have shown that errors
are not homogeneously distributed throughout the modules of a
software system (Myers, 1976) (Endres, 1975), instead systems
studied were found to be "characterized by the presence of
'error-prone modules' that show a high frequency of the
system's.total error content" (Jones, 1981). For example, if
there are say 5 undetected errors in a system that is
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comprised of 5 modules, it is quite possible that all 5
errors will be clustered in one error-prone module, as
opposed to being evenly distributed among the 5 modules. If
there is a much larger number of undetected errors (e.g.,
100), though, it would be quite unlikely then that all the
errors would still be clustered in what would be a single
extremely-error-prone module. Such a situation is unlikely
because we are dealing here with modules that have already
."passed" some QA testing. Thus, as the error density
increases, the distribution of errors among the system's
modules would generally also increase. As this happens,
i.e., as errors become less localized, they also become more
expensive to detect and correct. For example, because of the
set-up cost *of testing any single module, it is generally
less expensive to .fix 10 errors that all reside within a
single module, than fixing an equivalent set of 10 errors
that are distributed among two or more modules. Thus, higher
densities of undetected errors mean a wider (but not
necessarily an even) distribution of errors among the system
modules, -which leads to an escalation in the cost to fix
those errors. And since, as was indicated above, the
escalation in the cost-to-fix of an undetected error is
realized in the model through an increase in the number of
errors that the error reproduces, higher error densities
should lead to a higher error reproduction rate (per error).
This is achieved through the higher values of the "Multiplier
to Active Errors Regeneration due to Error Density," at
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higher error densities.
As was stated above, "Undetected Active Errors" can
potentially continue to reproduce new errors as long as new
tasks are being developed e.g., up until the last system
module is coded. Not all of the active errors will do so,
however. That is, for some errors the reproduction activity
will not continue up until the end of the development phase.
It, instead, might cease after the reproduction of one or two
"generations" of errors. For example, an error in a
high-level module might reproduce a number of interface
errors at some lower level, without necessarily leading to
any further errors in say the user manuals. When undetected
active errors cease to reproduce, they effectively become
"Undetected Passive Errors." The rate at which this occurs
is termed the "Active Error Retirement Rate," as shown in
Figure 111.23. This rate is regulated through the
"Retirement Fraction," which is the fraction of active errors
that retire (i.e., become passive) every unit of time. This
fraction is a function of the development phase as shown in
Figure 111.26. Notice that, because any design error must
translate into coding error(s), the "Retirement Fraction"
remains at a zero level during the design phase i.e., no
active design errors will retire and become passive since
every design error will reproduce at least one generation of
coding errors. As the project progresses towards the last
stages of development e.g., the coding of the lower level
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functional modules, opportunities for error propagation
quickly decrease, and as a result the "Retirement Fraction"
increases sharply, and reaches a value of 1 at the end of
development.
As the project progresses towards the last stages of
development, something else happens, namely, the System
Testing activities are initiated. The objective of system
Testing is to verify "that all elements (of the system) mesh
properly and that overall system function and performance are
achieved" (Pressman, 1982). The System Testing activities
are also depicted in Figure III.23.
As was explained in Section (B) on "Software
Development," the switch in manpower allocation from
development to testing is effected in the model through the
variable "Fraction of Effort for System Testing." The value
of this variable is initially set to zero i.e., no effort is
allocated for System Testing. When development (i.e., the
coding and design) is perceived to be completed, the value of
the "Fraction of Effort for System Testing" becomes a one,
i.e., 100% of the manpower effort available for
development/testing is allocated to the testing function.
The switch is not abrupt, however. There is, usually, some
overlap between the development and testing phases (Thibodeau
and Dodson, 1980), (Daly, 1977), (Hartwick, 1980). This
overlap of the phases was captured (in Section (B) above) in
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Figure 111.9., which shows the assumed gradual increase in
the value of the "Fraction of Effort for System Testing" as a
function of the fraction of development tasks perceived
remaining.
The objective of System Testing stated above is
operationalized in the model as follows: Test all tasks that
have been developed to detect and correct any remaining
(active and/or passive) errors.
The rate at which (developed) tasks are tested is
determined by dividing the "Daily Manpower for Testing" by
the "Testing Manpower Needed per Task." For example, if 5
man-days are allocated daily to the system testing activity,
and it takes, on the average, 1 man-day to test a task, then
5 tasks will be tested a day.
The "Normal Testing Manpower Needed per Task" has two
components, a fixed component and a vardiable.one (Alberts,
1976), (Herndon and Lane, 1977). The variable component is a
function of the number of errors in a task, and it represents
the testing effort that would be consumed in the actual
detection and correction of errors. The fixed component, on
the other hand, is independent of the number of errors. It
involves overhead-type activities such as developing test
plans, installing test tools, designing test cases, ... etc.
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The "Nominal Testing Overhead" (i.e., the fixed
component) is defined in the model in terms of nominal
man-days/KDSI. Estimates reported in Boehm (1981) suggest
that this overhead effort is in the range of 2 man-days/KDSI.
For example, for a 32 KDSI project, Boehm's estimate for the
above overhead functions (which he labelled "Test Planning")
amounted to 64.41 man-days. If we assume that motivation and
communication losses will, on the average, result in a 50%
loss in productivity, then Boehm's estimate translates into
an overhead of 1 nominal man-day/KDSI.
This constant parameter, could then be transformed in a
straightforward manner into an equivalent value of nominal
man-days/task. For example, if in a particular run of the
model, a "task" is defined to be, say 100 DSI, the nominal
testing overhead would be. 0.1 man-day/task.
In addition to the overhead incurred in testing a task,
effort is needed to detect and correct any remaining errors.
This needed effort to detect and correct the errors remaining
within a task is formulated as the product of the "Error
Density" and the "Nominal Testing Manpower Needed per Error."
The value of the former is obtained by dividing the sum of
both the active and passive errors still remaining by the
number of tasks yet to be tested. It represents the average
number of errors per task. The value of the "Nominal Testing
Manpower Needed per Error," on the other hand, is set to 0.15
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Man-Days/Error. For the nominal 8-hour working day, this
translates into 1.2 Man-Hours/Error. This value was chosen
on the basis of empirical results reported in (Shooman, 1983)
and (Herndon and Lane, 1977).
Finally, the actual testing effort needed per task, in
addition to being a function of testing overhead and error
density, must also depend on the efficiency of how people
work. That is, we need to account for the Communication and
Motivation losses incurred. For example, if the "Multiplier
to productivity due to Communication and Motivation losses,"
which represents the average productive fraction of a
man-day, is 0.5, then the actual manpower needed to test a
task becomes twice what is nominally needed.
The testing activity continues until all the tasks that
have been developed are all tested. When this is
accomplished, the project is declared completed. (Remember,
our model's boundary extends only until the end of the
testing phase.)
With the completion of the testing activties, we also
complete our presentation of the software production
processes in the model. We have discussed the allocation of
the manpower resource in part (A), the development activties
(i.e., coding and design) in (B), Quality Assurance and
Rework in part (C), and finally, System Testing in this final
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part (D). In the next two sections, we turn our attention to
two managerial functions of software developement, namely,
controlling and planning.
III.4.5. Controlling:
Any control function has at least three elements
(Anthony and Dearden, 1980):
1. Measurement. To detect what is happening in the
activity being controlled.
2. Evaluation. To assess the significance of what is
.happening, usually by comparing information on what is
actually happening with some standard or expectation of
what should be happening.
3. Communication. To report what has been measured and
assessed, so that behavior could be altered if the need
for doing so is indicated.
These three elements are captured in our formulation of
the control function of software project management depicted
in Figures 111.27. and 111.29. As work is accomplished in a
software project, progress is measured through the amount of
resources consumed, tasks completed, or both. Based on such
measurements, a determination is made on the "Total Man-Days
Perceived to be Still Needed" to complete the project. This
includes man-days perceived to be still needed to develop and
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QA tasks, to rework any detected errors, and to complete
system testing. Once this is determined, the effort
perceived to be still needed is compared to the actual
"Man-Days Remaining" in the project's plan. Thus, if 100
man-days are perceived to be still needed to complete the
project but only 50 man-days are remaining, the project would
be perceived to be behind schedule. Conversely, if only 25
man-days are what is perceived to be still needed, while 50
man-days remain available in the project's plan, then the
project would be perceived to be ahead of schedule. Once an
assessment is made of any man-day shortages or excesses,
behavior on the project could be altered if the need for
doing so is indicated. For example, if the project is
perceived to be behind (ahead of) schedule, i.e., if it is
experiencing a man-day shortage (excess), then project
members could be motived to work more (less) hard, the
project's schedule could be extended (trimmed), or a
combination of both of these could happen. In the remaining
part of this section, we will explain in detail how all these
control processes are formulated in the model.
At any point in the project, the amount of project work
that will be perceived as still remaining will, in general,
be a combination of three things: (1) work needed to develop
and QA new tasks; (2) work needed to rework any detected
errors; and (3) work needed to conduct the system testing
activities. Thus, the "Total Man-Days Perceived to be Still
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Needed" to complete the project is formulated as a summation
of three respective components, namely, "Man-Days Perceived
Still Needed for New Tasks," "Man-Days Perceived Needed to
Rework Detected Errors," and "Man-Days Perceived Still Needed
for Testing."
Because software is basically an intangible product
during most of the development process, and for which there
are no visible milestones to measure progress like a physical
product would, "It is difficult to measure performance in
-programming ... It is difficult to evaluate the status of
intermediate work such as underdebugged programs or design
specification and their potential value to the complete
project" (Mills, 1983). How, then, is progress in a software
project measured? Our own interview findings corroborate
those reported in the literature, namely, that progress,
especially in the earlier phases of software development, is
measured by the rate of expenditure of resources rather than
by some count of accomplishments (Putnam and Fitzsimmons,
1979), (Keider, 1974), (DeMarco, 1982), (Devenny, 1976),
(Baber, 1982), (Griffin, 6), (Donahue, 8), (O'Conner, 10),
(Lombardi, 16), (Chan, 20). For example, a project for which
100 man-days has been estimated is 10% complete when 10
man-days have been expended; when 50% of the man-days have
been expended, it is 50% complete. Paraphrasing Baber
(1982):
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It is essentially impossible for the programmers to
estimate the fraction of the program completed. What is
45% of a program? Worse yet, what is 45% of three
programs? How is he to guess whether a program is 40%
or 50% complete? The easiest way for the programmer to
estimate such a figure is to divide the amount of time
actually spent on the task to date by the time budgeted
for that task. Only when the program is almost finished
or when the allocated time budget is almost used up will
he be able to recognize that the calculated figure is
wrong.
As progress is measured, during the early phases of
development, by the rate of expenditure of resources, status
reporting ends up being nothing more than an echo of the
original plan (McKeen, 1981), (Baber, 1982), (DeMarco, 1982),
(Devenny, 1976). In other words, "Man-Days Perceived Still
Needed for New Tasks" will be equal to the "Man-Days
Perceived Remaining for New Tasks."
As the project develops, though, and the work becomes
relatively more visible, discrepancies between % of tasks
accomplished (remaining) and % of resources expended
(remaining) become increasingly apparent. For example, while
it might not be too apparent that a project that has consumed
50% of its estimated resources is only 25%, rather than 50%,
complete, any such descrepancy becomes quite obvious when the
allocated resources are almost used up. At the same time,
and as the project advances towards its final stages, project
members become increasingly able to perceive how productive
the workforce has actually been (McGowan, 3), (Nichols, 18).
As a result, the value of the "Man-Days Perceived Still
236
Needed for New Tasks" ceases to be a function of what the
"Man-Days Perceived Remaining for New Tasks" is, and,
instead, is determined on the basis of what the project
members perceive to be the amount of work that is still
remaining.
These differring modes of measuring progress, are
captured in the model through a single formulation of
"Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for Needed Tasks." As shown
in Figure 111.27., "Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for New
Tasks" (MDPNNT) is determined by dividing the value of "Tasks
Perceived Remaining" (TSKPRM) by the "Assumed Development
Productivity" (ASSPRD). That is,
MDPNNT = TSKPRM / ASSPRD (1)
Where "Assumed Development Productivity" (ASSPRD) is a
weighted average of "Perceived Development Productivity"
(PRDPRD) and a variable we are calling "Projected Development
Productivity" (PJDPRD). That is,
ASSPRD = PJDPRD*WTPJDP + PRDPRD*(1-WTPJDP) (2)
The weighting factor (WTPJDP) moves from 1 at the beginning
of the project to zero at the end of the development phase.
The conception behind this formulation is somewhat
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subtle, and will, therefore, require some explanation.
As was indicated above, in the earlier phases of
software development, progress tends to be measured by the
rate of expenditure of resources. As a result, status
reporting ends up being nothing more than an echo of the
original plan. "Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for New
Tasks" (MDPNNT) becomes, under such conditions, simply equal
to the "Man-Days Perceived Remaining for New Tasks" (MDPRNT).
That is,
MDPRNT = MDPNNT
Substituting for MDPNNT, we get
MDPRNT = TSKPRM / ASSPRD
which leads to,
ASSPRD = TSKPRM / MDPRNT
This is an interesting result. For, it suggests that as
project members measure and report progress by the rate of
expenditure of resources, they, by so doing, would be
implicitly assuming that their productivity equals "Tasks
Perceived Remaining" (TSKPRM) divided by the "Man-Days
Perceived Remaining for New Tasks" (MDPRNT). Which is
intersting because such an assumed value for productivity is
solely a function of future projections (i.e., remaining
tasks and man-days) as opposed to being a reflection of
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accomplishments (i.e., completed tasks and expended
resources). This implicit notion of productivity is captured
in the model by the variable "Projected Development
Productivity" (PJDPRD), defined, as the above equation
suggests, to be equal to "Tasks Perceived Remaining" (TSKPRM)
divided by "Man-Days Perceived Remaining for New Tasks"
(MDPRNT).
Thus, in the early phases of software development, we
would like equation (1) to reduce to,
MDPNNT = TSKPRM / PJDPRD^ (3)
where
PJDPRD = TSKPRM / MDPRNT
which would be achieved by setting the weighting factor
(WTPJDP) in equation (2) to 1, and substituting in equation
(1).
As "the project advances towards its final stages,
though, accomplishments become relatively more visible and
project members become increasingly more able to perceive how
productive the workforce has actually been. As a result,
what the project members assume their productivity to be,
i.e., the value of "Assumed Development Productivity," ceases
to be a function of future projections (i.e., remaining tasks
and man-days), and instead is determined on the basis of
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perceived accomplishments. This explicit notion of
productivity is captured in the model by the variable
"Perceived Development Productivity" (PRDPRD). Discussions
with (McGowan, 3), (Nichols, 18), and (Lombardi, 23) suggest
that, towards the final stages of development, the value of
the team's overall productivity would be determined by
dividing the value of "Cumulative Tasks Developed" (CUMTKD)
by "Cumulative Development Man-Days" (CUMDMD). In other
words, if 100 man-days have been expended to develop the
project's 100 tasks, then "Perceived Development
Productivity" would be 1 task/man-day.
Thus, in the final stages of software development, we
would like equation (1) to reduce to,
MDPNNT = TSKPRM / PRDPRD (4)
where,
PRDPRD = CUMTKD / CUMDMD
which would be achieved by setting the weighting factor
(WTPJDP) in equation (2) to zero, and substituting in
equation (1).
To recapitulate, the value of "Man-Days Perceived Still
Needed fo.r New Tasks" (MDPNNT) is a function, as equation (1)
indicates, of "Tasks Perceived Remaining" (TSKPRM) and
"Assumed Development Productivity." In the early phases of
240
development, "Assumed Development Productivity" is implicitly
determined on the basis of future projections (i.e.,
remaining tasks and man-days). Towards the end of
development, on the other hand, "Assumed Development
Productivity" gets to be explicitly determined on the basis
of perceived accomplishments (i.e., completed tasks and
expended resources). This is achieved through the weighted
average formulation of "Assumed Development Productivity"
given in equation (2), i.e., by setting the weighting factor
(WTPJDP) to 1 at the beginning of the project, and to zero at
the end of the development phase.
People's assumptions about their productivity,
therefore, change as the project develops. The change,
however, is often gradual not abrupt (McGowan, 3), (Nichols,
18), (Lombardi, 23). That is, the transition from having
"Assumed Development Productivity" being determined solely on
the basis of future projections early in the project, to
having it being determined entirely on the basis of perceived
accomplishements, towards the end of development, is a
smooth, not an instantaneous, type of a transition.
This transition in people's assumption about their
productivity is captured in the model through the formulation
of the weighting factor (WTPJDP) of equation (2). For
convenience, we are re-writing equation (2) below,
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ASSPRD = PJDPRD*WTPJDP + PRDPRD*(1-WTPJDP) (2)
In the beginning of the project, because "Assumed
Development Productivity" (ASSPRD) is equal to "Projected
Development Productivity" (PJDPRD), the weighting factor
WTPJDP is set equal to 1. As was explained above, under such
conditions status reporting ends up being nothing more than
an echo of the original project plan as "Man-Days Perceived
Still Needed for New Tasks" ends up being exactly equal to
"Man-Days Remaining for New Tasks." As the project develops,
though, descrepancies between % of tasks accomplished
(remaining) and % of resources expended (remaining) become
increasingly apparent, and in addition project members become
increasingly able to perceive how productive the workforce
has actually been. As a result, "Assumed Development
Productivity" (ASSPRD) becomes less a function of "Projected
Development Productivity" (PJDPRD) and more a function of
"Perceived Development Productivity" (PRDPRD). That is, the
weighting factor (WTPJDP) moves from a value of 1 to a value
of 0. The rate at which this learning process takes place is
the product of two factors, namely, the rate of expenditure
of resources and the rate of development of tasks. Remember
Baber's quote (1982), "Only when the program is almost
finished or when the allocated time budget is almost used up
will (the programmer) be able to recognize (the descrepancy
between % of tasks accomplished and % of resources expended."
To accomplish this in the model, we will formulate the
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weighting factor (WTPJDP) as the product of two multipliers,
the "Multiplier to Productivity weight due to Resource
Expenditures" and the "Multiplier to Productivity Weight due
to Development." As shown in Figure III.28., both
multipliers are assumed to have the same shape, moving from a
value of 1 in the beginning of the project to a value of zero
when all estimated development resources are expended or all
tasks are developed, respectively.
Thus far we have been only discussing how "Man-Days
Perceived Needed for New Tasks" is determined. As was
indicated earlier, at any point in the project the amount of
work that will be perceived as still remaining will, in
general, be comprised of not only work needed to develop and
QA new tasks, but in addition work needed to rework any
detected errors and work needed to conduct the system testing
activities. Thus, the "Total Man-Days Perceived to be Still
Needed" to complete the project is formulated as a summation
of "Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for New Tasks," "Man-Days
Perceived Needed to Rework Detected Errors," and "Man-Days
Perceived Still Needed for Testing."
The "Man-Days Perceived Needed to Rework Detected
Errors" is formulated as the product of "Detected Errors" and
"Perceived Rework Manpower Needed per Error." (The latter,
as was explained in some detail in the section on "Manpower
Allocation," is a SMOOTH of the "Actual Rework Manpower
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Needed per Error.") For example, if at some point in the
project 50 errors that have been detected through the QA
activities are still uncorrected, and if it is perceived that
an error requires 0.2 Man-Days, on the average, to correct,
then the "Man-Days Perceived Needed to Rework (those)
Detected Errors" would be 50 X 0.2 = 10 Man-Days.
The "Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for Testing," on
the other hand, is determined by dividing the value of "Tasks
Remaining to be Tested" by the "Perceived Testing
Productivity." The "Tasks Remaining to be Tested" is simply
the "Perceived Job Size in Tasks" minus "Cumulative Tasks
Tested." For example, if the perceived job is 100 tasks in
size, and 60 of these have already been tested, then "Tasks
Remaining to be Tested" would amount to 100 - 60 = 40 tasks.
Throughout most of the development phase, and before the
commencement of the System Testing phase, the value of
"Perceived Testing Productivity" is set equal to "Planned
Testing Productivity." This is the value of testing
productivity that is implicit in the project's plan. For
example, if for the 100 task project, the plan allocates 20
Man-Days for System Testing, then the "Planned Testing
Productivity" would be 5 tasks/man-days. However, as the
System Testing activity gets underway, people's perceptions
of their testing productivity becomes a function of how
productive the testing activity actually is, as opposed to
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how productive it was planned to be. The "Actual Testing
Productivity" is then determined by dividing the "Cumulative
Tasks Tested" by "Cumulative Testing Man-Days." And, because
"Full and immediate action is seldom taken on a change of
incoming information (e.g., on the sudden drop in yesterday's
testing productivity) ... (and because there is a) tendency
to delay action until the change is insistent ... "
(Forrester, 1961), "Perceived Testing Productivity" is
formulated as a SMOOTH. The smooth delay is set at 50
working days.
Once "Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for New Tasks,"
"Man-Days Perceived Needed to Rework Detected Errors," and
"Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for Testing" are all
determined, they would all be summed up to determine the
"Total Man-Days Perceived Still Needed" to complete the
project. And once this is determined, it is then compared to
the actual "Man-Days Remaining" in the project's plan. So,
if 100 man-days are perceived to be still needed to complete
the project, but only 50 man-days are remaining, the project
would be perceived to be behind schedule. Conversely, if
only 25 man-days are what is perceived to be still needed,
while 50 man-days remain available in the project's plan,
then the project would be perceived to be ahead of schedule.
After an assessment is made of any man-day shortages or
excesses, behavior on the project can then be altered if the
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need for doing so is indicated. For example, if the project
is perceived to be behind (ahead of) schedule i.e., if it is
experiencing a man-day shortage (excess), then project
members could be motivated to work more (less) hard. The
mechanisms that determine how much, if any, of any perceived
man-day shortage (excess) is absorbed by the project members
in the form of increased (decreased) work rate were fully
explained in our discussions on software development
productivity. Any shortages (excesses) that are not absorbed
will be reported, and will lead to adjustments to the
project's scope. (Such adjustments are then translated, in
the Planning section, into adjustments to the schedule or
adjustments tq the workforce level, or both.)
Let us consider an example. And, again, let us consider
the case of the 100 man-day project. If, after 60 man-days
have been expended, the values of "Man-Days Remaining" and
"Total Man-Days-Perceived Still Needed" were 40 man-days and
65 man-days respectively, then the "Perceived Shortage in
Man-Days" would be 25. If the project members (based on the
many factors discussed in the productivity section) decide to
absorb only 10 of the 25 man-days, then the "Reported
Shortage in Man-Days" would be 15 man-days. If these are
added to the value of "Man-Days Remaining" in the project's
plan, i.e., to 40, we come up with a value of 55 man-days for
the "Man-Days Reported Still Needed" to complete the project.
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Any time the "Man-Days Reported Still Needed" turns out
to be more (less) than the "Man-Days Remaining" in the
project's plan, it would, in effect, constitute a revision of
what the project'.s scope is perceived to be, i.e., that it is
larger (smaller) than what has been planned for. For
example, in the case above, reporting that 55 (rather than
40) man-days are still needed after having had 60 man-days
already expended, constitutes a revision in what the
project's size is perceived to be, namely, from the original
estimate of 100 man-days to a revised value of 60 + 55 = 115
man-days i.e., a 15% increase. When such a "revelation"
occurs in a project, project management reacts to transform
those revised perceptions about the "Total Job Size in
Man-Days" into actual adjustments. This adjustment process
is captured, as is shown in Figure III.29., through the "Rate
of Adjusting the Job's Size in Man-Days." It is the rate at
which the "Total Job Size in Man-Days" is adjusted, upwards
or downwards, to what is perceived as its newly revised
value. The "Rate of Adjusting the Job's Size in Man-Days" is
formulated as,
(GOAL - LEVEL)/ADJUSTMENT-TIME
where,
GOAL = Revised value of job size
in Man-Days
= Man-Days Reported Still Needed +
Cumulative Man-Days Expended
= Total Job Size in Man-DaysLEVEL
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ADJUSTMENT-TIME = Delay in Adjusting the
Job's Size in Man-Days
Thus, the adjustment process is not an instantaneous
one, instead it takes place over a time interval defined as
the "Delay in Adjusting the Job's Size in Man-Days."
The above formulation of the "Rate of Adjusting the
Job's Size in Man-Days" produces the behavior pattern shown
in Figure 111.30. In the situation portrayed in the figure,
it is assumed that up until time tl, LEVEL = GOAL. Then, at
time (t1) there is a sudden permanent increase (h) in the
GOAL e.g., the "Revised Value of the Job's Size" jumps from
100 man-days to 115 man-days. In response to such a step
rise in the value of the GOAL, the value of LEVEL (e.g., the
value of "Total Job Size in. Man-Days") rises in an
exponential, goal seeking pattern. And, it can be shown
that, the rate at which LEVEL rises is such that it would
close 63% of the gap after one "Adjustment time," and 95% of
the gap after 3 "Adjustment-times."
The "Delay in Adjusting the Job's Size in Man-Days"
ranged in the organizations we interviewed in from 2 days
(Landolfi, 22), (Lombardi, 23) to a week (i.e., 5 working
days), (Chan, 20). In the model the "Delay in Adjusting the
Job's Size in Man-Days" is set to 3 working days. This value
together with the ones reported by our interviewees might
strike some readers as somewhat lower than what they would
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have expected. But remember, this adjustment process is
really the project's final, not first, reaction to some
man-day shortage/excess. As we explained before, when the
project is perceived to be behind (ahead) of schedule people
first react by absorbing the shortage (excess). And only
when this is not enough, are adjustments to the project's
size undertaken. Thus, when, if ever, the the decision to
also adjust the project's size is made, people in the project
would have been "geared-up" for it.
Falling behind schedule is not the only reason why a
project's size in man-days might be adjusted upwards. It
could also happen, as Figure 111.29. indicates, as a result
of an upward adjustment in the project's size in tasks.
As a software project develops, project members often
realize that they have under-estimated the number of tasks
(e.g., modules) that comprises the software system being
developed (DeMarco, 1982), (Burchett, 1982), (Daly, 1977),
(Devenny, 1976). Boehm (1981) provides an explanation for
this tendency to underestimate software size:
There is a powerful tendency to focus on the highly
visible mainline components of the software, and to
underestimate or completely miss the unobtrusive
components (e.g., help message processing, error
processing, and moving data around).
In the model we define an initializing parameter called
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"Tasks Underestimation Fraction." Through this parameter we
can simulate any software under-sizing situation we wish to
investigate. For example, if the actual size of the software
product to be developed is, say, 100 tasks, then to simulate
a 25% under-sizing "problem" we would simply set the "Tasks
Underestimation Fraction" to 0.25. What this would do, is it
would initialize the model such that the value of the
"Currently Perceived Job Size in Tasks" is only
(1 - 0.25) * 100 = 75 tasks. It would also initialize
another level, namely, the "Undiscovered Job Tasks" to
0.25 * 100 = 25 tasks.
As the project develops, the "Undiscovered Job Tasks"
are progressively discovered as "the level of knowledge we
have of what the software is intended to do (increases)"
(Boehm, 1981). The rate at which this happens, i.e., the
number of undiscovered tasks that would be discovered per
unit of time, is regulated, in the model, by the "Rate of
Discovering Tasks." It is formulated as the product of the
number of "Undiscovered Job Tasks" and the "Percent of
Undiscovered Tasks Discovered per Day." Because the rate at
which undiscovered-tasks are discovered tends to increase as
the project develops (Daly, 1977) (e.g., because, as the
above quote indicates, the team's level of knowledge of what
the software product is intended to do increases), the
"Percent of Undiscovered Tasks Discovered per Day" is
formulated, not as a constant, but instead as a variable that
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increases in value as the project progresses. Its
formulation is depicted in the table function of Figure
III.31.
As the additional tasks are discovered, they are then
incorporated into the project e.g., incorporated into the
project's Work Breakdown Structure, the Gantt and/or PERT
charts, the Earned Value System, ... etc. This, of course,
takes time. In the model this process is modeled as a
third-order delay, with the "Average Delay in Incorporating
Discovered Tasks" set to 10 working days (i.e., two weeks)
(Landolfi, 22).
The final piece of structure we would like to discuss is
the one that model's the process by which the discovery of
additional tasks is translated into additions to the
project's allocation of man-days. This structure occupies
the lower portion of Figure 111.29.
When additional tasks are discovered in a project, they
do not necessarily always trigger an adjustment to the
project's man-days estimate (Boehm, 1981). Only if the
additional tasks are perceived as requiring a relatively
"significant" amount of effort to handle, would project
members "bother" to go through the trouble of formally
developing cost estimates and incorporating them in the
project's work plan (Chan, 20), (Lombardi, 23), (Hisamune,
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26) and (Nichols, 27). As Figure III.29. indicates, the
number of discovered tasks are first "mentally" sized-up by
dividing them by the "Assumed Development Productivity." For
example, if 10 tasks are discovered and if, at that point in
the project, the value of the "Assumed Development
Productivity" is 1 task/man-day, then the "Perceived Size of
Discovered Tasks in Man-Days" would be 10 man-days. This
absolute number by itself is not, however, enough to decide
whether the new tasks do or do not deserve a "formal
treatment." This determination is based, not on the
perceived absolute size of the discovered tasks, but instead
on what their size is perceived to be relative to the amount
of effort that is perceived remaining. For example, while it
would be quite possible that a 100 man-day task discovered at
the beginning of 100,000 man-day project would not trigger
any adjustments in the projects's man-days estimate, it would
be quite unlikely for this to happen if the 100 man-day task
is discovered at the end of the development phase when only
50 man-days are still remaining in the project's plan. Thus,
the value of the ""Perceived Size of Discovered Tasks in
Man-Days" is divided by the "Man-Day Perceived Remaining for
New Tasks" to determine the "Relative Size of Discovered
Tasks." Once this relative size is determined, it is then
compared to some threshold value, namely, the "Maximum
Relative Size of Additions Tolerated Without Adding to the
Project'.s Man-Days." If the relative size is lower than that
threshold, the newly discovered tasks are totally absorbed
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without triggering any adjustments to the project's man-days
estimate. If, however, the relative size exceeds that
threshold value, parts or all of the additional tasks are
translated into additional man-days in the project's plan.
This behavior is captured in the table function of Figure
111.32. Based on discussions with (Hisamune, 26), and
(Nichols, 27), we set the "Maximum Relative Size of Additions
Tolerated Without Adding to Schedule to the Project's
Man-Days" to 1%. .For example, for a 1000 man-day development
phase (e.g., 10 people working for 100 working days the
threshold is 10 man-days).
As a result of the above decision making process, a
decision could, therefore, be made to formally incorporate
either part or all of those tasks discovered, at some point
in the project, into the project's man-days estimate. Such
an adjustment involves producing two estimates, one for the
effort to develop and QA the new tasks, and the other for the
system testing work. Both of these estimates are determined
in basically the same manner. The former is determined by
dividing the number of discovered tasks that are to be
incorporated by the "Assumed Development Productivity," while
the system testing effort is estimated by dividing by the
"Perceived Testing Productivity."
Any such adjustments to the project's total man-days
estimate, will, in turn, trigger further adjustments in
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either the projects schedule completion date, the workforce
level, or both. These reactions are explained next in the
planning section.
III.4.6. Planning:
The Planning subsystem is depicted in Figure III.33.
The "Schedule Completion Date" is formulated, not as an
actual date (e.g., August 7th, 1983), but as a number of
working days from the beginning of the project (e.g., 200 -
days). Thus, by simply subtracting the current value of
"Time" (which represents the number of working days elapsed
in a simulation run), we can determine the scheduled "Time
Remaining." By dividing the value of "Man-Days Remaining,"
at any point in the project, by "Time Remaining" we can then
determine the "Indicated Workforce Level." This would
represent the number of full-time employees believed to be
necessary and sufficient to complete the project 6n time
i.e., on the (current) "Scheduled Completion Date." For
example, if the "Scheduled Completion Date" is 100 days, and
at time = 40 days the value of "Man-Days Remaining" is 600
man-days, the "Indicated Workforce Level" would be determined
as follows: First, the value of "Time Remaining" would be
determined to be 100 - 40 = 60 days. Dividing this into 600
man-days, we arrive at a value for the "Indicated Workforce
Level" of 10 men. As we said, this value is in terms of
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full-time equivalent employees. Thus, if (actual) employees
are iot assigned full-time on the project, adjustments should
be made. This is achieved in the model by dividing the value
of the "Indicated Workforce Level" obtained above, by the
value of the "Average Daily Manpower per Employee." For
example, if employees assign, on the average, only 50% of
their time to the project, i.e., "Average Daily Manpower per
Employee" equals 0.5, then the "Indicated Workforce Level"
obtained above would be adjusted to become 10 / 0.5 = 20
(actual) employees.
As was mentioned, the "Indicated Workforce Level"
represents the number of full-time employees believed to be
necessary and sufficient to complete the project on time
i.e., on the (Current) "Scheduled Completion Date." If this
number turns out to be lower than the value of the "Total
Workforce" on the project, excessive employees would be
simply transferred out of the project. The transfer
operation was explained in detail in the "Human Resource
Management Subsystem." If, on the other hand, the opposite
is true, i.e., the "Indicated Workforce Level" is larger,
then this would indicate a need to hire more people.
However, as has also been explained in the "Human Resource
Management Subsystem," hiring decisions are not determined
only on the basis of scheduling considerations. In addition,
consideration is also given to the stability of the
workforce. That is, before hiring new project members,
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management tries to contemplate the duration of need for
these new members. Different firms weigh this factor to
various extents. In general, however, the relative weighting
between the desire for workforce stability on the one hand,
and the desire to complete the project on time, on the other,
changes with the stage of project completion.
The "Workforce Level Needed" is formulated as a weighted
average of the (Current) "Total Workforce Level" and the
"Indicated Workforce Level." It, thus, takes into account
both the stable workforce level, and the number of employees
that would be required to complete the project on time.
Specifically, it is formulated as follows:
WF-Level Needed = Indicated WF-Level * WCWF +
Total WF-Level * (1-WCWF)
(Note: The above formulation only applies when the
value of the "Indicated Workforce Level" is larger than
"Total Workforce," indicating a need for hiring more people.
In cases where the opposite is true, i.e., "Indicated
Workforce Level" is lower, then "Workforce Level Needed"
would be simply set to that lower value, and any excessive
employees transferred out of the project.)
The weighting factor (WCWF) is termed the "Willingness
to Change Workforce Level." It is a variable that could
assume values between 0 and 1, inclusive. When WCWF = 1, the
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weighting considers only the "Indicated Workforce Level"
i.e., management would be adjusting its workforce level to
the number perceived required to finish on schedule. As WCWF
moves towards 0, more and more weighting would be given to
the stability of the workforce. And when WCWF equals exactly
0, the weighted number of employees desired becomes wholly
dependent on the workforce stability factors.
We formulated the "Willingness to Change Workforce
Level" to be compri-.d of two components. The first
component, WCWF-1, captures the pressures that develop, as
the project proceeds towards its final stages, for workforce
stability. Although different firms will weigh this factor
to various extents, we feel that the general form of WCWF-1
depicted in Figure 111.34. (and which is based on
discussions with (Lombardi, 23), (Garett, 24), and (Nichols,
25) is representitive. To understand what Figure 111.34.
represents, assume for the moment that "Willingness to Change
Workforce Level" is only comprised of, and is therefore equal
to, WCWF-1. Thus, in the early stages of the project when
"Time Remaining" would general;ly be much larger than the sum
of the "Hiring Delay" and the "Average Assimilation Delay,"
WCWF would be equal to 1, i.e., there would be total
willingness to adjust the size of the workforce to whatever
level is necessary to suit the project's scheduled completion
date. As the number of days perceived remaining drops below
1.5 * (Hiring . Delay + Average Assimilation Delay), though,
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the figure shows increasing reluctance to increase the
workforce level. For example, if the "Hiring Delay" is 40
working days and the "Average Assimilation Delay" is 80 days,
then as "Time Remaining" drops below 180 days, management
starts to become reluctant to hire new people, even though
the time and effort perceived remaining might imply that more
people are needed. This reluctance stems from the
realization that most of those remaining 180 days, would be
"wasted" in the hiring process and then in acquainting the
new people with the mechanics of the project, in integrating
them into the project team, and in training them in the
necessary technical areas. When the "Time Remaining" drops
below 0.3 * (Hiring Delay + Average Assimilation Delay), the
table function of Figure III.34. suggests that no more
additions would be made to the project's workforce i.e., the
hiring rate will fall to zero. Thus, at that stage, if the
project is behind schedule, project management would be
coping only by pushing back the schedule completion date.
This, of course, is not always feasible or acceptable.
For example, in our discussions at MITRE, we learned that in
projects that involve embedded software for weapon systems,
serious schedule slippages can not be tolerated. The reason
is that, in such projects, software development is often on
the critical path of overall system development, which, as a
result, translates any serious slippages in the software
schedule into very costly slippages in the overall delivery
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schedule of the system (O'Conner, 10).
Let's see what this meant in a recent software
development for a large defense system. It was planned
to have an operational lifetime of seven years and a
total cost of about $1.4 billion --- or about $200
million a year worth of capability. However, a
six-month delay caused a six-month delay in making the
system available to the user, who thus lost about $100
million worth of needed capability --- about 50 times
the direct cost of $2 million for the additional
software effort (Boehm, 1973).
Because of the software industry's less than impressive
track record in delivering projects on schedule, such
embedded software projects are often scheduled with some
"safety factor" incorporated (O'Conner, 10). For example, if
some "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date" is, say, 100 days,
.and a 20% safety factor is used, then the project would be
initially scheduled to complete in 0.80 * 100 = 80 days. If
such a project starts to fall behind schedule, what would
happen? We will assume the following scenario (O'Conner,
10): As long as the "Scheduled Completion Date" is
comfortably below the "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date"
then decisions to adjust the schedule, add more people, or do
a combination of both will continue be based on the balancing
of scheduling and workforce stability considerations, e.g.,
as captured by WCWF-1. However, as the "Scheduled Completion
Date" starts approaching the "Maximum Tolerable Completion
Date," pressures would develop that would override the
workforce stability considerations. That is, management
becomes increasingly willing to "pay any price" necessary to
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avoid overshooting the "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date."
And this often translates into a management that is
increasingly willing to hire more people.
The development of such overriding pressures are
captured through the following formulation of the
"Willingness to Change Workforce Level" (WCWF),
WCWF = MAXIMUM (WCWF-1, WCWF-2)
WCWF-2, the second component of WCWF, is the table
function depicted in Figure 111.35. Thus, as long as
"Scheduled Completion Date" is comfortably below the "Maximum
Tolerable Completion Date," the value of WCWF-1 would be
zero, i.e., it would have no bearing in the determination of
WCWF, and consequently no bearing on the hiring decisions.
When "Scheduled Completion Date" starts approaching the
"Maximum Tolerable Completion Date" the value of WCWF-2
starts to gradually rise. Becauise such a situation would be
developing towards the end of the project, the value of
WCWF-1 would be probably close to zero and decreasing. Thus,
as WCWF-2 exceeds the value of WCWF-1, the "Willingness to
Change Workforce Level" would be totally dominated by
scheduling considerations, i.e., by the desire not to
overshoot the "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date."
Note that the above formulation of WCWF allows us to
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easily simulate those environments in which there are no
tight time commitments. In such cases we need only to set
the value of "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date" to some high
value. This would keep WCWF-2 always at the zero level.
And, thus, WCWF becomes solely a function of WCWF-1.
One final note about the formulation of the "Willingness
to Change Workforce Level." It is important to realize that
the variable WCWF is an expression of a policy for managing
projects. Thus, a range of functions are possible here
(e.g., different- forms of the table functions WCWF-1 and
WCWF-2), capturing different strategies for how to balance
workforce and schedule adjustments throughout the project to
minimize overruns and costs. In the next chapter, we will
take the opportunity to explore a range of other alternate
policies besides the (representitive) one discussed here.
Once the "Workforce Level Needed" is determined, it is
translated into a goal for hiring in (or transfering out)
employees. This goal is termed the "Workforce Level Sought."
The "Workforce Level Sought" is almost always identical to
the "Workforce Level Needed." They could, however, differ.
When this happens, it is usually in the early stages of the
project, when the project's manpower build-up rate tends to
be at its highest level. A consideration is given then, as
was explained in the "Human Resource Management Subsystem,"
to the project's ability to absorb new people into its
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organization. This factor defines, in effect, a ceiling on
the number of employees sought i.e., to be hired. That is,
"Workforce Level Sought" would be set to the value of
"Workforce Level Needed" as long as this is less than or
equal to the "Ceiling on Total Workforce." Otherwise,
"Workforce Level Sought" is set to the value of the latter.
By dividing the "Man-Days Remaining" by the value of the
"Workforce Level Sought" (after being adjusted if necessary
to be in terms of full-time equivalent employees) we can
determine the "Time Perceived Still Required." This would
represent the remaining time, in working days, that is
perceived to be still required to complete the project, given
its current condition. Notice that by computing the "Time
Perceived Still Required" in terms of the "Workforce Level
Sought rather than the "Total Workforce" means that we are
assuming that schedule adjustments (which would be based on
this computation), are made with full awareness of the hiring
decisions being made in the project. For example, if at some
point as much as 1100 man-days are still remaining to
complete the project, 10 full-time employees are working on
it, and it has been decided to hire an additional employee
(i.e., "Workforce Level Sought" is 10 + 1 = 11), then we are
assuming that management would (often through a
back-of-the-envelope computation) determine that the time
still required is 1100 / 11 = 100 days. (Based on
discussions with (Landolfi, 11), (Chan, 14), and (Lombardi,
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16).)
Once the "Time Perceived Still Required" is computed, it
would be added to the value of "Time" (i.e., the number of
working days elapsed on the simulated project) to determine
the "Indicated Completion Date." For example, if at Time =
40 days, the value of "Time Perceived Still Required" is 100
days, then the value of the "Indicated Completion Date" would
be 140 days. Once this, in turn, is determined, it is used
to adjust the project's formal "Scheduled Completion Date,"
if necessary. The "Rate of Adjusting the Schedule" has the
(by now) familiar formulation,
(GOAL) - LEVEL) / ADJUSTMENT-TIME
where,
GOAL = Indicated Completion Date
LEVEL = Scheduled Completion date
ADJUSTMENT-TIME = Schedule Adjustment Time
The "Schedule Adjustment Time" is set in the model to 5
working days (i.e., one calender week) (Landolfi, 22), (Chan,
20).
111.5. Summary:
In this chapter on model development, we accomplished
three tasks. First, we identified the sources of information
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utilized in developing the model. As was explained in
Section 111.2, the model was developed on the basis of an
extensive review of the literature, supplemented by 27
focused field interviews of software project managers in 5
organizations. Second, we defined the model's boundary. As
was shown in Section 111.3, the model focuses on the
development phases of software production, extending from the
beginning of the design phase of the software lifecycle, up
untill the end of the system testing phase. Finally, in
Section III.4, a detailed description of the model's
structure was presented. The model is comprised of four
sectors. At the heart of the model is the Software
Production Sector, where software production activities such
as coding and testing are modeled. The project management
activities comprise the remaining three sectors: Planning,
Human Resource Management, and Control.
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IV. A CASE-STUDY:
THE NASA DE-A SOFTWARE PROJECT
In this chapter we report the results of a case-study we
conducted to test the model. The objective of the case study
is to examine the model's ability to reproduce the dynamic
behavior patterns of a completed software project. The
dynamic behavior of a set of variables pertaining to the
management of the project is tracked, including: completion
date estimates, man-day estimates, cost (in man-days), and
workforce loading.
The case-study was conducted at the Systems Development
Section of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) at
Greenbelt, Maryland. This organization is engaged in the
development of application software that supports
ground-based spacecraft attitude determination and control.
The subsystems included in a typical attitude system are
telemetry processing, sensor calibration, attitude
computation, and maneuver planning. In the section that
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follows we will provide a detailed description of one such
project, namely, the DE-A project used in our case-study.
This will then be followed in Section IV.2., by a discussion
of model parameterization. That is, we will discuss the set
of model parameters that are set to simulate the particular
DE-A project environment (e.g., project size). Finally, in
Section IV.3., we will simulate the DE-A project, observe its
behavior, and compare it to DE-A's actual behavior patterns.
IV.1. The DE-.A Project:
The basic requirements for the DE-A project were to
design, implement, and test a software system that would
process telemetry data and would provide definitive attitude
determination as well as real-time attitude determination and
control support for NASA's DE-A satellite. The DE-A
satellite was designed to study the physical process of the
earth's upper atmosphere, ionosphere, and magnetosphere. The
overall requirements were similar to previous space mission
requirements at the GSFC System Development Section (NASA,
1983).
The DE-;A project was selected for the case-study by
NASA. Specifically, it was selected by Frank E. McGarry,
Head of the Systems Development Section of the Goddard Space
Flight center, who is participating, as we are, in the
NASA/MIT "Advanced Information Systems Project." The project
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was selected by McGarry so as to satisfy three criteria
(furnished by us): (1) to be medium in size (i.e., 16-64
KDSI); (2) recent; (3) "typical" i.e., one that would be
considered as having been developed in a familiar in-house
software development environment.
In the remaining part of this section we will provide a
more detailed account of the nature and development history
of the project. The data presented was extracted from two
primary sources:
1. Interviews with Frank E. McGarry, who managed the
project. Two lengthy personal interviews were conducted
at the Goddard Center on August 11 and 12, 1983. These
were then followed by 4 (15-minute) telephone
interviews.
2. Project documentation. These included:
* "Software Development History for Dynamics
Explorer (DE) Attitude Ground Support System
(AGSS)," June, 1983.
* DE-A Resource Summary
The life cycle phases covered in this study include the
design, coding, and system testing phases. Excluded from the
study are the requirements definition phase and the
acceptance testingý phase. Both the requirements and
acceptance testing phases were excluded because they both lie
outside the boundary of our model. This did not pose any
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complications, however. The requirements phase, it turns
out, was also not included in McGarry's group's project
responsibility. Requirements were, instead, the
responsibility of the user organization, which for the DE-A
project was the Attitude Determination and Control Section
(ADCS) of the Goddard Space Flight Center. The ADCS, thus,
developed the functional requirements of the system,
including system input and output, algorithms, and timimg and
accuracy requirements. The responsibility for the acceptance
testing phase, on the other hand, was shared by both the
development team, and an independent testing group.
Excluding the acceptance testing phase posed no complications
to our analysis simply because it was the last phase in the
life cycle, hence its exclusion had no impact on any of the
other life cycle phases studied.
The development and target operations machines were the
IBM S/360-95 and -75. The programming language was mostly
Fortran (85%). (Assembler language and assembler language
macros constituted the remaining 15%.) The size of the
system in Delivered Source Instructions (DSI) is 24,400 DSI.
Recall the definition of a DSI:
Delivered. This term is generally meant to exclude
nondelivered support software such as test drivers.
However, if there are developed with the same care as
delivered software, with their own review, test plans,
documentation, etc., then they should be included.
Source Instructions. This term includes all program
instructions created by project personnel and processed
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into machine code by some combination of preprocessors,
compilers, and assemblers. It excludes comment cards
and unmodified utility software. It includes job
control language, format statements, and data
declarations. Instructions are defined as lines of code
or card images. Thus, ,~ line containing two or more
source statements counts as one instruction; a
five-line data declaration counts as five instructions
(Boehm, 1981).
The size of the project in DSI is determined by NASA as
follows (NASA, 1983):
Size in DSI = New Statements +
extensively modified statements
0.2*(Slightly Modified Statements)
a "Statement" a non-comment source
instruction.
The project's actual key development dates were:
Start End
Design
Coding
Sys. Test
Oct. 1, 1979
May 10, 1980
Nov. 15, 1980
May 9, 1980
March 27, 1981
April 24, 1981
Thus, the project was completed in 19 calendar months.
In terms of cost, the project consumed 2,222 man-days of
effort. (2,784 man-days were expended to complete the total
project, of which 562 man-days were consumed in the
acceptance testing activity.)
Where,
Phase
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IV.2. Model Parameterization:
Three sets of parameters need to be set in the model, to
simulate a particular project situation. These are:
Initial Project Estimates
1. Initial estimate of project size in DSI
2. Initial estimate of man-day expenditures
3. Initial staffing level
4. Initial estimate of project duration Human
Resource Management
5. Average daily manpower per staff member
6. Hiring delay
7. Average employment time
8. Training overhead
9. Average assimilation delay
Software Development Environment
10. Nominal Potential Productivity
11. Error rate
We now proceed to set the DE-A project values for the
above collection of model parameters.
Project Planning
1. Initial Estimate of Project Size:
As was mentioned above the actual DE-A project size was
24.4 KDSI. At the initiation of the design phase (i.e.,
October 1, 1979), though, the project's size was
under-estimated by 45%. That is, the project was perceived
to be only 24.4 * (1-.45) = 16 KDSI (NASA, 1983). (Note:
Initial estimates were made in terms of source instructions
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with comments. The actual size of the project in source
instructions with comments was 49,500 and the initial
estimate was 32,600 i.e., under-estimated by 45%.)
2. Initial Estimates of Man-Day Expenditures: In a NASA
document titled Recommended Approach to Software Development
(April, 1983), the following estimating guidelines are
provided:
It is important for the manager to use a model that is
tuned to the specific environment and corresponds well
with the resources expended for similar past projects.
The Meta-Model has been developed using SEL data.
However, managers must never completely rely on any
formal resource estimation model. Rather, they must use
the results of the model, together with historical
knowledge of similar systems, to update resource and
cost estimates. The new estimates are more accurate
because they are based on additional information and
model support.
The Meta-Model refered to above is a software estimation
model developed as part of a research project of the Software
Engineering Laboratory (SEL). The SEL is a research
organization established in 1977 at the NASA Goddard Space
Flight Center (Systems Development and Analysis Branch) in
cooperation with the University of Maryland (Computer Science
Department), and the Computer Sciences Corporation (Flight
Systems Operation). The Meta-Model is discussed in (Bailey
and Basili, 1981).
In the DE-A project, the above recommended procedure was
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indeed followed ((NASA, 1983) and discussions with McGarry).
That is, the Meta-Model estimates were used as guidelines,
which were then adjusted on the basis of managerial
experience and judgement.
For Project DE-A the initial estimates were made for the
design, coding, system testing, and acceptance testing
phases. The value was 1,380 man-days. Since the actual
man-day expenditures (including the acceptance testing phase)
were 2,784 man-days the initial estimate was 50% off the
actual. Recall, though, that our model excludes the
acceptance testing phase. Thus, the above 1,380 value cannot
be used, and must be adjusted downwards. To do this we will
make the following assumption: we will apply the man-day
estimation error of 50% to the design, coding, and system
testing phases of the project. For these three phases, the
actual man-day expenditures were 2,222 man-days. Assuming
that the effort for these three phases was under-estimated by
50% (as was the total project effort) we arrive at an initial
estimate of 0.5 * 2,222 = 1,111 man-days.
This total man-day estimate is then distributed among
the project's life cycle phases. In DE-A the distribution
used was 85% for development (i.e., design and coding) and
15% for system testing (discussions with McGarry).
Finally, effort is also allocated to the QA activity.
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The "Planned Fraction of Manpower for QA" for project DE-A is
shown in Figure IV.3. (discussions with McGarry).
3. Initial Staffing Level:
The project was initialized with a staffing level of
approximately 1.5 full-time equivalent employees (NASA,
1983).
4. Initial Estimate of Project Duration:
The DE-A project was initiated on October 1, 1979, and
it was planned to complete (i.e., design, coding, and system
testing) on January 30, 1981. (The acceptance testing phase
was planned to start on January 31, 1981 and end on April 4,
1981.) That is, the project's duration (until system
testing) was estimated to be 16 months, or 16 X 20 = 320
working days (NASA, 1983).
Because NASA's launch of the DE-A satellite was tied to
the completion of the DE-A software, serious schedule
slippage were not tolerated. Specifically, "all software was
required to be accepted and frozen 90 days before launch"
(NASA, 1983).
The DE-A satellite's launch date was August 3, 1981.
This meant that all software was required to be accepted and
frozen by May 3, 1981. And because, the acceptance testing
phase was scheduled for 2 months, this meant that the
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"Maximum Tolerable Completion Date" for the system testing
phase was March 3, 1981. That is, the DE-A project was
initially scheduled for 16 months, with the realization that
it should not slip by more than 2 more months. (Note, the
project ended up completing on April 24, i.e., it did
overshoot the 18 month ceiling by approximately 20 calendar
days. As a result the acceptance testing phase was
"compressed" in duration.)
Human Resource Management
5. Average Daily Manpower per Staff:
On project DE-A the "Average Daily Manpower per Staff
was set to 0.5. That, is, on the average, DE-A project
personnel were assigned half-time to the project (from DE-A's
Resource Summary).
6. Hiring Delay:
The "Hiring Delay" was set to 30 working days i.e., 6
calendar weeks (discussion with McGarry). This is somewhat
lower than the industry, average (40 days). The reason is
that prompt hirings are often made from the Computer Science
Corporation (CSC) (under a special arrangement between CSC
and the Goddard Center).
7. Average Employment Time:
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The average employment time at the Systems development
Section of the GSFC is 1000 working days (i.e., 50 calendar
months). This translates into a turnover rate of
approximately 20% (discussions with McGarry).
8. Training Overhead:
As was explained in Chapter III, the determination of
the amount of effort to commit to the training of new
employees is made on the basis of managerial intuition and
organizational custom. At the System Development Section,
25% of an experienced employee's time is committed per new
employee (discussions with McGarry).
9. Average Assimilation Delay:
The "Average Assimilation Delay" was set for the DE-A
project to 20 working days (i.e., 4 calendar weeks). This
value is much lower than values reported in the literature.
The reason, given by McGarry, has again to do with the
special arrangement his group has with the Computer Sciences
Corporation. As was said earlier, on many occasions,
software professionals are recruited from CSC to work on
Goddard projects. This tapped pool of software professionals
is one that over the years has gained experience with the
NASA project environment. And as a result, when recruited on
a new project, a CSC professional is assimilated at a faster
rate.
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Software Development Environment
10. Nominal Potential Productivity:
Recall that this parameter captures the set of
productivity determinants that distinguish different software
development environments. e.g., availability of software
tools, computer-hardware characteristics, and product
complexity. That is, the set of factors that affect
productivity, but which tend to remain invariant during the
life cycle of a single project.
To determine the nominal potential productivity for the
DE-A project environment, we need first to determine the
actual development productivity. As stated above, the total
effort expended to develop the 24.4 KDSI project amounted to
2,222 man-days. Of these, 228 man-days were expended on
system testing, and approximately 914 man-days on QA and
rework ((NASA, 1983) and discussions with McGarry). Thus, a
total of 1,080 man-days were expended on the development
(i.e., design and coding) of the system. From this, we can
determine the average development productivity as
24,400/1,080 = 22.59 DSI/man-day. This, however, is still
not the value we are looking for. We are looking for the
"Nominal Potential Productivity" and what we have is the
actual productivity. Recall, potential productivity is,
the maximum level of productivity that can occur
when an individual or group employs its funds of
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resources to meet the task demands of a work situation.
It is the level of productivity that will be attained if
the individual or group makes the best possible use of
its resources (that is, if there is no loss of
productivity due to faulty process) (Steiner, 1966).
As was explained in detail in chapter III, actual
productivity rarely equals potential productivity because of
losses due to communication and motivation problems. These
losses are captured in the model by the "Multiplier to
Productivity due to Communication and Motivation Losses."
Specifically, actual productivity is formulated in the model
as the product of potential productivity and the "Multiplier
to Productivity due to Communication and Motivation Losses."
Thus, if we can estimate the.value of this multiplier, we can
then divide it into the value of actual productivity
calculated above, to come up with an estimate for DE-A's
"Nominal Potential Productivity."
The multiplier is itself a product of two variables,
namely, the "Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on Project" and
"Communication Overhead." The nominal value of the former
was set in Chapter III to 0.6 (i.e., a full-time employee
allocates, on the average, 60% of his or her time to
productive work on the project). The "Communication
Overhead," on the hand, was shown to be a function of team
size. In DE-A, the size of the team size was approximately
10 people during most of the development period. From Figure
111.15., we can then determine that the loss due to
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"Communication Overhead" will be 60%. Thus, the value of the
"Multiplier to Productivity due to Communication and
Motivation Losses" becomes: 0.6 * (1-.06) = 0.564. - By
dividing this into the value of actual productivity (22.59
DSI/Man-Day) calculated above, we come up with the estimate
for the "Nominal Potential Productivity," namely,
22.59/0.564 = 40 DSI Man-Day.
11. Error Rate:
In Chapter III, we explained that the formulation of the
table function "Nominal Number of Errors Committed per Task"
serves two purposes. First, its shape over the project's
life reflects the relative generation rates of different
error types (e.g., design versus coding errors) throughout
the life of the project. These assumptions, as all others in
the model, are expected to apply to all project situations
modeled. Hence, this shape would remain the same, even when
modeling different project situations. The second purpose of
the formulation, namely, its absolute value, reflects the
different error generation characteristics of different
project environments i.e., the software product's
characterisitics (e.g., reliability requirements), as well as
those of the organization in which it is developed (e.g.,
quality of personnel). This, obviously, would generally
change when modeling different project environments.
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In the DE-A project, the actual number of errors
committed was somewhere between 495 and 510 errors. (The
exact figure is not known, because of "errors" in counting
errors.) On the basis of this data, we formulated the
"Nominal Number of Errors Committed per Task" for the DE-A
project environment as shown in Figure IV.3.. The shape of
the curve is exactly similar to that of the base-case (shown
in Figure 111.17.), however, for DE-A the absolute values are
slightly lower, ranging from 24 errors/KDSI at the beginning
of design to 12 errors/KDSI towards the end of coding, with
an average value for the project of 18 errors/KDSI.
Notice that an average nominal error rate of 18
error/KDSI would generate 18 X 24.4 = 439 errors only ...
and not 495-510. This is because this error rate is the
nominal rate. As was explained in Chapter III, the nominal
error rate is defined to be that generated by the average
experienced-type employee. Such a rate is therefore a lower
bound, attained only when the workforce is solely comprised
of experienced personnel. When this is not the case, i.e.,
when the workforce contains new hirees as well, the error
rate would be adjusted upwards through the the "Multiplier to
Error Generation due to Workforce Mix." By setting the
nominal average error rate to 18, we are, therefore, assuming
that 15% more errors (i.e., above the nominal level) will be
produced) because of new hirees on the DE-A project
(18 X 24.4 X 1.15 = 505 errors).
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Summary
The value of the above set of model parameters is
summarized in Table IV.1. The parameters are in the same
order above, and are refered to by their DYNAMO names.
It is important to notice that the parameterization
process of this section did not involve any of the model's
policy formulations. By policy we mean the criteria for
decision making. The set of parameters we have set merely
defines the particular environment within which the policies
are exercised. For example, by setting parameters such as
"Hiring Delay" and "Turnover," we do not alter in any way the
rationale that determines how hiring/firing decisions will be
modulated through-out the project's lifecycle. Thus, while
it can be determined from the set of parameter values of
Table IV.1 that, for example, the DE-A project is initialized
with a workforce level of 1.5 full-time-equivalent employees,
one can not, on the other hand, ascertain the project's
workforce loading pattern. The dynamic behavior of
management systems tends to be largely a function of the
interaction of the collection of policies that govern such
systems (Forrester, 1979). For example, we will see in the
next section how the workforce loading pattern of the DE-A
software project is a function of not only the policies
Parameter Name
(DIMENSIONLESS)
(MAN-DAYS) ,
(DIMENSIONLESS)
(%)
(DIMENSIONLESS)
(DAYS)
(DIMENSIONLESS)
(DIMENSIONLESS )
(DAYS)
(DAYS)
(DIMENSIONLESS )
(DAYS)
(DSI/TASK)
11. TNERPT (ERRORS/KDSI)
35.0
1,111.0
0.85
.325/.29/.275/.255/.25/.275/.325/.375/.4/.4/0
0.4
320.0
1.16
0.5
30.0
1,000.0
0.25
20.0
40.0
24/22. 9/20.75/15.25/13.1/12
TABLE IV,I
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Value
1.
2.1
2.2
2.3
3.
4.1
4.2
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
UNDEST
TOTMD1
DEVPRT
TPFMQA
INUDST
TDEV1
MXSCDX
ADMPPS
HIREDY
AVEMPT
TRPNHR
ASIMDY
DSIPTK
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governing the management of the human resource, but also of
the interaction between these policies and other policies
such as those of project scheduling.
IV.3. Actual and Simulated Project Behavior:
Once the model was parameterized, it was run to simulate
the DE-A project. In this section we discuss the model's
output and compare it to DE-A's actual behavior. We will
examine the dynamic behavior of the following four project
variables: (1) estimated completion date; (2) estimated
project man-day expenditures; (3) cumulative man-day
expenditures; and (4) workforce level.
Figure IV.3. depicts how DE-A's estimated completion
date and estimated total man-day espenditures changed
overtime. The actual project values are shown as circles
with a dot inside. The time axis is in terms of working days
(a calendar month is-20 working days).
Notice that the model accurately portrays management's
inclination not to adjust the project's scheduled completion
date during most of the development phase of the project.
Adjustments, in the earlier phases of the project, are
instead made in the project's workforce level. This behavior
pattern arises, according to DeMarco (1982), because of
political reasons:
Portions of the text
on the following page(s)
are not legible in the
original.
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Once an original estimate is made, its' all too tempting
to pass up subsequent opportunities to estimate by
simple sticking with your previous numbers. This often
happens even when you know your old estimtes are
substantially off. There are a few different possible
explanations for this effect: 'It's too early to show
slip' ... 'If I re-estimate now, I risk having to do it
again later (and looking bad twice)' ... As you can
see, all such reasons are political in nature.
Notice also that adjustments in the project's man-days
budget start to be made towards the end of the design phase.
These adjustments are triggered as "undiscovered Job Tasks"
start to be discovered (discussion with McGarry). Recall
that at the project's initiation, the project was incorrectly
perceived to be (only) 16 KDSI in size. The actual
adjustments that were made in DE-A are, however, somewhat
larger than those estimated by the model. This indicates
that the visibility in the DE-A project is somewhat higher
than that assumed in the model. That is, DE-A management
detected more of the discrepancies between the project's
actual scope, and it detected them faster. Indeed, in a
post-project evaluation, the project was rated as "above
average" in the area of project visibility (NASA, 1983).
This was attributed to the utilization of a number of project
management tools, including: librarians that maintain a
central repository of the project's records, configuration
analysis tools (CATs), and Unit Development Folders (UDF).
However, while the visibility in the DE-A project is
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somewhat better than the industry's norm (as captured by our
model), it is still, by no means, total. As a result,
significant adjustments in both the project's man-days and
the schedule continue to be made until the final stages of
development. An outcome that the model successfully
reproduces.
Notice that the model's values for the project's fiial
man-day expenditures (2,092) is slightly lower than the
actual (2,222). The primary reason for this, is that the
model, while it successfully reproducess the project's
manpower loading pattern (as we shall see later), it slightly
under-estimates the values of the manpower level. Lower
manpower levels mean lower communication and training
overheads, which means a slight over-estimation of
productivity.
Also, the model's project duration (387.5 days) is
slightly longer than DE-A's actual (380 days). The reason
for this, is again, the fact that the DE-A management behaved
slightly more aggressively (than is assumed in the model) in
acquiring manpower, especially during the final stages of the
project. In DE-A, the workforce level at the end of the
system testing phase was approximately 16 full-time
equivalent people, while the model's value was 14.8. With
more people at hand in .the actual project, a smaller schedule
overshoot was achieved.
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We turn next to Figures IV.4. and IV.5., which depict
the simulated -and actual manpower loading patterns,
respectively. For the reader's convenience, we also plotted
a number of actual values alongside the simulation output.
The model accurately replicates the actual DE-A pattern.
What is quite encouraging about this result is the fact that
the model successfully reproduced such an "atypical"
workforce loading pattern. The ."typical" software project
workforce pattern discussed in the literature is a
concave-type curve that rises, peaks, and then drops back to
lower levels as the project proceeds towards the end of the
system testing phase (e.g., see (DeMarco, 1982), (Boehm,
1981), and (Albrecht, 1979).)
The reason why the workforce level shoots upwards
towards the end of the project has to do with NASA's tight
scheduling constraints. As explained above, because NASA's
launch of the DE-A satellite was tied to the completion of
the DE-A software, serious schedule slippages were not
tolerated. Specifically, "all software was required to be
accepted and frozen 90 days before launch" (NASA, 1983).
This, in effect, defined a "Maximum Tolerable Completion
Date" for the project. For the DE-A project that date was
March 3, 1981 ... or day 380 from the start. As this date
was approached,.pressures develop that override the workforce
stability considerations. That is, project management
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becomes increasingly willing to "pay any price" necessary to
avoid overshooting the "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date."
And this "translates, as the figures indicate, into a
management that is increasingly willing to add more people.
Finally, in Figure IV.6. we plot the model's cumulative
man-day expenditures, together with actual project results,
Again, the model captures the exponentially increasing
pattern. The actual figures are slightly higher, however,
because, as we explained earlier, the model slightly
under-estimates the workforce level ... especially, towards
the second half of the project i.e., the DE-A management's
"Willingness to Change Workforce" does not decrease as the
project proceeds towards its final stages, nearly as much, as
is assumed in the model.
IV.4. Conclusion:
The objective of this case-study was to test the model's
ability to reproduce the dynamic behavior patterns of a
completed software project, namely, the NASA DE-A software
project. To do this we first parameterized the model. The
process involved setting model parameters that capture the
particular DE-A project environment. The parameter values
were obtained from two sources, namely, interviews at NASA
and project documentation. The 14 model parameters that were
set, (e.g., "Hiring Delay," "Turnover Rate," ... etc.), it
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is important to -note, do not involve any changes in the
formulation of the model's policy structures. The paramter
set merely defines the (DE-A) environment within which the
policies are exercised. This is significant, since the
dynamic behavior patterns generated are largely a result of
the interaction of the model's (unchanged) policy structures.
Four DE-A project variables were examined, namely,
completion date estimates, man-day estimates, cost in
man-days, and workforce loading. While the model was quite
accurate in reproducing the project's patterns of dynamic
behavior, it slightly under-estimated the absolute value of
DE-A's workforce level. That is, DE-A's management was
somewhat more aggressive in its manpower acquisition policy
than is assumed in the model. This underestimate caused the
model to slightly underestimate the project's cost in
man-days (by 6%), and slightly overestimate the project's
duration (by 2%).
One of the advantages of system dynamics modeling is
that it not only allows us to generate the dynamic
implications of a given set of policies, but it in addition
allows us to go a step further and explore the implications
of new and different sets of managerial policies and
procedures. In the next chapter, we will take this further
step, as we explore an array of managerial policies
pertaining to the management of software projects. To set
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the stage for such an analysis, let us explore some of the
"what-if" questions that DE-A's management, having completed
the project, might be interested in answering:
1. What if a different estimation tool was used? In
DE-A, estimation by NASA's Meta-Model was used as a
guideline, that was then adjusted on the basis of
management's experience and judgement. Like NASA, a
number of other software development organizations have
developed other quantitative software estimation tools
e.g,, TRW's COCOMO model. How can the applicability of
such new tools to the NASA environment be evaluated? To
what extent are such models portable to the NASA
environment? If not, why not? And how can the
portability of new estimation models be improved?
2. What if more/less quality assurance (QA) effort was
expended? In DE-A, 30-40 % of the development effort
was allocated to QA activities ... a level that is
significantly higher than the industry average. Is this
an "optimal" allocation? How can we determine what an
"optimal" allocation is? And what project and
organizational factors affect such a determination?
3. What if more people were not added at the. final
stages of the project? Brooks' Law suggests that adding
more people to a late project makes it later. When
300
would the DE-A project have completed had management
resisted adding more people at DE-A's final stages?
These are some of the issues we turn to next in Chapter
V.
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V. MODEL BEHAVIOR:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DYNAMICS OF SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
V.1. Introduction:
A system dynamics model is a laboratory tool. It allows
repeated experimentation with the system, testing assumptions
or altering management policies. The purpose is to gain an
understanding of, and make predictions about, the dynamic
implications of managerial actions, policies, and procedures.
The most important advantage of a simulation model
is its ability to 'play out' the dynamic consequences of
a given set of assumptions in a way the human mind can
do neither well nor consistently; a useful model
produces scenarios which are both realistic and
explainable in the policymaker's own terminology. In
addition, a simulation model provides an experimental
arena for discovering the sources of real-life problems
and evaluating alternative policy options in relatively
little time and with little cost. (Quoted from (Homer,
1983) who references (Forrester,1979) and (Forrester,
1979b).)
Using the system dynamics model as an experimentation
vehicle should be particularly welcomed by the software
engineering community. Several authors have "complained"
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about the lack of tested "ideas" in the software engineering
field (Thayer, 1979), (Weinwurm, 1970). For example Weiss
(1979) commented:
in software engineering it is remarkably easy
to propose hypotheses and remarkably difficult to test
them. Accordingly, it is useful to seek methods for
testing software engineering hypotheses.
Unfortunately, controlled experiments in the area of
software development tend to be costly and time consuming
(Myers, 1978). Furthermore, " ... the isolation of the
effect and the evaluation of impact of any given practice
within a large, complex and dynamic project environment can
be exceedingly difficult " (Glass, 1982).
In addition to permitting less-costly and less-time
consuming experimentation, simulation models make "perfectly"
controlled experiments possible, which, as -the following
quotation shows, addresses the difficulty expressed by Glass
above:
The 3ffects of different assumptions and environmental
factors can be tested. In the model system, unlike real
systems, the effect of changing one factor can be
observed while all other factors are held unchanged.
Such experimentation will yield new insights into the
characteristics of the system that the model represents.
By using a model of a complex system, more can be
learned about internal interactions than would ever be
possible through manipulation of the real system.
Internally, the model provides complete control of the
system organizational structure, its policies, and its
sensitivities to various events. Externally, a wider
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range of circumstances can be generated than are apt to
be observable in real life (Forrester, 1961).
In this chapter we will use our integrative system
dynamics model of software project management to
predict/study the dynamic implications of an array of
managerial actions, policies, and procedures pertaining to
the development of software. Four areas will be studied:
(1) Scheduling; (2) Controlling; (3) Quality Assurance;
and (4) Staffing. To set the stage for this discussion, we
will first characterize, in the next section, the software
project (which we will simply call EXAMPLE) to be used in our
analysis.
V.2. The "EXAMPLE" Software Project:
The objective of this section is to set up the
environment within which to conduct our experimentation and
analysis of the dynamics of software development. To do this
we will first characterize the "EXAMPLE" software project,
which will serve as the prototype project for the
experiments. We will then run the model to simulate the
"EXAMPLE" project, and observe its dynamic behavior. The
behavior of a number of significant project variables (e.g.,
workforce level, schedule completion time, errors,
productivity, ... etc.) will be analyzed and explained.
And we will demonstrate that the model's behavior patterns do
replicate those reported in the literature. Once this is
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done, we will then move on to Sections V.3. through V.6., to
study the dynamic implications of an array of managerial
actions, policies, and procedures pertaining to the software
development environment.
We will define the "EXAMPLE" software project to be
64,000 DSI in size. DSI stands for "Delivered Source
Instructions." These are defined as follows (Boehm, 1981).
Delivered. This term is generally meant to exclude
nondelivered support software such as test drivers.
However, if these are developed with the same care as
delivered software, with their own review, test plans,
documentation, etc., then they should be included.
Source Instructions. This term includes all program
instructions created by project personnel and processed
into machine code by some combination of preprocessors,
compilers, and assemblers. It excludes comment cards
and unmodified utility software. It includes job
control language, format statements, and data
declarations. Instructions are defined as lines of code
or card images. Thus, a line containing two or more
source statements counts as one instruction; a
five-line data declaration counts as five instructions.
Recall that in Chapter III, productivity was defined,
not. in terms of DSI/Man-Day, but in terms of Tasks/Man-Day.
And it was explained then, that the notion of a "Task" is
tied to that of "Nominal Potential Productivity."
Specifically, we indicated that "Task" is a unit for sizing
up a software project, that it is defined in terms of a
number of DSI, and that its value, for a particular
simulation, would be set to the numerical value of "Nominal
Potential Productivity," when the latter is expressed in
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terms of DSI/Man-Days. For example, if "Nominal Potential
Productivity," for a particular project situation, is, say,
50 DSI/Man-Day, then the value of "Task" would be set, for
that particular project situation, to 50 DSI. This would
then allow us to maintain the value of "Nominal Potential
Productivity" to 1 Task/Man-Day, for all project situations.
Let us provide an example to further clarify the
concepts of "Nominal Potential Productivity" and "Task."
Assume two different software development organizations,
ORG-1 and ORG-2, have just completed the development (i.e.,
design and coding) of a software project. The two projects,
PROJ-1 and PROJ-2, are 8000 DSI in size. Now, let us assume
that in ORG-1 the development effort consumed a total of 400
man-days to design and code the 8000 DSI PROJ-1, while in
PROJ-2 the development effort was 200 man-days. If, for
purposes of simplification, we disregard the communication
and motivation losses in both organizations i.e., assume that
actual productivity = potential productivity, we could then
conclude that the potential productivity in ORG-1 is half
that of ORG-2. (This productivity differential can be due to
a number of differences between the two organizations, such
as differences in the availability of software tools,
personnel capability, computer-hardware characteristics,
etc.) This productivity differential would be realized in
the model as follows: The "Nominal Potential Productivity"
parameter would be defined in both runs of the model at the
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same value, namely, 1 Task/Man-Day, but in the PROJ-1 run we
would define a Task to be 20 DSI, while in the PROJ-2 run a
"Task" would be set at 40 DSI. That is, the 8000 DSI project
PROJ-1 will be defined in the first run as a 400 Task
project, while the 8000 DSI project PROJ-2 would be defined
as a 200 Task project.
To determine the value of "Task" in the EXAMPLE project
we need to do the following: First, select some project
environment; second, determine the value of "Nominal
Potential Productivity" in terms of DSI/Man-Day for that
environment; and finally set the value of "Task" to the
numerical value of "Nominal Potential Productivity."
There aren't many project environments that are
adequately characterized in the literature. One exception is
Barry Boehm's excellent book titled Software Engineering
Economics, which provides a wealth of data on the software
production environment at TRW. To maintain consistency, the
EXAMPLE project will be characterized totally on the basis of
this TRW data. In particular, we will draw upon Boehm's data
on the set of projects he described as "the most common type
of software project: the small-to-medium size (project)
developed in a familiar, in-house, organic software
development environment" (Boehm, 1981).
For a 64,000 DSI project, Boehm's data indicate that
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overall project productivity would be approximately 338.4
DSI/Man-Month. This value is arrived at by dividing the
project's size in DSI by the total effort expended e.g., to
develop, QA, rework, and test the software. Boehm's data
also indicates that system testing would consume
approximately 22% of the total effort, while the effort
expended on QA activities would be in the range of 15 - 20%
of the total effort. No explicit estimates are given,
however, for the effort to rework errors during development.
If we assume that this rework effort will be approximately
10% of total effort, then QA, rework, and testing activities
would together constitute approximately 50% of the project's
man-months. (Note: Boehm's data covers the design, coding,
and system testing stages of software production, as does our
model.) This means that the amount of effort expended on
developing the product (e.g., designing and coding it) is
half the total man-days expended on the project. Which in
turn means that the development productivity would be
2 * 338.4 = 676.8 DSI/Man-Month. To translate this into
DSI/Man-Day we divide by 20, and get 33.84 DSI/Man-Day.
This, still, is not the value we are looking for. We are
looking for the "Nominal Potential Productivity" and what we
have is an estimate for the actual productivity. Recall,
potential productivity is,
... the maximum level of productivity that can occur
when an individual or group employs its funds of
resources to meet the task demands of a work situation.
It is the level of productivity that will be attained if
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the individual or group makes the best possible use of
its resources (that is, if there is no loss of
productivity due to faulty process) (Steiner, 1966).
As was explained in detail in Chapter III, actual
productivity rarely equals potential productivity because of
losses due to communication and motivation problems. These
losses are captured in the model by the "Multiplier to
Productivity due to Communication and Motivation Losses."
Specifically, actual productivity is formulated in the model
as the product of potential productivity and the "Multiplier
to Productivity due to Communication and Motivation Losses."
Thus, if we can estimate the value of this multiplier, we can
then divide it into the value of actual productivity
calculated above, to come up with an estimate for EXAMPLE's
"Nominal Potential Productivity."
The multiplier is itself a product of two variables,
namely, the "Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on Project" and
"Communication Overhead." The nominal value of the former
was set in Chapter III to 0.6 (i.e., a full-t'ime employee
allocates, on the average, 60% of his or her time to
productive work on the project). The "Communication
Overhead," on the other hand, was shown to be a function of
team size. Again, referring to Boehm's results, we find his
estimate for the "average staffing level" for the 64,000 DSI
project, to be approximately 10 people. From Figure III..15.
we can then determine that the loss due to "Communication
309
Overhead" will be 6%. Thus, the value of the "Multiplier to
Productivity due to Communication and Motivation Losses"
becomes: 0.6 * (1-.06) = 0.564. By dividing this into the
value of actual productivity (33.84 DSI/Man-Day) calculated
above, we come up with the estimate for the "Nominal
Potential Productivity," namely, 33.84 / 0.564 = 60 DSI
Man-Day.
We said there were three steps to determine the value of
"Task" in the EXAMPLE project. The third and final step, is
to set the value of "Task" to the numerical value of "Nominal
Potential Productivity" when the latter is expressed in terms
.of DSI/Man-Day. Thus, for the project EXAMPLE, Task is
defined to be 60 DSI. (Which, therefore, allows us to
maintain "Nominal Potential Productivity" as being 1
Task/Man-Day.)
Thus far we have first defined the real size of the
project EXAMPLE to be 64,000 DSI and second, by defining what
constitutes a Task we have also (implicitly) defined the
project's environment. When any project is initialized,
managerial decisions are made on how much manpower and time
to allocate to the project. Such decisions are obviously
important determinants of how the project will develop. For
the project EXAMPLE we must do the same, i.e., initialize its
manpower and schedule allocation variables.
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As was stated earlier, in order to maintain consistency
in our characterization of the project EXAMPLE, we will
characterize it totally on the basis of Boehm's TRW data. In
calculating EXAMPLE's development effort, schedule, and
staffing level, we will, therefore, use Boehm's COCOMO model.
COCOMO stands for the COnstructive COst MOdel, and is a
software project estimation model that has been developed and
is being used by TRW. COCOMO exists in a hierarchy of
increasingly detailed forms. In our analysis we will use the
version called "Basic COCOMO," and which, according to Boehm
(1981) is "the version applicable to the large majority of
software projects: small-to-medium size (projects) developed
in a familiar in-house software development environment."
The development period covered by COCOMO estimates
begins at the beginning of the product design phase
(successful completion of a software requirements review) and
ends up at the end of the system testing phase, as does our
model. The primary input to COCOMO is the perceived size of
the project in KDSI (i.e., thousand delivered source
instructions). Notice that it is the perceived not the real
size of the project that is input to COCOMO to derive the
estimates, since at the beginning of development (when the
estimates are made) the real size of the project is often not
known.
As with other computer-based models, (COCOMO) is a
'garbage in-garbage out' device: if you put poor sizing
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(data) in one side, you will receive poor cost estimates
out the other side (Boehm, 1981).
Boehm further suggests (we assume on the basis of his
TRW experience) that "The software undersizing problem is our
most critical road block to accurate software cost
estimation." This is substantiated by the experiences of
several other authors (DeMarco, 1982), (Burchett, 1982),
(Daly, 1977), (Devenny, 1976). A major cause for this
undersizing problem is,
... (the) powerful tendency to focus on the highly
visible mainline components of the software, and to
underestimate or completely miss the unobtrusive
components (e.g., help message processing, error
processing, and moving data around) (Boehm,1981).
But how much undersizing? There is, obviously, a wide
range of "reasonable possibilities." For the project
"EXAMPLE" we will assume that management (at the beginning of
design) underestimates the project's size by a factor of 1.5.
This value was, again, chosen to conform to Boehm's estimates
(Boehm, 1981). That is,.a project of size N (KDSI) would be
incorrectly perceived as being only 0.67N (KDSI) in size. In
terms of our EXAMPLE software project, this means that the
project would be perceived (at the beginning of the
simulation run) as being only 0.67 * 64 = 42.88 KDSI in size.
In other words, we will assume that as the project
EXAMPLE is initialized, project management's perception of
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the project's size will (incorrectly) be 42.88 KDSI. This
value then becomes the input that management uses in COCOMO's
effort and schedule estimation equations.
The COCOMO equation for the number of man-days (MD) to
develop and test the project is:
MD = 2.4 * 19 * (KDSI)1.o s
Substituting for the EXAMPLE project we get,
MD = 2.4 * 19 * (42.88)1.05
= 2,359 man-days
This represents the total man-days to develop and test
the software product. For planning purposes, this effort is
then distributed among the project's life cycle phases. In
our model there are two explicit phases, namely, development
(which includes design and coding) and testing. So, how much
would management allocate to development versus testing in
our EXAMPLE project? Boehm provides a number of phase
distribution guidelines. He notes (1981):
The phase distribution varies as a function of size of
the product. Larger software projects require
relatively more time and effort to perform integration
and test activities ...
For a 42 KDSI project (which is what EXAMPLE is
perceived as being) a development to testing distribution of
80 to 20% is suggested (Boehm, 1981). That is, we will
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initialize project EXAMPLE with the following allocation of
man-days:
MD for Development
MD for Testing
In addition to estimati
requirements, management al
development time and the staffi
= 0.8 * 2,359
= 1887 man-days
= 0.2 * 2,359
= 471 man-days
ng the project's man-day
.so estimates the project's
nq level.
The COCOMO equation for the development time (TDEV) is:
TDEV = 47.5 * (MD/19)0.38 days
Substituting for the value of man-days (MD), we get
TDEV = 47.5 * (2,359/19)0 .38
= 296 days
Finally, the average staffing level (ASL) is determined
by dividing the estimated value of the total man-days (MD),
by the estimated value of the development time (TDEV). Thus,
for project EXAMPLE we get
ASL = MD / TDEV
= 2,359 / 296
= 8 full-time-equivalent software personnel
We will assume that, on project EXAMPLE, project members
will be working full-time on the project. That is, the
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model's parameter "Average Daily Manpower per Staff" would be
set to 1 man-day. Thus, the average staffing level
calculated above would be 8 actual software personnel. Not
all 8 personnel will be on-board, however, at the beginning
of the project. Most software projects start with a smaller
core of designers, and as the project develops, the .workforce
slowly builds up to higher levels. For project EXAMPLE, we
will assume that the project starts with a workforce level
equal to half the "Average Staffing Level," i.e., with
0.5 * 8 = 4 software personnel on board. (Again, this
initial staffing level is based on the results reported in
(Boehm, 1981).)
With the above accomplished, our model initialization
procedure is complete. Next, we run the model to simulate
project EXAMPLE, and observe its behavior. The remaining
part of this section will be devoted to a discussion of the
model's results. The following will be discussed:
* Project progress
* Manpower distribution
* Work intensity
Project Progress:
Six key measures of progress are depicted in Figure V.1,
namely, cumulative tasks developed (i.e., designed and
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coded), cumulative tasks tested, cumulative man-days, the
perceived job size in tasks, the perceived job size in
man-days, and the scheduled completion date in days. And in
Table V.1., the project's "Vital Statistics" are shown.
As was mentioned above, at EXAMPLE's initiation, its
size is underestimated by a factor of 1.5. That is, instead
of being perceived as being a 64,000 DSI project, it would be
perceived as being only 42,880 DSI. In terms of "Tasks"
(where a "Task" is 60 DSI), the project would be perceived at
its initiation as being only 714.6 tasks in size, rather than
1,067 tasks ... its true size. As we have already
mentioned, the undersizing problem is largely due to the
tendency to underestimate the size of the unobtrusive
components of the software system e.g., help message
processing, error processing, support software, ... etc. As
the project develops, such "Undiscovered Job Tasks" are
progressively discovered as the " ... level of knowledge we
have of what the software is intended to do (increases)"
(Boehm, 1981). Notice, though, that the rate at which the
"Undiscovered Job Tasks" are discovered remains low for a
significant portion of the development phase, before it
starts to accelerate rapidly. (Such behavior was also
observed in the NASA case study.) The early phase of
development constitutes the architectural design phase of the
project. In the architectural design phase, the emphasis is
on determining the overall structure of the system,
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1. Project Size
= 64,000 DSI
2. Man-Days
Total
Development
Coding + Design =
QA
Rework =
Testing
= 3,795
= 2,681
1,782
380
519
1,114
3. Completion Time = 430 working-days
4. Errors
Total Error Generated
Total Error Caught
During Development
= 1,494 -4 23 Error/KDSI
-728 --*P 49% of Error Generated
TABLE V.I
man-days
1I
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decomposing the system into its major components, and
specifing the interfaces between the components (Gagliardi,
1980). At that level, implementation details such as help
message processing or error processing would (still) not be
visible. And thus the rate of discovering such "Undiscovered
(Unobtrusive) Job Tasks" remains low. The rate, however,
starts to accelerate rapidly as the project work moves into
the detailed design phase, where the emphasis is on the
selection, evaluation, and design of the implementation
algorithms (Gagliardi, 1980).
As the additional tasks are discovered i.e., as project
members start realizing that the project's scope is larger
than what has been expected, adjustments are made in the
project's plan. to accomodate the additional work load. As
Figure V.1 indicates, both the "Job's Size in Man-Days" and
the "Scheduled Completion Date" are adjusted upwards. There
are, however, two interesting observations about these
adjustments. Firstly, the adjustments prove to be inadequate
to fully accomodate the additional work load, and secondly,
the first adjustment to the schedule lags considerably behind
the first adjustment to the man-days.
The additions to the project's man-days and schedule
that. are triggered explicitly by the discovery of new tasks
level off at approximately day 200 when almost all the
"Undiscovered Job Tasks" have been discovered. As shown in
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Figure V.1., at approximately day 200 the value of perceived
job size levels off at 1,067 tasks ... the true size of the
project. At that point, the project's size in man-days
plateaus at a value of 3,200 man-days. However, notice that
while the perceived job size remains unchanged after day 200,
further significant additions are made to the project's
man-days and its schedule. These further adjustments are not
triggered by the discovery of further "additional tasks"
(since none are discovered after day 250). Their direct
cause (as will be explained in more detail later) is the
realization at approximately day 300 that the project is
behind schedule i.e., that the "Total Man-Days Reported Still
Needed" to complete the project is more than "Man-Days
Remaining" in the project's plan. (Such a shortage in
man-days can, of course, arise even if the project's size had
not been underestimated. For example, it would arise if
management overestimates its staff's productivity, and as a
result does not allocate enough man-days to the project.) In
this case, however, the man-day shortage problem is largely
the indirect result of the project's undersizing problem.
What happens is that when additional tasks are discovered in
a software project (as they do up until day 200 in EXAMPLE),
the additions that are made in the project's man-days to
accomodate those additional tasks are often not quite
sufficient. The reason being that some of the discovered
tasks are absorbed by the project members without any formal
adjustments to the project's plans. Only if the additional
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tasks are perceived as requiring a relatively significant
amount of effort to handle, would project members "bother" to
go through the trouble of formally developing cost estimates
and incorporating them in the project's work plan.
Thus, by day 200 when almost all the "Undiscovered Job
Tasks" have been discovered i.e., when the value of the
perceived job size attains the job's true size of 1,067
tasks, the value to which the "Job's Size in Man-Days" would
be raised, namely, 3,200 man-days, would not be high enough
to accomodate all the additional tasks. An interesting
comparison to make, and one which would provide us with some
feel of how much higher the man-day level should have been
raised, is to compare the 3,200 man-day value (which is
supposedly enough to develop a 1,067 task product) to the
number of man-days that would be allocated to a project
perceived from the start as being 1,067 tasks (i.e., 64 KDSI)
in size. To do this we use COCOMO's man-days (MD) equation,
MD =2.4 * 19 * (KDSI)1.05
= 2.4 * 19 * (64)1.05
= 3,593 man-days
Thus, increasing the number of man-days allocated to the
project from 2,359 (at the beginning of EXAMPLE) to only
3,200 (by day 200, when almost all the undiscovered tasks are
discovered), falls approximately 400 man-days short of the
above 3,593 man-days benchmark, a significant deficit in the
project's man-days budget.
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When and how is this man-days deficit handled? It is
handled when it becomes visible. This usually happens (as
was explained in Chapter III) towards the later stages of
development when the development work is almost finished
and/or when the allocated man-days budget is almost used up.
Once visible, the man-days deficit would be handled by
overworking (e.g., the staff members work overtime hours),
and/or adjusting the project's man-days budget upwards. Both
of these responses take place in project EXAMPLE, and will be
discussed in some detail later. (Notice, though, that the
latter response i.e., adjusting the man-day budget, is
evident in Figure V.1., as the "Job's Size in Man-Days" makes
a significant upward adjustment at around day 300.)
The second interesting observation about Figure V.1.
concerns the adjustments made in the schedule completion
date. Notice that the first adjustment to the schedule lags
considerably behind the first adjustment to the man-days.
(Such behavior was also observed in the NASA. case study.)
Specifically, the first adjustment to the "Job's Size in
Man-Days" is made around day 80, whereas the first adjustment
to the schedule is made 60 days later, around day 140. Why?
When the "Job's Size in Man-Days" is adjusted upwards,
it is done by adjusting the men, the days, or both. That is,
it is done by adjusting the project's workforce level, the
project's schedule completion date or both. As was explained
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in Chapter III. the decision on which alternative to choose
is really an expression of management's policy on how to
balance workforce and schedule adjustments throughout the
project. (A number of different policies will be explored
later in this chapter.) In general, though, the decision is
a function of the project's stage of completion. In the
earlier stages of the project, project managers are generally
willing to make any necessary adjustments to the workforce
level to maintain the project on its scheduled course.
However, as the project proceeds, management becomes
increasingly reluctant to add new people to the project, as
consideration is increasingly given to the stability of the
workforce. As this happens, any additions to the project's
man-days get absorbed, not only through adjustments to the
project's workforce level, but, in addition, they get
absorbed in part by adjustments to the schedule. This shift
away from. workforce adjustments to schedule adjustments
continues as the project progresses.
With this in mind we can now refer back to Figure V.1.,
and explain why the .first adjustment to project EXAMPLE's
schedule completion date lags considerably behind the first
adjustment to the man-days level. Notice that the first
adjustment to the project's man-days is made at day 80. At
that relatively early point, the additional man-days are
absorbed totally by adding more people to the project, rather
than by changing the schedule. This can be clearly seen in
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Figure V.2. The figure depicts EXAMPLE's manpower level for
the project's full life cycle. And it also shows curve (*),
which depicts what the manpower level of EXAMPLE would have
been like (for the first 150 days) if none of the
"Undiscovered Job Tasks" were ever discovered. Notice that
the two curves coincide up until day 100 i.e., approximately
40 days after "Undiscovered Job Tasks" are first discovered
in EXAMPLE. This 40 day delay constitutes the "Hiring Delay"
in project EXAMPLE.
As explained above, as the project proceeds management
becomes increasingly reluctant to add new people to the
project. As this happens, any additions to the project's
man-days get absorbed, not only through adjustments to the
project's workforce level, but, in addition, they get
absorbed in part by adjustments to the schedule. Thus, as
EXAMPLE's man-days level continues to escalate (as a result
of the continued discovery of new tasks), the point is
reached (at around day 140) when the project's schedule
starts absorbing part of the newly added man-days load.
Notice that the rate at which the schedule is adjusted
upwards remains low at first, as most of the emphasis is
still on adjusting the workforce level. However, as the
project proceeds, the emphasis shifts away from workforce
adjustments, and towards schedule adjustments. The result of
this shift is clearly reflected in the much faster rate at
which the project's schedule completion date is adjusted
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upwards during the second set of adjustments in the project's
man-days i.e., that start at around day 300. Notice also
that during this second adjustment process, adjustments in
the project's scheduled completion date do not lag behind the
adjustments in man-days i.e., that both start around day 300.
Manpower Distribution:
In this section we will discuss, not one, but .two
manpower distributions. The first and foremost is, of
course, the manpower distribution of project EXAMPLE. This
is depicted in Figure V.2. The shape of EXAMPLE's manpower
distribution curve shown in the figure conforms well with
manpower distributions reported in the literature (e.g., see
(DeMarco, 1982), (Boehm, 1981), ani (Basili and Zelkowitz,
1979)). For example, Figure V.3. represents the manpower
distribution at IBM's DP Services organization reported in
(Albrecht, 1979).
The second workforce distribution we would like to
comment on is the one we encountered in the NASA case study.
For the reader's convenience, the simulated and the actual
NASA workforce distributions are included below in Figures
V.4. and V.5. What is interesting about the NASA workforce
distribution is its non-conformance to the "typical"
workforce patterns discussed in the literature. And it is
quite encouraging that the model has proved capable of
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reproducing both types of distributions. As was explained in
Chapter IV, the reason why the workforce level in the NASA
project shoots upwards towards the eid of the project has to
do with NASA's tight scheduling constraints. Because
software is embedded in a large and expensive space system,
serious schedule slippages (e.g., t> i would jeopardize the
launch date) can not be tolerated. Because of this, when
software projects are planned, they are not only provided
with a "Scheduled Completion Date," but, in addition, a
"Maximum Tolerable Completion Date" is specified. As long as
the "Scheduled Completion Date" is below the "Maximum
Tolerable Completion Date" then decision to adjust the
schedule, add more people, or do a combination of both will
continue to be based on the balancing of scheduling and
workforce stability considerations. However, as the
"Scheduled Completion Date" starts approaching the "Maximum
Tolerable Completion Date," as it does in the NASA project,
pressures develop that override the workforce stability
considerations. That is, project management becomes
increasingly willing to "pay any price" necessary to avoid
overshooting the "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date." And
this translates, as the results indicate, into a management
that is increasingly willing to hire more people.
Work Intensity:
In Chapter III it was explained that the "typical" 8-hr
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day of a full-time staff member on a software project is not
entirely devoted to productive project-related work. Time is
often lost on personal matters, coffee-breaks, non-project
communication, and other miscellaneous non-project related
activities. These slack components comprise about 40% of the
software person's time on the job.
The loss in productivity due to these slack components
does not, of course, remain constant at the 40% level
throughout the life of the project. The motivational effects
of schedule pressures can push the "Actual Fraction of a
Man-Day on Project" to both higher (under positive schedule
pressure) as well as lower (under negative schedule pressure)
values.
For example, positive schedule pressures arise whenever
the project is perceived to be behind schedule. That is,
whenever the total effort still needed to complete the
project is perceived to be greater than the total effort
actually remaining. Such a difference represents a perceived
shortage in man-days on the project. When confronted with
such a situation, software developers tend to work harder,
i.e., allocate more man-hours to the project, in an attempt
to compensate for the perceived shortage and bring the
project back on schedule. This would be achieved by first
compressing the slack time, and then, if needed, by working
overtime. This then decreases the man-hour lost per-day,
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while increasing the "Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on
Project."
The dynamic behavior of the "Actual Fraction of a
Man-Day on Project" for project EXAMPLE is depicted in Figure
V.6. Notice that the two "spikes" in overwork occur, in both
occasions, as an explicit project milestone is approached.
The first spike occurs towards the end of the development
phase (which includes both design and coding), and the second
spike occurs towards the end of the only other explicit
milestone in our model, the end of the system testing phase.
This behavior pattern was observed by Boehm, and which he
labelled as the "Deadline Effect" phenomenon. Figure V.7.
shows his measured data on two projects with three major
milestones: a plans and requirements review (PRR); a
product design review (PDR), and an acceptance test (Boehm,
1981). It is clear that the Deadline Effect held strongly
for both projects, generally producing a doubling of effort
as each milestone is approached.
With a simulation model (such as ours), one need not
guess at the cause of, say, a spike in a particular variable.
Simulation experiments isolating and combining the effects of
suspected factors can precisely pinpoint the mechanism(s)
responsible. In the remaining part of this section, we will
make use of this capability to trace out the set of actions
and reactions that lead to the behavior pattern of the
331
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"Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on Project" shown in Figure
V.6.
As was mentioned under "Project Progress," when project
EXAMPLE is started, it is incorrectly perceived as being only
714.6 tasks in size, rather than 1,067 tasks ... its true
size. As the project develops, and those "Undiscovered Job
Tasks" are progressively discovered, adjustments are then
made in the project's man-days budget to accomodate the
additional work load. However, as has been explained in
detail, these additional man-day allocations turn out to be
less *that what is actually required. This, therefore,
creates a man-day shortage in the project. Unfortunately,
though, such a man-day shortage is not immediately visible.
In fact, it only becomes visible towards the end of the
development phase, when the development work is almost
finished and the allocated man-days budget is almost used up.
The "Perceived Shortage in Man-Days" is depicted in
Figure V.8. The shortage in man-days is first perceived
quite late in the development phase, at around day 180. As
project members perceive the shortage, they react by working
harder i.e., allocating more man-hours to the project, in an
attempt to compensate for the perceived shortage and to bring
the project back on schedule. Working harder translates in
the model into the higher values of the "Actual Fraction of a
Man-Day on Project" as shown in Figure V.8.
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Notice that even though the project members are working
harder, the shortage in man-days keeps on rising. The reason
this happens is that as the development phase continues to
approach its final stages, the degree of visibility increases
rapidly, exposing even larger man-day shortages. Thus, by
working harder, project members are in effect only cutting
into, not eliminating the man-day shortage, whose real
magnitude is becoming progressively apparent. To appreciate
the significance of the workforce's contributions, we also
plotted curve (*) which depicts what the level of the
"Perceived Shortage in Man-Days" would have been, had the
project members maintained their normal (lower) work rate.
Project members would not, however, be willing to
maintain an above-normal work rate indefinately. Once people
start working harder, i.e., at a rate above their normal
rate, their "Overwork Duration Threshold," which (as was
explained in Chapter III) at any point in time would
represent the maximum remaining duration for which they would
be willing to continue working harder, would decrease. This
happens because people enjoy their slack time (e.g., coffee
breaks, social communications, personal business, ... etc.),
and they would not tolerate prolonged deprivation of such
"breathers." Thus a compressed slack-time exhausts them in
the sense that it cuts into their tolerance level for
continued hard work since that would mean a continued
"deprivation" of their slack time. As the "Overwork Duration
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Threshold" decreases, the maximum amount of man-days of
backlogged work that the project members would be willing to
handle (in addition to their planned work) also decreases.
If this "Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be Handled" happens
to drop below the value of the "Perceived Shortage in
Man-Days," only the maximum value would be handled through
overwork, while arrangements with project management would be
made to adjust the project's man-days budget so as to handle
what exceeds the "Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be
Handled."
In project EXAMPLE, this is exactly what happens. That
is, the persistence of the man-day shortage eventually
overwhelms the workforce's intensified efforts, and around
day 300 (i.e., at the end of the development phase)
arrangements with project management are made to handle those
remaining shortages through adjustments to both the project's
man-days budget and its schedule.
The samef sequence of events recur towards the end of the
system testing phase. As testing progresses the system's
error proneness becomes relatively more visible, and the
project members become increasingly more able to perceive how
productive (in testing) the workforce has actually been. As
this happens, any shortages in man-days (for the testing
phase) become more apparent. As Figure V.8. indicates, in
project EXAMPLE such shortages are indeed perceived, and at
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an accelerating rate, starting at day 370. It is interesting
to note, though, that no such shortages were experienced in
the NASA project, which, at first sight, seems
counter-intuitive since in the NASA project only 15% of the
project's man-days were allocated to the systems testing
phase, whereas here, in project EXAMPLE, 20% were allocated.
The answer lies in NASA's exceptionally high expenditures on
Quality Assurance activities, which, as a fraction of the
development °effort, is almost double that of EXAMPLE. As a
result, in the NASA project a larger fraction of the errors
is detected early on during the development phase (when
errors are relatively less costly to detect and correct),
which of course dramatically reduces the workload of the
system testing activity.
Returning to project EXAMPLE and Figure V.8., as the
man-day shortage is detected, the workforce reacts again by
working harder i.e., compressing their slack time and
increasing the "Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on Project." At
this stage, though, the magnitude of the shortages is not as
high as those experienced towards the end of the development
phase. Recall that at the end of development, the man-day
shortage had to be handled, not only through a surge in
productivity, but also through additions to the project's
man-days budget. Here, however, the shortage in man-days is
sufficiently low to be handled solely through this final
surge in productivity.
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Conclusion:
The objective of this section was to define the
experimental setting within which to conduct our
experimentation and analysis of the dynamics of software
development. We first characterized the "EXAMPLE" software
project, which will serve as the prototype project for the
experiments. We then ran the model to simulate EXAMPLE and
observed its behavior. The behavior of a number of project
variables were presented and explained. And we also
demonstrated that the model's behavior pattern does replicate
those reported in the literature. With this done, we are now
ready to move on to the next three sections, where we use the
model as a laboratory tool to study the dynamic implications
of an array of managerial actions, policies, and procedures
in the four areas of (1) scheduling, (2) controlling, (3)
quality assurance, and (4) staffing.
V.3. Software Cost and Schedule Estimation:
Over the years, estimation of software project
development time and cost has been an intuitive process.
Experience and analogy have been used as a basis to develop
estimates for any given project (Oliver, 1982), (McKeen,
1981), (Gehring, 1976). More recently, a number of
quantitative software estimation models have been developed.
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They range from highly theoretical ones, such as Putman's
model (1978), to empirical ones, such as the Walston and
Felix model (1977), and Boehm's COCOMO model (Boehm, 1981).
An empirical model uses data from previous projects to
evaluate the current project and derives the basic formulae
from analysis of the particular data base available. A
theoretical model, on the other hand, uses formulae based
upon global assumptions, such as the rate at which people
solve problems, the number of problems available for
solutions at a given point in time, ... etc.
Still, software cost schedule estimation continues to be
a major difficulty associated with the management of software
development (Devenny, 1976), (Distaso, 1980), (Mills, 1976),
(Pooch and Gehring, 1980), (Yourdon, 1982), (Zelkowitz et al,
1979), (Zmud, 1980). "Even today, almost no model can
estimate the true cost of software with any degree of
accuracy" (Mohanty, 1981). Farquhar (1970), articulates the
significance of the issue:
Unable to estimate accurately, the manager can know with
certainty neither what resources to commit to an effort
nor, in retrospect, how well these resources were used.
The lack of a firm foundation for these two judgements
can reduce programming management to a random process in
that positive control is next to impossible. This
situation often results in the budget overruns and
schedule slippages that are all too common today.
A number of reasons .for the difficulty have been
suggested in the literature, including:
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1. Software development is a process, that is not yet
fully understood by "estimators" (Myers, 1972), (Oliver,
1982), (Gehring and Pooch, 1980), (Synnott and Gruber,
1981), (Pietrasanta, 1968).
2. The phases and functions which comprise the
software development process are influenced by a large
number of ill defined variables (Gehring and Pooch,
1980), (Devenny, 1976), (Aron, 1976), (Distaso, 1980),
(Pressman, 1982), (Oliver, 1982).
3. Most of the activities within the process are
still primarily human rather than mechanical, and
therefore.prone to all the subjective factors which
affect human performance (Gehring and Pooch, 1980),
(Pressman, 1982), (Oliver, 1982).
Identifying the causes of a difficulty or a problem is
an important first step towards resolving the difficulty or
problem. The next step is to then identify a strategy for
handling those identified hurdles. For the software
estimation problem, a strategy that has been frequently
quoted in the literature was articulated by Pietrasanta more
than a decade ago:
The serious student of estimating must first be willing
to probe deeply into the fascinating and complex system
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development process, to uncover the phases and functions
of the process, to highlight the subtle
interrelationships of the program system being developed
and the project organization doing the developing ...
relationships is precisely what is required if estimates
are ever to be improved. Only then can we do meaningful
quantitative research and scientific analysis of
resource requirements (Pietrasanta, 1968).
Having "probed deeply into the fascinating and complex
system development process," and captured within our
integrative system dynamics model (we hope) those "influence
variables of software development and their causal
relationships," we will embark, in this section, on a
quantitative analysis of software cost and schedule
estimation. We will conduct three separate experiments. In
one, we will focus on the most widely used estimation
technique, namely, estimation by analogy. We will examine
the long-term implications of using such a method. And we
will demonstrate how the feedback concept is a useful tool to
study those long-term dynamic issues. The second feature of
our modeling approach, namely, its integrative perspective,
will prove useful in a second experiment, in which we focus
on the much heralded quantitative estimation tools. We will
identify a number of managerial and organizational variables
that the current models fail to "acknowledge," but which
significantly influence the cost of software development.
Finally, in the third experiment, we turn our attention from
the techniques of software estimation, to address a more
basic issue. It is the issue of estimation accuracy.
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The above three experiments are discussed next, in
reverse order.
V.3.1. On the Accuracy of Software Estimation:
In this section we will show firstly, why software cost
estimators should reject the notion that a (new) software
estimation tool can be adequately judged on the basis of how
accurately it matches historical project results; and
secondly, why a more accurate estimate is not necessarily a
"better" estimate.
Consider the following situation: A 64 KDSI software
project which has been estimated at its initiation, using an
estimation method "A," to be 2,359 man-days, ends up actually
consuming, at its completion, 3,795 man-days. The project's
characteristics (e.g., its size, complexity, ... etc.) are
then fed into another estimation method "B" (e.g., that is
being considered by management for adoption) and its results
compared to the project's actual performance. And let us
assume that method "B" produces a 5,900 man-day estimate. If
we define "% of relative absolute error" in estimating
man-days (MD) as,
% Error =100 * ABS[MDACT-MDEST] / MDACT
Then, for estimation method "A,"
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% ErrorA =100 * ABS[3,795-2,359] / 3,795
=38%
And for method "B,"
% Errors =100 * ABS[3,795-5,900] / 3,795
=55%
Question: Can one conclude from this that estimation
method "B" would have provided a less accurate estimate of
the project's man-days, had it been used instead of method
"A"?
The answer is NO. And the reason why we cannot make
such a conclusion is that we cannot, and should not, assume,
that had the project been initiated with B's 5,900 man-day
estimate, instead of A's 2,359 man-day estimate, that it
would have still ended up actually consuming exactly 3,795
man-days. In fact the project could end-up consuming much
more or much less than 3,795 man-days. And before such a
determination can be made, no "accurate" assessment of the
relative accuracy of the two methods can be made.
The point we are trying to make is this: a different
estimate creates a different project.
This phenomenon is somewhat analogous to the "General
Heisenberg" principle in experimentation. The principle is
stated as follows: "When experimenting with the system about
which we are trying to obtain knowledge, we create a new
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system" (Koolhass, 1982). Koolhas gives a fine example of
this: "A man who inquires through the door of the bedroom
where his friend is sick, How are you? whereupon his friend
replies Fine, and the effort kills him."
In an analogous manner, by imposing different estimates
on a software project we would, in a real sense, be creating
different projects. In the remainder of this discussion we
will explain how.
Research findings clearly indicate that the decisions
that people make in project situations, and the actions they
choose to take are significantly influenced by the pressures
and perceptions produced by the project's schedule (Roberts,
1981b), (Hart, 1982), (Shooman, 1983), (Gagliardi, 1981), and
(Brooks, 1978). In our model, we capture such schedule
influences. The most significant of which are depicted in
the causal loop diagram of Figure V.9.
Schedules have a direct influence on the hiring and
firing decisions throughout the life of a software project.
As was shown earlier in this chapter, in TRW's COCOMO model,
the project's staff size is simply determined by dividing the
man-days estimate (MD) by the development time estimate
(TDEV). Thus, for example, a tight time schedule (i.e., a
low TDEV value) means a larger workforce. We also saw how
scheduling can dramatically change the manpower loading
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throughout the life of a project. For example, we saw how
the workforce level shoots upwards towards the end of the
NASA project (but not in project EXAMPLE), because of NASA's
strict constraints on the extent to which the project's
schedule is allowed to slip.
Through its effects on the workforce level, a project's
schedule also affects productivity. This happens because a
higher workforce level, for example, means more communication
and training overhead, which in turn affects productivity
negatively. -
As shown in Figure V.9. (and as we explained in detail
in Chapter III), productivity is also influenced by the
presence of any man-day shortages.. For example, if the
project is perceived to be behind schedule i.e., when the
total effort still needed to complete the project is
perceived to be greater than the total effort actually
remaining in the project's plan, software developers tend to
work harder i.e., allocate more man-hours to the project, in
an attempt to compensate for the perceived shortage and to
bring the project back on schedule. Such man-day shortages
are, obviously, more prone to occur when the project is
initially underestimated. Conversely, if project management
initially over-estimates the project, man-day "excesses"
could arise. And when the project is perceived to be ahead
of schedule i.e., when the total man-days remaining in the
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project's plan exceed what the project members perceive is
needed to complete the project, "Parkinson's Law indicates
that people will use the extra time for ... personal
activities, catching up on the mail, etc." (Boehm, 1981).
Which, of course, means that they become less productive.
Having identified how software project estimation can
influence project behavior, are we now in a position to
return back to the example we posited at the beginning of
this section, and answer the still unanswered question,
namely, whether estimation method "A" is truely more accurate
than method "B"?
Identifying the feedback relationships through which
software estimation influences project behavior is one thing,
and discerning the dynamic implications of such interactions
on the total system is another. Paraphrasing Richardson and
Pugh (1981),
The behavior of systems of interconnected feedback loops
often confounds intuition and analysis, even though the
dynamic implications of isolated loops may be reasonably
obvious.
One option that might be suggested, is to conduct a
controlled experiment, whereby the 64 KDSI software project
is conducted twice under exactly the same conditions, except
that in one case it would be initiated with a 2,359 man-day
estimate (i.e., on the basis of method "A"), and in the
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second case with a 5,900 man-day estimate (i.e., on the basis
of method "B"). While theoretically possible, such an option
is almost infeasible from a practical point of view because
of its high cost, both in terms of money and time.
Simulation experimentation provides an, obviously, more
attractive alternative. In addition to permitting
less-costly and less-time-consuming experimentation,
simulation experimentaion makes "perfectly" controlled
experiments possible (Forrester, 1961).
However, rather than conduct a limited experiment simply
to investigate methods "A" and "B," above, we will instead
conduct a broader experiment that answers a broader set of
issues that were raised in one of the organizations we
interviewed in.
In the particular organization, project managers were
rewarded -on how close their projects met their initially
estimated man-days budget. The estimation procedure that
they informally used was as follows:
1. Use Basic COCOMO to estimate the number of man-days
(MD). That is, use
MD = 2.4 * 19 * (KDSI)1.o05 man-days
2. Multiply this. estimate by a Safety Factor. The
safety factor ranged from 25% to 50%.
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3. Use the new value of man-days (MD') to calculate the
development time (TDEV) using COCOMO. That is, use
TDEV = 47.5 * (MD'/19)0 .38 days
It is important to note, before we proceed with our
experiment, that this "Safety Factor Philosophy" is not, in
any way, unique to this one organization. For example, in a
study of the software cost estimation process at the
Electronic System Division of the Air Force Systems Command,
Devenny (1976) found that most program managers budget
additional funds for software as a "management reserve." He
also found that these management reserves ranged in size (as
a percentage of the estimated software cost) from 5% to 50%
with a mean of 18%. And as was the case in the organization
we interviewed in, the policy was an informal one: "
frequently the reserve was created by the program office with
funds not placed on any particular contract. Most of the
respondents indicated that the reserve was not identified as
such to prevent its loss during a budget cut" (Devenny,
1976).
To test the efficacy of such an informal policy we will
run a number of simulations of our prototype project, namely,
project EXAMPLE, with different values for the Safety Factor.
We will experiment with values ranging from 0 (i.e., the base
run) to 100%. For example, for a Safety Factor of 50%, the
project would be initialized with the following estimates:
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1. First, calculate MD,
MD = 2.4 * 19 * (42.88)1.05 = 2,359 man-days
2. Second, calculate MD'
MD' =MD * (1+Safety-Factor/100)
=MD * 1.5 = 3,538.5 man-days
3. Finally, calculate TDEV
TDEV = 47.5 * (MD'/19)0 .38 = 346 days
The results of the experiment are exhibited in Figures
V.10. through V.13.
In Figure V.10., the % of the relative error in
estimating man-days is plotted against different values of
the Safety Factor. Notice that the "Safety Factor Policy"
seems to be working. The larger the Safety Factor the
smaller the estimation error. In particular, in the 25-50%
range (which is what was used in the organization) the
estimation error drops from being approximately 40% in the
base run, to values in the upper twenties. In fact, Figure
V.10. suggests that by using a Safety Factor in the 25-50%
range, the project manager might not be going far enough,
since a 100% Safety Factor, for example, would drop the
estimation error down to a "more rewarding" 12%.
The rational, or the justification, for using a Safety
Factor (as .provided by our. interviewees) is based on the
following set of assumptions:
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1. Past experiences indicate a strong bias on the part
of software developers to underestimate the scope of a
software project.
2. "(One) might think that a bias would be the easiest
kind of estimating problem to rectify, since it involves
an error that is always in the same direction ... (But
biases) are, almost by definition, invisible ... the
same psychological mechanism (e.g., optimism of software
developers), that creates the bias works to conceal it"
(DeMarco, 1982).
3. To rectify this bias on the part of software
developers (e.g., systems analysts and designers),
project management must use a Safety Factor. When the
project manager " ... adds a contingency factor (25%?
50? 100?) he is, in effect, saying that: 'much more
is going to happen that I don't know about, so I'll
estimate the rest as a percentage of that which -I do
know something about'" (Pietrasanta, 1968).
In other words, the assumption is that the Safety Factor
is simply a mechanism to bring the initial man-days estimate
closer to the project's true size in man-days ... as shown
in Figure V.11.
Notice that such an assumption cannot be contested
solely on the basis of Figure V.10. which provides only part
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of the story. A more complete picture is provided by Figure
V.12. In the figure we plot the actual man-,lays that were
cbnsumed by the project EXAMPLE, when different Safety
Factors are applied to its initial estimate. The assumption
of Figure V.11 is obviously invalidated. As higher Safety
Factors are used, leading to more and more generous initial
man-day allocations, the actual amount of man-days consumed,
does not remain at some inherently-defined value. For
example, in the base run, project EXAMPLE would be initiated
with a man-day estimate of 2,359 man-days and would end up
consuming 3,795 man-days. When a Safety Factor of 50% is
used, i.e., leading to a 3,538 man-day initial estimate,
EXAMPLE ends up consuming, not 3,795 man-days, but 5,080
man-days. To reiterate a point made earlier:
A different estimate creates a different project.
The reason why this happens (as was explained earlier)
is that the project's initial estimates create pressures and
perceptions that affect how people behave on the project. In
particular, an overestimate of the project's man-days can
lead to a larger buildup of the project's workforce, leading
to higher communication and training overheads, which in turn
affect productivity negatively. In addition, when a project
is overestimated, it often leads to an expansion of the
project members' slack time activities (e.g., non-project
communication, personal activities, ... etc.), leading to
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further reductions in productivity.
Figure V.13. is a plot of "Gross Productivity," which
is defined as the project size in DSI (i.e., 64,000 DSI)
divided by the actual number of man-days expended, for the
different Safety Factor situations. Gross Productivity drops
from a value of 16.8 DSI/Man-Day in the base run, to as low
as 12 when a 100% Safety Factor is used. Notice that the
drop in productivity is initially significant, and then
levels off for higher Safety Factors. The reason for this is
that when the Safety Factor increases from 0 (i.e., in the
base run) to say a relatively small value (e.g., 25%) most of
the man-day excesses that result are absorbed by the
employees. This happens in two ways, less overworking and
more slack time. Recall that in project EXAMPLE's base run,
man-day backlogs occurred towards the end of both the
development phase and the system testing phase leading to
periods of overwork. When a small Safety Factor is used,
however, such backlogs will decrease, leading to less
overwork durations. As the Safety Factor is increased
further, man-day excesses, rather than backlogs will result.
When these excesses are "reasonable" they tend to be largely
absorbed in the form of reasonably expanded slack activities.
However, as was explained in detail in Chapter III, there is
a limit on how much "fat" employees would be willing, or
allowed, to absorb. Beyond these limits, man-day excesses
would be translated into cuts in the project's workforce,
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schedule, or both. Thus, as the Safety Factor increases to
larger and larger values, losses in productivity due to the
expansion of the slack time activities decreases, leading to
lower and lower drops in Gross Productivity.
We are now in a position to answer the question posited
at the beginning of this discussion. The situation concerned
a 64 KDSI project which is in fact our own project EXAMPLE,
and a comparison of two estimation methods. Method "A"
produces a 2,359 man-day estimate. It is, in other words,
the estimate used in the base run. Since, project EXAMPLE
ended up actually consuming 3,795 man-days, the % of relative
absolute error in estimating man-days is 38%. We then
questioned whether a new estimation methods "B," which
produces a 5,900 man-day estimate for project example (i.e.,
an estimate that is 55% higher than EXAMPLE's actual man-day
expenditures of 3,795), would have provided a less accurate
estimate of the project's man-days, had it been used instead
of method A.
Notice that method "B's" estimate of 5,900 man-days is
150% higher than "A's" 2,359 estimate i.e., method "B" is
equivalent to a "Safety Factor Policy" in which the Safety
Factor is set to 150%. To check the behavior of project
EXAMPLE had it been estimated using Method "B," we re-ran the
model with an initialized value of the man-days estimate (MD)
equal to 5,900. The results of the run, together with those
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of the base case are tabulated below:
Method "B"
5,900
5,412
9 %
Method "A" (Base Run)
2,359
3,795
38 %
The results are quite interesting. Method "B" turns out
to be, in fact, a more accurate estimator. However, the
improved accuracy is attained at a high cost. The project
turns out consuming 43% more man-days!
In terms of the real life organization we interviewed
in, the message is the same. The "Safety Factor Policy" does
achieve its intended objective, namely, produces relatively
more accurate estimates. However, the organization is paying
dearly for this. As Figure V.12. indicates, a Safety Factor
in the 25-50 % range results in a 15-35% increase in the
project's cost in terms of man-days.
To conclude this section, we restate the two basic
insights we gained:
1. A different estimate creates a different project.
The important implication that follows from this is that
both the proj.ect manager as well as the student of
MDEST
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software estimation should reject the notion that a new
software estimation model can be adequately judged on
the basis of how accurately it can estimate historical
projects. Because of the significant influence that a
schedule has on the behavior of a software project, the
only real test of an estimation method is to try it.
2. A more accurate estimate is not necessarily a better
estimate. An estimation method7 should not be judged
only on how accurate it is, but in addition it should be
judged on how costly the projects it "creates" are.
V.3.2. On the Portability of the Quantitative Software
Estimation Models:
There has been a fair amount of work towards developing
different kinds of quantitative software estimation models.
These models vary in what they provide (e.g., total cost,
manning schedule) and what factors they use to calculate
their estimates. They also vary with regard to the type of
formula and parameters they incorporate. In almost all
cases, the model is based either directly or indirectly on
past historical data (Shooman, 1983). Sometimes the
collected data are translated into tables or graphs
indicating the productivity (instructions per man-day,
man-month, or man-year). Another approach is to formulate a
parametric model, a mathematical function of several
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variables, suggested by previous experimentation and
engineering judgement. Statistical techniques are then
applied to the data in order to reduce the number of model
variables (analysis of variance and correlation) and to
compute the constants in the equation (parameter estimation).
However, "Even today, almost no model can estimate the
true cost of software with any degree of accuracy" (Mohanty,
1981). For example, the "Basic COCOMO" estimates come within
a factor of 1.3 of the actual development figures for the
projects in the COCOMO data base only 28% of the time, and
with a factor of 2 only 60% of the time" (Boehm, 1981). The
1965 SDC model had a standard deviation which was larger than
the mean estimate (Nelson, 1966). The analysis of the
IBM-FSD model in (Walston and Felix, 1977) reported a
standard deviation of a factor of 1.71 (mean of 274
instructions/man-month; range about the mean of 160-470
instructions/man-month).
Furthermore, the portability of such models from the
companies in which they were developed to another, has proven
to be poor (Benbasat and Vessey, 1980), (Boehm, 1981),
(Mohanty, 1981).
The thesis of this section is that both the accuracy as
well as the portability of software estimation models can.be
significantly improved by taking into consideration not only
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the technical aspects of the software development
environment, as is the case with the current models, but, in
addition, by accounting for the managerial and organizational
characteristics of the environment. Specifically, we will
identify a number of managerial and organizational variables
that the current models fail to "acknowledge," but which
significantly influence the cost of software development.
To set the stage for our analysis, we will first report
on an interesting experiment by Mohanty (1981), which
cleverly demonstrates the above two weaknesses in the current
models.
Mohanty's objective was to examine the extent to which
the available quantitative software estimation models produce
the same cost estimate for a given project. The following
models were included in the exercise: (1) The Farr and
Zagorski -Model; (2) The Kustanowitz Model; (3) The
Wolverton Model; (4) The Walston-Felix Model; (5) The
Aerospace Model; (6) The Aaron Model; (7) The GRC Model;
(8) The Naval Air Development Center Model; (9) The Doty
Model; (10) The SDC Model; (11) The Schneider Model; and
(12) The Price-S Model.
In order to fully specify his hypothetical software
project for the experiment, it was necessary to first
identify the full set of factors that are collectively
361
incorporated in the 12 models. Once this set is identified,
the software project could then be defined in terms of this
set of parameters. Forty-nine factors were identified. They
involved system size, data base, system complexity, type of
program, documentation, environment (e.g., requirements
definition, security, and computer access), and an "other"
category that includes such items as miles traveled,
reliability, and growth requirements. However, none of the
cost models described uses all the factors. Cost models
developed before 1974, for example, emphasized productivity
without considering the quality of the finished product.
Newer cost models do consider quality; however, they do not
include it explicitly.
As we said, a hypothetical software project was then
defined in terms of the identified set of parameters. The
size of the project was chosen to be 36,000 machine-language
executable instructions. The resulting 12 cost estimates for
the project are exhibited in Figure V.14. (Note: the
estimates cover the design, coding, and testing phases only
... as does our model.) As the figure indicates, the
estimated cost varies from a low of $362,500 (the Farr and
Zagorski Model) to a high of 2,766,667 (the Kustanowitz
Model) for the same software project.
Since the size of the project and cost per instruction
were the same for the different models, the variations in
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cost are obviously caused by other factors. Two sources of
variation were suggested by Mohanty. The first related to
the quality of the final product. For example, when the
costs of highly reliable software are collected into a cost
data base, a model that uses this data base will estimate the
cost of a reliable product. On the other hand, if the data
base reflects software products with low reliability, any
model based on it would invariably estimate the cost of a
less reliable product. Since the cost data bases used in
developing the cost models are different, embodying software
with different qualities, one source of variation in
estimated cost is the quality of the final product.
The second source of variation suggested by Mohanty is
environmental:
That is, each model was developed for a cost data
base collected in a given company environment. This
data base thus embodies the specific nature of the
organizational problems, work patterns, and management
approaches and practices. Where this data base is
regressed to derive coefficients for use in a given
model, the model reflects that company's environment
only (Mohanty, 1981).
This contention, on the significance of the managerial
and organizational environment, is supported by others in the
literature [(Tausworthe, 1977), (Bartol and Martin, 1982),
(Pietrasanta, 1968), and (Clap, 1976)]. A few researchers
have even suggested some managerial/organizational factors
which they feel need to be accounted for in software cost
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estimation. For example, Tausworthe (1977) discusses the
importance of accounting for manpower turnover, while Clap
(1976) argues for the consideration of managerial policy on
both the acquisition of manpower and the distribution of
effort among the software development activities.
In the remaining part of this section we will discuss
the results of a simulation experiment we conducted to
quantify the impact of four managerial variables on the cost
of software development. Two of the variables address
manpower-acquisition and staffing policy issues, while the
other two concern issues of effort distribution among the
software development activities. The four variables were
selected with two criteria in mind. The two criteria were
proposed in (Boehm and Wolverton, 1980), and they are: (1)
objectivity and (2) prospectiveness. According to Boehm and
Wolverton, software cost estimation models should only
include objective variables to avoid allocating the software
cost variance to poorly calibrated subjective factors (e.g.,
complexity). That is, the inclusion of only objective
variables makes it harder to manipulate the model to obtain
any result that one wants. Secondly, a software cost
estimation model should avoid the use of variables whose
values cannot be determined until the project is complete.
First we will examine the impact of each of the four
variables individually. This will then be followed by an
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experiment to evaluate the impact of the four variables
combined. The result is quite significant: project
EXAMPLE's cost varies by a factor of two.
Manpower-Acquisition and Staffing Variables:
As mentioned above, two model variables that address
manpower-acquisition type policy issues, will be examined.
The two model variables are: (1) "Average Daily Manpower per
Staff," and (2) the "Willingness to Change Workforce."
Our interviews at GM and Digital, revealed a difference
in the two organizations' software project staffing policies.
At GM, project members were assigned full-time to a single
project (Hisamune, 15), whereas at Digital, it was more
common to assign software people to more than one project
(usually two) (Landolfi, 11), (Lombardi, 16). The practice
of these two types of policy for staffing software projects
has been also reported in the literature, e.g., in (Knutson,
1980). In the model, this staffing issue is captured, as was
explained in Chapter III, by the variable "Average Daily
Manpower per Staff." For example, when project members are
assigned full-time to the project, the value of the "Average
Daily Manpower per Staff" would be set to 1 i.e., each
project member contributes 1 man-day every (working) day to
the project. On the other hand, if project members assign,
on the average, only 50% of their time to the project (e.g.,
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as is the case with the Digital groups we studied), the value
of the "Average Daily Manpower per Staff" would be set to
0.5.
To examine the impact of these two different staffing
policies on project cost, we ran project EXAMPLE twice, in
the first run the value of the "Average Daily Manpower per
Staff" was set to 1, and in the second it was set to 0.5.
And we compared EXAMPLE's cost under the two policies. The
measure of project cost we will use is simply the value of
the total number of man-days expended to complete the
project. The results were as follows:
Average Daily Manpower per Staff Man-Days
1.0 3,795
0.5 4,641
In other words, the policy of allocating project members
half-time (on the average) to the project results in a cost
that is 22% higher. And the rvason for this increase in cost
is two-fold. First, there is a loss in productivity due to
the increased communication overhead. This factor accounts
for approximately 90% of the increase in the project's cost.
As was explained earlier, the average staffing level of a
project (in terms of full-time equivalent employees) is
determined by dividing the estimated value of the projects
development time, i.e.,
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Staffing Level = MD / TDEV full-time equiv. employees
If the "Average Daily Manpower per Staff" is less than
1, adjustments would then be made to determine the actual
number of employees needed. For example, if MD = 1000
man-days and TDEV = 200 days, the average staffing level in
terms of fullrtime equivalent employees would be 5. And .if
employees will be assigned only half-time, on the average, to
the project, then the actual staffing level would be 10
employees. Having 10 people involved in developing the
system rather than 5 increases the communication overhead in
the project, and, therefore, decreases the group's overall
productivity. As was explained in detail in Chapter III, the
productivity loss takes two forms. First, more.time is lost
on human communication, e.g., to resolve questions about
design, testing, ... etc. (Tausworthe, 1977). Secondly,
the amount of work itself usually increases e.g., in the form
of more documentation, more modules and interfaces, ... etc.
(Gagliardi, 1981), (Conway, 1968).
The second reason why the cost increases is because of
an increase in the training overhead. This second factor
accounts for the remaining 10% of the increase in the
project's cost. Again, as was explained in detail in Chapter
III, when new project members are recruited (from within the
organization or from the \outside), they pass through a
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project orientation period (Brooks, 1974) e.g., to learn the
project's ground rules, the goals of the effort, the plan of
the work," and all the details of the system (GRC, 1977),
(Thayer and Lehman, 1977). This training of newcomers, is
usually carried out by the "old timers" (Tanniru, et al.,
1981), (GRC, 1977), (Winrow, 1982), (Corbato and Clingen,
1978). This training overhead is, of course, costly, because
"while (the oldtimer) is helping the new employee learn the
job, his own productivity on his other work is reduced"
(Canning, 1977). This training overhead is a function of the
number of newcomers, not of the number of equivalent
full-time newcomers (Brooks, 1975). For example, in (Gordon
and Lamb, 1977) when project members were assigned half-time
on the project, the team size was doubled, and as a result
the training overhead also doubled. When the "Average Daily
Manpower per Staff" is, therefore, less than 1, a larger
training overhead will be incurred, because as was shown
above, it would mean a larger workforce buildup in terms of
actual employees.
The second manpower-acquisition variable we examined is
the "Willingness to Change Workforce." In Chapter III we
made the following note about the "Willingness to Change
Workforce:"
It is important to realize that the variable
'Willingness to Change Workforce' is an expression of a
policy for managing projects. Thus, a range of
functions are possible here, capturing different
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strategies -for how to balance workforce and schedule
adjustments throughout the project to minimize overruns
and costs.
Our objective now is to examine the sensitivity of the
project's cost to this policy variable. In particular, we
will examine two different policies that lie at different
sides of the base case policy i.e., the one explained in
Chapter III.
The first manpower acquisition policy, we'll call it
polEcy (A), can be defined as follows: At the initiation of
the project estimates are made for the project's total effort
in man-days (MD), and its development time (TDEV). Based on
this, the project's desired staffing level is determined
i.e., by dividing MD by TDEV. People are hired,
complementing the core of project members on hand at the
initiation of the project, until the desired staffing level
is reached. Once reached, the workforce is maintained at
that level. That is, new people would be hired only to
replace either those who quit or are transferred out.
Such a policy was reported by Devenny (1976), in his
study of software cost estimation at the Electronic Systems
Division of the Air Force Systems Command. He observed:
The data indicate that none of the ten contractors ever
significantly altered the size of the original software
team. The contractor will normally keep the initially
formed team working until the software is eventually
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completed.
In terms of project EXAMPLE, this policy will be
implemented as follows: Estimates for the total effort in
man-days, the development time, and the staffing level will
be calculated exactly as we did before in Section V.2. These
values turn out, respectively, to be 2,359 man-days, 296
days, and 8 people. We will also continue to assume that at
the project's initiation only half the desired number of
people (i.e., 4) will be actually on board. To achieve the
desired staffing level of 8 people, 4 more people will then
be recruited into the project. Once, that desired level is
achieved, it is maintained until the end of the project.
That is, new people would be hired only to replace those who
either quit or are transferred out.
The result of this policy, together with that of the
base run, are tabulated below:
Manpower Acquisition Policy Man-Days Duration
Base Case 3,795 430
A 3,559 488
As the figures indicate, Policy (A) leads to a 6% drop
in cost (i.e., below the base case). Notice, however, that
this is achieved at the cost of a larger schedule slip.
Under Policy (A), project EXAMPLE takes 13.5% more time to
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complete (i.e., over the base case). Whether this tradeoff
is made explicitly and willingly by the Electronic Systems
Division contractors is not clear. However, by foregoing the
flexibility of adjusting the workforce level to account for
any initial errors in estimating the scope of the project,
the policy leaves little room to handle any initial
under-estimate but to translate them into a software schedule
slip. (Remember, project EXAMPLE's size is initially
underestimated by 33%, i.e., it is initially perceived as
being 42.88 KDSI in size, rather than being 64 KDSI, its true
size.) In the base case, on the other hand, when the
project's "Undiscovered Job Tasks" are progressively
discovered i.e., as project management comes to realize that
the project's scope is larger than what has been expected,
adjustments are made (as we explained in detail in Section
V.2.) not only to the schedule, but to the workforce .level
as well.
The point here is not to decide which policy is better,
since this can only be evaluated on the basis of what an
organization's objectives are, but merely to point out that
the different policies do impact what the project's cost will
end up being, and should, therefore, be explicitly considered
when project cost estimates are made.
Under the second manpower acquisition policy we will
examine, call it policy (B), project management is not only
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willing to adjust the workforce level to account for any
initial underestimation error, but it is willing to continue
making such adjustments further into the project's life cycle
(that is, further than in the base case),
In the base case (and based on discussions with
(Lombardi, 23), (Garett, 24) and (Nichols, 25)), the
"Willingness to Change Workforce" was formulated in terms of
the sum of the "Hiring Delay" and the "Average Assimilation
Delay." Specifically, in the early stages of the project
when "Time Remaining" would generally be much larger than the
sum of the "Hiring Delay" and the "Average Assimilation
Delay" management would be willing to adjust the workforce
level to meet the project's scheduled completion date. As
the number of days perceived remaining drops below
1.5 * (Hiring Delay + Average Assimilation Delay), though,
management starts becoming reluctant, and increasingly so, to
increase the workforce level. For example if the "Hiring
Delay" is 40 working days and the "Average Assimilation
Delay" is 80 days, then as "Time Remaining" drops below 180
days, management, in the base case, starts becoming reluctant
to hire new people, even though the time and effort perceived
remaining might imply that more people are needed. The
reluctance stems from the realization that most of those
remaining 180 days, would be "wasted" in the hiring process
and then in acquainting the new people with the mechanics of
the project, in integrating them into the project team, and
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in training them in the necessary technical areas. And when
the "Time Remaining" drops below 0.3 * (Hiring Delay +
Average Assimilation Delay), no more addition would be made
to the project's workforce i.e., the hiring rate will fall to
zero. Thus, at that stage, if the project is behind
schedule, project management would be coping only by pushing
back the schedule completion date.
As has been repeatedly, stressed, while the above
formulation does express (what we feel is) a representitive
policy for manpower acquisition, it is by no means the only
policy. A range of policies are possible here, capturing
different strategies for how to. balance workforce and
schedule adjustments throughout the project to minimize
overruns costs.
Policy (B) is one such policy. It is adopted by (at
least) one group in a Massachusetts-based software
development/consulting company. Policy (B) is similar in
structure to the policy above, the only difference is that
the "Willingness to Change Workforce" is formulated in terms
of just the "Hiring Delay." This, of course, means that
policy (B) is a more aggressive policy in terms of acquiring
people. For example, while in the base case policy,
management starts becoming reluctant to increase the
workforce level when the perceived number of days remaining
to complete the project drops below 1.5 * (Hiring Delay +
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Average Assimilation Delay), i.e., below 1.5 * (40+80) = 180
days, under policy (B) this happens much further into the
project's life cycle, i.e., when only 1.5 * 40 = 60 working
days are perceived remaining. (This aggressive manpower
acquisition policy, is justified, we were told, because the
firm is experiencing an impressive growth rate, fueled by a
sizable backlog of client assignments. Hiring new people to
a project that is "winding down" is, therefore, not
inhibitted by management since securing the future
utilization of the new people is almost always guaranteed.)
The WCWF-1 table function for policy (B) is shown in Figure
V.15. It has exactly the same form as that of the base case
(shown in Figure 111.34.), the only difference is that the
denominator of the x-axis is simply the "Hiring Delay" rather
than being the sum of the "Hiring delay" and the "Average
Assimilation Delay."
The result of -adopting such a policy in project EXAMPLE
is shown below, together with the results of both the base
case and policy (A).
Manpower Acquisition Policy Man-Days Duration
Base Case 3,795 430
A 3,559 488
B 4,321.5 373
As the figures indicate, policy (B)'s cost is 14% higher
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than the base case, and 21% higher than that of policy (A).
On the other hand, under policy (B), the project takes 13%
less time to complete than the base case, and almost 25% less
time than when policy (A) is used. Both the increase in the
cost and the decrease in the duration can be attributed to a
single cause, namely, a higher workforce level. More people
on the project means more work can be done faster. It also
means that the project team's overall productivity would be
lower because of the increased communication and training
overheads.
Once again, it is important to reiterate that the
objective of this exercise is not to decide which policy is
better, since this can only be decided on the basis of what
an organization's objectives are, but merely to establish
that manpower acquisition policy does have an impact on what
the project's costs will end up being, and should, therefore,
be explicitly considered when project cost estimates are
made.
From a pragmatic point of view, establishing the
significance of a particular factor for cost estimation
purposes is not enough. The factor must also be quantified,
before it can be used in a quantitative cost estimation
model. For example, paraphrasing Clapp (1976):
Variables used in cost estimation tend to be those which
are easier to measure, quantify, and estimate, even if
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they are not the most significant.
We feel that our "Willingness to Change Workforce" table
function formulation does provide the software engineering
community with a valid measure of manpower acquisition policy
that is also easy to measure. We must note, however, that
this measure is not an original one, for it has been
previously used in other System Dynamics models e.g., of R&D
project management (Roberts, 1964). Our role, here, is,
therefore, that of transferring a useful idea from the System
Dynamics field to the software engineering community.
A final note. Notice that our results above seem to
contradict Brooks' Law, which states that "Adding manpower to
a late software project makes it later" (Brooks, 1978). The
most aggressive of the three policies in terms of adding
manpower, namely, policy (B), actually leads to the earliest
completion date. What our results indicate is that "adding
manpower to a late software project makes it more costly."
More on this later in this chapter.
We turn next to the second category of variables, those
addressing issues of effort distribution among the software
development activity.
Effort Distribution Variables:
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In planning a software project, management does not only
provide estimates for the project's total man-days
expenditure, it in addition plans the distribution of this
total effort among the project's phases (McKeen, 1983),
(Davis, 1974), (Gunther, 1978). Numerous authors have
presented figures indicating life cycle resource
distributions among phases. In some cases the source of
their information has been reported; in most instances, it
has gone unreported causing some difficulty with
interpretation and application. In Figure V.16. a
comparison of three authors' results, done by McKeen (1981),
indicates that substantial differences do exist particularly
in the coding and testing phases of development. Commenting
on the situation, McKeen (1981) wrote:
A major conclusion ... is that we do not possess an
adequate understanding of resource consumption behavior
over the life cycle development phases.
In McKeen's own research work, he studied 32 software
development projects. He found "no real support ... for
'typical' or 'dominant' development profiles at all" (McKeen,
1981).
In this section, it is our objective to enhance our
understanding of the "resource consumption behavior." In
particular, we will investigate the impact of planned effort
distribution among the project's phases on project cost.
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Thibodeau and Dodson (1978) were the first to
hypothesize the existance of such an impact:
Past attempts to establish mathematical expressions that
can predict the life cycle cost components for software
systems have achieved only qualified success. The
mathematical models for these relationships included
only variables that describe the software
characteristics and related environmental factors. This
paper presents the hypothesis that software cost
estimating relationships must include the effects of
resources consumed in one life cycle phase on other
phases. Such a model is difficult to validate. This is
primarily due to the need for greater quantities of data
of greater precision than is usually available.
In our view, the difficulty arises because of the
phenomenon we discussed in detail in Section V.3.1., namely,
that a different project estimate creates a different
project. While, all the arguments we presented in Section
V.3.1. were in terms of a project's total effort estimate,
they do equally apply to estimates at the phase level. We
can, therefore, restate the above assertion as follows: A
different distribution of estimated effort among a project's
phases creates a different project. And because of this, the
impact of different effort distributions on the cost of a
particular software project can only be determined by
repeating the particular project under controlled conditions
in which only the distribution of estimated effort among the
project's phases would be allowed to change.
In the remainder of this section we will use the model
to conduct an experiment using our prototype project EXAMPLE
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to examine the impact of the distribution of effort among the
project's activities on project cost. Again remember the
objective of this exercise is not to determine what the
optimal effort distribution is, but rather to establish that
effort distribution decisions do have an impact on what the
project's cost will end up being, and should, therefore, be
explicitly considered when project cost estimates are made.
(Optimal effort distributions will be examined in another
experiment later in this chapter.)
The model has two effort distribution parameters. The
first parameter allocates the project's estimated man-days
among the model's two explicit phases, namely, development
(which includes design and coding) and system testing. In
the base case 80% of the effort is allocated to development
and 20% to testing. The second effort distribution parameter
is the "Planned Fraction of Manpower for QA," which is set to
15%. That is, 15% of the development effort is planned for
QA activities during the design and coding stages. As was
explained in Section V.2., these values were selected to
conform to the TRW software development environment.
The selection of another effort distribution profile to
experiment with and compare to the base case distribution
was, in a sense, both easy and difficult. It was easy,
because there was a large number of candidate profiles. As
the remarks in the beginning of this discussion indicate,
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there is a wide range of effort distribution profiles
reported in the literature. However, the selection of an
effort distribution profile was difficult, because, of the
many that are reported, none seemed to be "typical" or
"dominant" (e.g., as McKeen's (1981) study indicates). We
finally decided to make our selection on the basis of our own
data i.e., the data collected in our interviews. And from
this we selected the case which we felt would provide the
most interest. It involved one group at GM using the
40-20-40 effort distribution profile i.e., 40% for
preliminary and detailed design, 20% for coding, and 40% for
testing. We feel that this particular profile would interest
many in the software engineering area because of the fact
that this 40-20-40 rule is perhaps the most widely touted
rule-of-thumb on the distribution of effort among.the phases
of software development projects (McKeen, 1981), (Bruce and
Pederson, 1982), (Oliver, 1982), (Jensen and Tonies, 1979).
In terms of our model's effort distribution parameter
this translates into a 60-40 distribution. That is, 60% of
the total man-days would be allocated to development (i.e.,
design and coding) and 40% to system testing. As for the QA
effort, the GM group allocated to it 20% of their development
effort. This translates into a 0.20 value for the models
"Planned Fraction of Manpower for QA."
The result of running project EXAMPLE with this new
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effort distribution profile, call it (C), were as follows:
Effort Distribution Profile Man-Days
Base Case 3,795
C 4,442.5
Thus, a change in project EXAMPLE's effort distribution
profile from the base case to profile (C) leads to a 17%
increase in cost. Four factors contributed to this increase
in cost. The first obvious one is the (planned) increase in
the QA effort. Secondly, and as a result of this increased
QA effort, more errors were detected during development
leading to a larger rework effort expenditure. Thirdly, the
cost of development increased. The reason for this is,
however, less obvious. Recall the sequence of steps followed
in planning a project's various activities. First, total
man-days is determined. Based on this total value, the
project's schedule is calculated. Allocations to the
development versus testing activities are then made. What
this means is that, since this run's total man-day estimate
is the same as that of the base case, the scheduled duration
would also be the same in both cases. However, since in the
current case a lower fraction of the manpower is devoted to
development work, a larger team will be required to meet the
schedule. A larger team means larger training and
communication overheads, and hence the larger development
cost. The fourth, and final factor, is an increase in the
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testing effort. Notice that the testing effort increases
(i.e., over the base-case situation) even though it "should"
be lower. It should be lower because more effort was devoted
to QA leading to the detection of a larger fraction of the
errors. The testing effort increases inspite of a lower
testing workload (because of the lower errors) because of a
lower testing productivity. In the base-case, project
members had to over-work during the testing phase, because
there were more errors and less time. In the current case,
on the other hand, there is more time, and the work expands
to fill it.
What the above suggests, is that (for an EXAMPLE-type
software project) if 40% of development effort is allocated
to the testing phase, a 20% allocation to QA would be
excessive. Or conversely, for a 20% allocation to QA, a 40%
testing phase is excessive. What is more interesting, and
would be more useful, to determine, of course, is the
"optimal" combination. This will be investigated in Section
v.6.
A Final Experiment:
Our objective in this section was to demonstrate the
significant impact of a number of managerial variables on the
cost of software developemt. We examined four managerial
variables. Two variables related to the acquisition and
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staffing of the project's workforce, namely, the "Average
Daily Manpower per Staff" and the "Willingness to change
Workforce." The other two variables concerned the
distribution of effort among the project's different
activities i.e., development, testing, and QA. The
individual impact of the different variables on the project's
cost was evaluated in separate experiments (except for the 2
effort distribution variables which were tested together).
The results indicate that, individually, the variables can
make as much as a 20% difference in project EXAMPLE's total
cost (in man-days). What we would like to evaluate next, in
this final experiment, is the combined effect of the four
managerial variables on cost.
This is achieved by re-running project EXAMPLE with the
following four adjustments:
1. Set the value of the "Average Daily Manpower per
Staff" to 0.5. (The base-case value is 1.)
2. The "Willingness to Change Workforce" is formulated
in terms of the "Hiring Delay," yielding a more
aggressive manpower acquis ion policy. (In the
base-case it is formulated in terms of the (Hiring Delay
+ Average Assimilation Delay).)
3. Allocation of effort among the development and
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testing phases is set at 60% development and 40%
testing. (In the base case it is 80-20.)
4. The "Planned Fraction of Manpower for QA" is set at
20%. (In the base-case it is 15%.)
The result of running project EXAMPLE with this
different set of managerial policies is a total cost of 7,316
man-days. That is, a cost that is almost double the
base-case cost of 3,795 man-days.
The implication of this significant result is clear:
Because the above four managerial policies do vary from
software development organization to another, the portability
of software cost estimation models can be improved
significantly if such variables are accounted for. Recall
Mohanty's (1981) comments:
... each (cost estimation) model was developed for a
cost data base collected in a given company environment.
This data base thus embodies the specific nature of the
organizational problems, work patterns, and management
approaches and practices. When this data base is
regressed to derive coefficients for use in a given
model, the model reflects that company's environment
only.
Heretofore, the impact that a company's managerial
environment can have on the software development has not be
quantified. We feel that our work can be useful in three
aspects. First, we have established that the impact is a
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significant one i.e., we have shown that the effect of four
managerial variables can modify the cost of a software
project by a factor of 2. Second, by quantifying the impact,
we are making it harder on the software engineering community
to ignore the issue. And, finally, we have identified four
aspects of a company's managerial environment that are
significant determinants of software development cost, and
which are, therefore, deserving of future research efforts.
V.3.3. On the Analogy Method of Software Estimation:
While in the previous section our focus was on the
state-of-the-art software estimation methods, namely, the
quantitative models, in this section we turn our attention to
the "state of the practice." In this section we focus on
"Estimation by Analogy," probably the most commonly used
method to estimate software projects.
Estimation by analogy is defined as follows:
Estimation by analogy involves reasoning by analogy with
one or more completed projects to relate their actual
costs to an estimate of the cost of a similar new
project (Boehm, 1981).
To employ this method at least one project with similar
features must have been completed previously. The new
project must be clearly specified at least at the
functional level, permitting comparison of similar
elements (Benbasat and Vessey, 1980).
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According to Aron of IBM, when methods of estimating are
ranked, the list is headed by the analogy method (Aron,
1976). More recently, Oliver (1982) wrote: "The most common
technique on making operational estimates is the use of
experience gained on one or more similar projects." These
assertions are supported by at least one empirical study. In
his Ph.D. dissertation, Thayer (1979) surveyed 60 software
development projects in the aerospace industry, and found
that the analogy method was used in 60% of the cases, making
it, by far, the most common estimation method used.
In the previous sections, we argued that software
project estimation affects project behavior. That a
project's estimate creates pressures and perceptions that
directly influence the decisions that people make, and the
actions they choose to take, throughout the project's life
cycle. For example, the causal loop diagram of Figure V.17.
depicts the influence of project estimation on hiring/firing
decisions, perceived project status, and productivity. What
this implies for the use of analogy in estimation is the
existence of a feedback loop (see Figure V.18.): The
estimation by analogy method produces project estimates and
schedules, which affect the decisions and actions of the
technical performers anO their managers, which in turn affect
work performance, which would then eventually influence
future estimations.
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But what does the existence of such a feedback loop
mean? Is it good or bad? These are some of the questions
which we will attempt to answer in this section's simulation
experiment.
The experiment involves a hypothetical situation in
which a company undertakes a sequence of five identical
software projects, all. identical to project EXAMPLE, our
prototype project. On the first such project, and let us
call it EXAMPLE1, the company (lacking the benefit of
previous experience) underestimates the size of the project
by 33%, that is, estimates the project's size to be only
48.22 KDSI, i.e., as in project EXAMPLE's base-case. And let
us also assume that the base-case estimates for the project's
man-days an.d duration were the estimates used in EXAMPLE1.
That is, the project's man-days are estimated to be 2,359,
and its development time is estimated to be 296 working days.
In other words, EXAMPLE1- is conducted under our base case
conditions.
As our base case analysis of Section V.2. indicates,
EXAMPLE1 will end up actually consuming 3,795 man-days, and
will be completed in 430 working days. After completing
EXAMPLE1, the following is, therefore, learned:
* Project EXAMPLE1 is really 64 (and not 42.88) KDSI.
* It consumes 3,795 man-days.
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* It takes 430 days to complete.
Some time later, when project EXAMPLE2 (which is
identical to EXAMPLE1) comes along, project management will
be in a better position to estimate its true size. In fact,
we will assume that EXAMPLE2's size will be estimated
perfectly, that is, to be 64 KDSI. Furthermore, realizing
the analogy between the two projects, EXAMPLE1 and EXAMPLE2,
management will estimate EXAMPLE2's man-days and duration to
be 3,795 man-days and 430 days respectively i.e., the actual
values for EXAMPLE1. Based on these figures, management
estimates that a staff size of 3,795/430=9 (approx) full-time
equivalent people will be required.
Conducting project EXAMPLE2 under such circumstances
produces the following results: actual man-days expended =
3,787, and actual duration = 454 days. That is, while the
project is almost perfectly on target in terms of the man-day
expenditures, it still finishes late, approximately 6% beyond
the "improved" schedule.
This result is not only surprising, it is also
disturbing, the reason being that project EXAMPLE2 over-runs
what amounts to be a "perfect" schedule estimate. And when
we repeated the above sequence of actions and reactions three
more times for projects EXAMPLE3 through EXAMPLE5, this
surprising behavior persisted. That is, the schedule was
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overrun in each case. As a result, project management
started each project (e.g., EXAMPLEi) with a slightly longer
scheduled duration than the previous one (i.e., EXAMPLEi-1).
However, EXAMPLEi would still overrun its schedule, which
caused management to use an even longer schedule duration for
the next project. The results for the five simulation runs
are shown in Figure V.19.
It is important to pause here, and make one important
clarification. The objective of this experiment is not to
investigate the behavior of a sequence of five identical
software projects! Such a scenario is admittedly unrealistic
(recall that we carefully labelled our experiment as being
hypothetical). Choosing to conduct such an "unreasonable"
experiment, and being able to do so, is, however, one of the
strengths of simulation modeling. For it allows us to
conduct experimentation with absolute control over variables.
Remember, our objective is to study the effects of using
analogy in estimation on the management of software projects,
and the effects of that on future scheduling. And only that.
Studying such relationships in a setting where projects and
managers vary (albeit more realistic) can only and
unnecessarily confuse the issues and complicate the analysis.
For example, in our experiment when project EXAMPLE2
overruns, we can definitively rule out under-scheduling as a
cause, and instead look for a "better" explanation. If,
however, EXAMPLE2 had not been identical to EXAMPLE1, we
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would not have been able to make such an argument. Instead
we would have had to make unnecessary diversions, e.g., to
investigate the differences in scope between the two
projects.
With this in mind, we can now proceed to interpret the
experiment's results. There are two. First, there appears
to be inherent factors in the management of a software
project that would cause it to over-run even what amounts to
a "perfect" schedule estimate. The second, more interesting
finding, is that because of this inherent tendency to
overshoot, the use of the analogy method in estimating would
inject a bias in the scheduling process, a bias that
generates in the long-run longer (than necessary) project
schedules.
Concerning the first result, we have already noted that
project EXAMPLE2 over-runs a schedule that was perfectly
adequate to complete EXAMPLE1, which. is a. project identical
to it (i.e., to EXAMPLE2). Through further experimentation
with the model, it was possible to isolate the real cause of
this persisting schedule-overrun problem. It turned out to
be a consequence of the interaction of two factors, the
manpower-acquisition policy and the turnover of project
personnel.
As was explained in detail in Chapter III, in the
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earlier stages of the project, the staffing of the project is
maintained at that level which is perceived to be necessary
and sufficient to complete the project on time i.e., on its
(current) scheduled completion date. As the project proceeds
towards its final stages, however, project management becomes
increasingly reluctant to hire new people. This reluctance
stems from the realization that most of the time remaining on
the project would be "wasted" in the hiring proces and then
in acquainting the new people with the mechanics of the
project, in integrating them into the project team, and in
training them in the necessary technical areas. If at that
stage, the project runs into schedule problems, management
would react, not by adding more people, but rather by pushing
the schedule completion date back.
A project runs.into scheduling problems whenever the
"man-Days Perceived Still Needed" to complete the project
exceeds the "man-Days Remaining." In previous sections we
discussed how this can develop due to an increase in the
former. For example, if the project's size was
under-estimated, the value of the "Man-Days Perceived Still
Needed" could rise as the undiscovered tasks are discovered.
In our current situation (e.g., in project EXAMPLE2), though,
this will not occur. Remember, we are assuming that the
experience gained on project EXAMPLE1 will lead to a
"perfect" estimate of EXAMPLE2's size. What can happen,
however, is that the value of the "Man-Days Remaining" for
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project EXAMPLE2 drops below the value of the "Man-Days
Perceived Still Needed," and when this happens, EXAMPLE2
would run
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Thus far, we have been addressing only the first result
of our experiment, namely, that a software project can still
over-run what amounts to a "perfect" schedule estimate. The
second result of the experiment can be stated as follows:
because of the inherent tendency to overshoot, the use of the
analogy method in estimating would inject a bias in an
organization's scheduling process, a bias that-generates in
the long-run longer (than necessary) project schedules.
The "surprising" phenomenon we are observing here (i.e.,
of projects consuming longer and longer schedules), is a
phenomenon that has been frequently encountered in system
dynamics studies of organizational behavior (Sterman, 1981).
It has been termed "The Policy Resistance of Social Systems,"
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"Shifting the Burden to the Intervenor," and "Addiction"
among other things. A simple example of such a phenomenon is
that of caffeine addiction, whereby an addict has to consume
a certain amount of caffeine per day to maintain a certain
level of alertness. As time goes on the burden of
maintaining alertness will keep shifting from the normal
physiological body processes to the externally supplied
caffeine dose. The result, of course, is that higher and
higher doses will be required to maintain the same level of
alertness.
Richardson and Pugh (1981) provide an explanation for
,why social systems have this tendency to resist policies
designed to improve behavior (e.g., why a software project
would tend to resist the policy of estimation by analogy
which is designed to solve the schedule over-run problem, and
continues to over-run its schedule):
(The) compensating feedback is a property of real
systems, as well as system dynamics models, and is the
reason real systems tend to be resistent to policies
designed to improve behavior ...
(A) parameter change may weaken or strength a feedback
loop, but multi-loop nature of a system dynamics model
naturally strengthens or weakens other loops to
compensate. The result is often little or no overall
change in model behavior.
In terms of our software project situation this is
exactly what happens. To see how, let us first recall the
steps followed to estimate a project. First, the estimates
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of the project's man-days and its duration are made. These
can be made using analogy, COCOMO, ... etc. On the basis of
these two estimates, the pr6ject's average staffing level is
calculated i.e., by dividing the man-days estimate by the
estimate for the development time. For example, in EXAMPLE2
the estimates were MD = 3,795, TDEV = 430 and the average
staffing level = 3,795/430 = 8.8 full-time equivalent
employees. And we also know that EXAMPLE2's actual man-days
and duration end up being 3,787 and 454 respectively. From
these figures, we can also calculate EXAMPLE2's actual
average staffing level, namely, 3,787/454 = 8.3 full-time
equivalent employees. When the analogy method is then used
to estimate EXAMPLE3, EXAMPLE2's actual values will be used,
yielding: MD = 3,787, TDEV = 454, and an average staffing
level of 8.3 full-time equivalent employees. Notice what is
happening: EXAMPLE2's actual average staffing level ends up
(because of the turnover problem) to be slightly less than
what was planned for i.e., 8.3 instead of 8.8, and the actual
(lower) value is the one passed over to the next project. In
terms of Richardson and Pugh's explanation: extending the
project's schedule (from 430 to 454) weakens the strength of
the schedule pressure in the system, to which the hiring loop
simply compensates by causing the project to start with a
small workforce level target. It is also important to note
that such compensating behavior is often invisible to the
participants. For example, it is quite unlikely that
EXAMPLE3's project managers will realize such compensating
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behavior because, for one, the 8.8 figure is only a planning
(not an actual) figure for EXAMPLE2. It is quite possible,
therefore, that it would not be preserved in any project
records. And even if it is, it is unlikely that EXAMPLE3's
manager will use it, after all, by concentrating on
EXAMPLE2's actual data, the manager would be behaving in what
appears to be the rational way.
It is interesting to note, that this managerial dilemma
is not at all unique to the management of software projects.
Paraphrasing Forrester (1971):
social systems are inferently insensitive to most
policy changes that people select in an effort to alter
the behavior of the system. In fact, a social system
tends to draw our attention to the very points at which
an attempt to intervene will fail. Our experience,
which has been developed from contact with simple
systems, leads us to look close to the symptoms of
trouble for a cause. When we look, we discover that the
social system presents us with an apparent cause that is
plausible according to what we have learned from simple
systems. But this apparent cause is usually a
coincident occurrence that, like the trouble symptom
itself, is being produced by the feedback-loop dynamic
of a larger system.
In the case of software development, where a project
over-runs its schedule, the situation provides us with an
apparent cause, namely, that the project was poorly
estimated. It is a cause that is quite plausible according
to what we have learned e.g., that software estimation is not
yet an exact science. Furthermore, and this is significant,
it is often impossible in a real life situation to
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demonstrate that under-estimation was not in fact the cause.
(Note: Remember, we are excluding changes in requirements
from our analysis.)
Conclusion:
A number of conclusions can be drawn from our
"laboratory" experiment on the analogy method for estimating
software projects:
* A software project can still over-run what amounts to
a "perfect" schedule estimate.
* The software engineering community needs, therefore,
to expand its research agenda on the causes of the
schedule over-run problem, that is, beyond its current
(limited) agenda on software estimation accuracy.
* We have identified one such cause, namely, the
interaction of the manpower-acquisition policy and
personnel turnover.
* Estimating by analogy injects a bias in an
organization's scheduling process, a bias that
generates, in the long run, longer (than necessary)
project schedules.
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V.4. The "90% Syndrome:"
In this section, we will focus on one control-type
problem faced by many software project, managers, namely, the
"90% syndrome" problem. Specifically, our aim is to
demonstrate the model's capacity to generate this important
phenomenon of software project management, and in the process
provide some insights into its causes.
There is ample evidence in the literature to support the
pervasiveness of the "90% syndrome" problem in the management
of software development projects (e.g., see (Baber, 1982),
(DeMarco, 1982), (Synnott- and Gruber, 1981), and (Devenny,
1976).) Baber (1982) provides the following description of
the problem:
... estimates of the fraction of work completed
(increase) as originally planned until a level of about
80-90% is reached. The programmer's individual
estimates then increase only very slowly until the task
is actually completed.
To examine the model's capacity to generate the "90%
syndrome" type of behavior, we simulated project EXAMPLE with
three different initial conditions:
1. The base case, where the size is initially
under-estimated by 33%. That is,
SIZE = 42.88 (and not 64) KDSI
401
MD = 2,359 man-days
TDEV = 296 days
2. When its size is properly estimated, but its
man-days requirements are under-estimated by 33%. Such
a situation could arise due to an under-estimate of the
project's complexity or an over-estimate of the team's
productivity, or both. As was mentioned before, COCOMO
exists in a hierarchy of increasingly detailed forms.
In its more detailed versions, the estimate of a
project's man-day requirements can be adjusted by a
number of multipliers to account for factors such as
complexity, required reliability, team's capability, ...
etc. For example, for a project that is perceived to
have a "very low" complexity rating, the man-days
estimate would be 30% below the "nominal" case. Thus,
if a project is incorrectly perceived at its initiation
as being "very low" in complexity, when in fact it is
not, an under-estimate of its man-day requirements will
result.
Thus, for this second case.
SIZE = 64 KDSI
MD = 0.67 (MDNOMINAL)
= 0.67[2.4*19*(64)1.05 ]
= 2,407 man-days
TDEV = 47.5 * (2,407/19)0.38
= 299 days
3. When neither size nor man-day requirements are
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under-estimated. In this case,
SIZE = 64 KDSI
MD = 2.4 * 19 * (64)1.05=3,593 man-days
TDEV = 47.5 * (3,593/19)0.38 = 348 days
The results of these three simulation runs are shown in
Figure V.20.
One result was expected, namely, that the "90% syndrome"
arises only when a software project is initially
under-estimated. Because of the lack of visibility in the
earlier phases of development, progress is measured .by the
rate of expenditure of resources rather than by some count of
actual accomplishments. By measuring progress by the rate of
expenditure of resources, status reporting ends up being
nothing more than an echo of the project's plan. This
creates the "illusion" that the project is right on target.
However, as the project approaches its final stages (e.g.,
when 80-90% of the resources are consumed), discrepancies
between % of tasks accomplished and % of resources expended
become increasingly more apparent. At the same time, and as
the project advances towards its final stages, the project
members become increasingly able to perceive how productive
the workforce has actually been. This results in a better
and better. appreciation of the amount of effort actually
remaining. As this appreciation develops, it would, in
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effect, be discounting the project's progress rate. Thus, as
the project members proceed towards the final stages of the
project, perhaps at a higher work rate, their net progress
rate slows down considerably. This continues, until the
project completes.
What, however, was unexpected, was the significant
difference in the acuteness of the problem between the two
types of under-estimates. Notice that the "90% syndrome" is
much more acute when the project's man-days requirements are
underestimated than it is when the under-estimate is in the
project's size. With a little reflection we can see why.
When the project's man-days requirements are under-estimated
the problem would often remain largely undetected (as was
explained above) until the final stages when, first, most of
the project's resources (i.e., budgeted man-days) are
consumed, and second the project members become more able to
perceive how productive the workforce has actually been.
When, on the other hand, the initial under-estimate is in the
project's size, the situation is, in a sense, less severe.
And the reason for this is that the problem tends to be
detected faster. As we saw in project EXAMPLE's base case
behavior in Section V.2., the "Undiscovered Job Tasks" do not
remain undiscovered until the very last stages of the
project, but, instead, start to be discovered in a
significant way during the detailed design phase of the
project. Any new task that is discovered is by definition
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visible. And as we saw, when such tasks are discovered,
adjustments to the project's man-days are often made. As a
result of this, the project arrives at its final stages with
its initial under-estimate largely detected, which, in turn,
reduces the severity of the "90% syndrome" experienced.
Some Concluding Remarks: The "90% syndrome" arises
because of the interaction of two factors, under-estimation
and imprecise measurement of progress. The reason why
progress tends to be imprecisely measured, is because
imprecise surrogates are used to measure it. "A surrogate is
a substitute measure of some phenomenon that is used because
it is not feasible to measure the phenomenon directly
"(Anthony and Dearden 1980). In the case of software,
consumption of resources is the (imprecise) surrogate often
used to measure progress.
To rectify this situation, attempts have been made to
develop more precise measurements that would directly measure
progress in a software project e.g., automated monitoring
systems such as SIMON (Fleischer and Spitter, 1976).
However, primarily because such tools only address one
aspect of the problem i.e., the imprecise measurement of
progress, but not the under-estimation aspect, their use
could possibly result in unintended and dysfunctional
consequences. Consider, for example, the situation of
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introducing an effective measurement tool in a (typical)
environment where projects tend to be grossly under-estimated
at their initiation. The better the measurement tool, the
earlier it will detect the fact that progress is not keeping
up with the grossly under-estimated schedule. When such a
discrepancy is detected early in the development cycle,
management will, more often than not, react by adding more
people rather than adjusting the schedule. This happens,
according to DeMarco (1982), for political reasons:
Once an original estimate is made, it's all too tempting
to pass up subsequent opportunities to. estimate by
simply sticking with your previous numbers. This often
happens even when you know your old estimates are
substantially off. There are a few different possible
explanations for this effect: 'It's too early to show
slip' ... 'If I re-estimate now, I risk having to do it
again later (and looking bad twice)' ... As you can
see, all such reasons are political in nature.
The result of sticking with a wrong schedule that is too
tight, is often an increase in the project's cost (Boehm,
1981), e.g., due to a large workforce level. Thus, what an
application of an effective measurement tool will result in,
in such an environment, are projects that are compressed in
duration, and inflated in cost. Such an outcome might not
necessarily be expected or welcomed (e.g., in an organization
where smaller costs are more critical than shorter
durations).
Such a scenario of unintended and Iyfntoa
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consequences of some managerial intervention, it should be
noted, is not at all unique to this particular situation:
The chain of effects in going from a problem to
immediate consequences then to second-order-consequence
(i.e., those that appear subsequent to, or as a result
of, the immediate and obvious consequences of an action)
and newly created problems is one of the pervasive
characteristics of modern social systems. Quite
literally, in such systems everything depends on
everything else and often in ways so complex and round
about that it is difficult to understand the
interrelationships (Cleland and King, 1975).
And as a result,
... apparently logical solutions may prove faulty as
their consequences ramify. Furthermore, since the
consequences of a decision often occur much later than
the decision itself, it is difficult for the members to
trace backward from the disruptive consequences to
determine precisely what caused them. The members
cannot make such an analysis, simply because there are
too many competing explanations. Thus, the only thing
members can do when a new problem arises is to engage in
more localized problem-solving (Weick, 1979).
The reader might recall that the above two quotations,
were used in Chapter I within our argument for an integrative
perspective to the study of software project management.
Indeed, even though the issues we are raising here, on the
possible dysfunctional consequences of measurement tools, are
beyond the scope of our current model, we do feel that our
general integrative approach does provide the viable basis
for future extensions to address them.
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V.5. The Economics of Quality Assurance:
The development of software systems involves a series of
production activities where the opportunities for
interjection of human fallibilities are enormous.
Errors may begin to occur at the very inception of the
process where the objectives of the software system may
be erroneously or imperfectly specified, as well as
during the later design and development stages where
these objectives are mechanized. The basic quality
factor for software is that it performs its functions in
the manner that was intended by its architects. In
order to achieve this quality, the final product must
contain a minimum of mistakes in implementing their
intentions as well as being void of misconception about
the intentions themselves. Because of human inability
to perform with perfection, software development is
accompanied by a quality assurance activity (Deutsch,
1979).
Quality Assurance (QA) is, thus, a set of activities
performed in conjunction with (the development of) a
software product to guarantee the product meets the specified
standards. These activities. reduce doubts and risks about
the performance of the product in the target environment"
(Pressman, 1982).
Software quality assurance is approached by two distinct
and complementing methodologies. The first is that of
assuring that the quality is initially built into the
product. This involves emphasis on the early generation of a
coherent, complete, unambiguous, and nonconflicting set of
requirements. Then as the product is designed and coded,
review and testing of the product, the second quality tool,
-are encountered (Deutsch, 1979).
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As was indicated in Section 111.3. (on "Model
Boundary") the model's development phase includes both the
design and coding activities, but excludes the development of
the requirements. It was also indicated then, that we will
be assuming that software design commences (withirn the
model's boundary) at the "successful completion" of a
software requirements review (outside the model's boundary),
and that there would be no subsequent changes or
modifications in the system's requirements. As a result, the
analysis of this section on the economics of QA only applies
to the second QA tool above, namely, the review and testing
of the product.
Several specific techniques are available for reviewing
and testing the software product as it is designed and coded.
These include, structured walkthroughs and technical reviews
(Freedman and Weinberg, 1982), inspections (Fagan, 1976),
code reading (a process where code logic and code format is
scrutinized by a programmer other than the original designer)
(Weinberg, 1971) and integration testing (Daly, 1977),
(Jones, 1982). Not included in this activity is module or
unit testing, which is commonly considered to be part of the
coding process (McKeen, 1979).
In this section we will focus, not on the technical
aspects of QA, but rather on the economics of the QA
activity. We will investigate the tradeoff between the
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benefits and costs of the QA effort in terms of the total
project cost.
The utilization of QA tools and techniques adds cost to
the development of software. For example, man-hours are
expended in developing test cases, running test cases,
conducting structured walkthroughs,... etc. This added cost
is,
... a source of concern to everyone associated with
the program, particularly the program manager and the
customer ...
A (more) pressing concern to the software quality
manager is how cost efficient are the QA operations
during the development cycle. The QA organization, just
as. all elements of the development process, will and
should be subject to detailed and continuing scrutiny
regarding the cost of doing business (Knight, 1979).
This "pressing concern" has not, however, been addressed
in the literature. That is, as of yet, there are no
published- studies investigating "how cost efficient are the
QA operations during the development cycle." We can propose
three possible reasons for this deficiency in the field's
research repertoire: (1) It is a managerial issue. Like
many other aspects of software production, managerial
considerations tend to attract less research attention.
"Perhaps this is so because computer scientists believe that
management per se is not their business" (Cooper, 1978). (2)
"Software Quality assurance has only recently i.e., within
the last four or five years, gained a place of formal status
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and recognition within engineering hierarchies" (Stringer,
1979). The emphasis, until now, has been on "selling" this
"young" concept to practicing managers ... hence the
emphasis on stressing (only) the benefits (e.g., see (Ergott,
1979) and (Cooper and Fisher, 1979).) (3) The high cost of
controlled experimentation in software engineering (Myers,
1978), (Glass, 1982).
In the remaining part of this section we will use our
model to investigate, not whether QA is justified, but how
much QA is justified. To do this, we simulated project
EXAMPLE under different levels of manpower commitments to the
QA function and observed the benefits and costs in each case.
The primary goal of QA is "that errors be detected and
corrected as early as possible and only a minimal amount of
problems be allowed to slip from one phase of the development
to the next" (Tsui and Priven, 1976). Several studies have
established the significant cost savings gained by the early
detection and correction of errors. For example, in a study
by Shooman reported in McClure (1981), it was determined that
detecting and correcting a design error during the design
phase (i.e., through the QA activities) is one-tenth the
effort that would be needed to detect and correct it later
during the system testing phase because of the additional
inventory of specifications, code, user and maintenance
manuals, ... etc., that would require correction in the
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later case.
An important relationship to investigate is, therefore,
the one between the QA effort expended and the % of errors
detected during development. Such a relationship was
obtained from our experiment, and is exhibited in Figure
V.21.
The significant feature of the relationship is the
"diminishing returns" of QA exhibited as QA expenditures
extend beyond 20-30% of development effort. This type of
behavior is supported by two types of results in the
literature. First, Shooman (1983) observed that "In any
sizable program, it is impossible to remove all errors
(during development) ... some errors manifest themselves,
and can be exhibited only after system integration." The
second result, reported by Boehm (1981) and shown in Figure
V.22., is a compilation of a number of studies that provide
single points on error-removal functions.
What the results of Figure V.21. suggest is that the
savings in the cost of processing errors that result from the
application of QA, flattens out as QA expenditures extend
beyond 20-30% of development effort. This result is shown in
Figure V.23. As can be seen, the combined costs of rework
(i.e., correcting errors during development) and testing
flatten out as QA expenditures extend beyond 20%. On the
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other hand, notice that increasing QA as a % of the
development effort results in an exponential increase in QA's
absolute cost (in man-days). The reason why this happens is
that as a larger fraction of the development effort is
allocated to QA, the development effort itself increases.
And the reason why this in turn happens is that as more
man-days are allocated to QA (without corresponding
reductions in Rework + Testing man-days), the project's total
size in man-days goes up. This in turn leads to the
acquisition of a larger workforce. A large workforce, in
turn, means a less productive workforce (e.g., due to
training and communication overheads) which, as a result,
drives the project's development man-days effort higher.
The final, and perhaps most useful, question to address
concerns the "optimal" QA effort expenditure. For project
EXAMPLE, the answer is shown in Figure V.24., which plots
EXAMPLE's total cost (in man-days) against QA effort defined
in terms of % of development man-days. As can be seen, the
"optimal" QA effort expenditure is 16% of the development
man-days.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from Figure V.24.
The first, more generalizable conclusion, is that QA policy
does have a significant impact on total project cost. As can
be seen from the figure, project EXAMPLE's cost ranges from a
low of 3,770 man-days, to values in the range of 5,000
418
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man-days i.e., values that are 33% higher. At low values of
QA expenditures this increase in cost results from the large
cost of the testing phase. On the other hand, at high values
of QA expenditures, the excessive QA expenditures are
themselves the culprit. The second result is, of course,
deriving the optimal QA expenditure level of .16%. What, in
our opinion, is really significant about this result is not
its value, since this cannot be generalized beyond an
EXAMPLE-type software project, but rather the process of
deriving it, namely, our integrative system dynamics
approach. Beyond controlled experimentation (which are too
costly and time consuming to be practically feasible), as far
as we know, this model provides the first capability to
quantitatively analyze the costs/benefits of QA policy for
software production. And this, it is encouraging to note, is
generalizable, in the sense that one can customize models for
different software development- environments to derive
environment-specific optimality conditions.
But why is the optimal value of 16% derived above not
generalizable? To address this question we will test its
sensitivity to two project variables, which can change from
project to project and/or from organization to organiztion.
Such an investigation will have two useful outcomes: First,
we will derive results of the form "An increase in factor (X)
warrants a. greater QA expenditure," which will be
generalizable beyond our specific project EXAMPLE
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environment. Such results could, for example, be useful
"rules-of-thumb" for organizations to use when adapting
published results or results from other organizations to
their own environments. Secondly, such "rules-of-thumb" can,
in the same way, be applied to adapt and adjust our own
results above, thus increasing their generalizability.
The first project variable we consider concerns the
distribution of effort among the project phases. In planning
a software project, management does not only estimate the
project's total effort in man-days, it in addition allocates
that effort among the project's phases (Gunther. 1978). As
was explained in detail in Section V.3.2., substantial
differences in opinion exist on how this effort distribution
is or should be made (McKeen, 1983). In project EXAMPLE's
base-case, we assumed a distribution of 80% for development
(i.e., design and coding) and 20% for testing. As was
explained in Section V.2., these values were chosen to
conform to the TRW software development environment. In this
experiment, we will examine the effect of another
distribution, namely, the 40-20-40 effort distribution
profile i.e., 40% for preliminary and detailed design, 20%
for coding, and 40% for testing. Which, as was mentioned
before, is perhaps the most widely touted rule-of-thumb for
the distribution of effort among the phases of software
development projects (McKeen, 1981), (Bruce and Pederson,
1982), (Oliver, 1982), (Jensen and Tonies, 1979). [As was
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explained earlier, this effort profile is translated in our
model into 60% for development (i.e., design and coding) and
40% for system testing.]
Before we present the experiment's results, there is an
important comment to make. Notice that we are examining the
affects of how much effort is allocated to the testing phase
on how much effort should be allocated to QA! It appears as
though we have confused what the independent and dependent
variables are. After all, QA is utilized not only earlier in
the development cycle, but also for the explicit purpose of
affecting the testing phase (i.e., minimizing its cost). Our
experiment's (seemingly) lopsided set-up is, however, really.
a reflection of what the state-of-the-practice is in software
project management. Both in the literature (e.g., (Boehm,
1981)) as well as in the organizations we interviewed (e.g.,
based on discussions with (McGowan, 3), (O'Conner, 10),
(Landolfi, 11), (Sheldon, 12), and (Hisamune, 15)) the
sequence of steps followed in allocating the planned man-day
expenditures are as a follows: First, the total project's
effort is estimated. Then, the effort is distributed among
the life-cycle phases (e.g., using the 40-20-40 rule). And
then effort is allocated to QA as % of the development
effort. For example, in Boehm's Software Engineering
Economics, he uses a case study titled "The Hunt National
Bank EFT System" to outline how COCOMO would be used to
estimate and allocate a project's man-day expenditures. The
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following sequence of steps is followed:
1. COCOMO's effort and schedule equations are used to
estimate the project's man-days, and development time.
2. Next, using guidelines for the distribution of
effort among the project's life cycle phases, man-days
are allocated to development (i.e., design and coding)
and testing.
3. Finally, effort is allocated to QA activities using
some guidelines expressing QA as a % of development
man-days.
A final note. This lopsided approach to planning a
software project is probably a result of how the (young)
software engineering field has grown. First, there was no
explicit development life cycle with the emphasis almost
totally placed on the programming phase of a project. Next,
we realized the value of breaking the development process
into distinct life cycle phases, and emphasizing its earlier
requirements and design phases. And, only recently have we
also come to realize the importance of emphasizing quality
during the development of a software project. However, what
the above lopsided planning sequence suggests is that the
field has not yet grown to full maturity.
Running project EXAMPLE with the new effort distribution
profile i.e., where 40% of the man-days are allocated to
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testing rather than the base-case's 20%, produced the result
shown in Figure V.25. (for experiment #1). That is, the
optimal QA expenditure level drops to 11% of development
effort.
The fundamental reason for this is that effort
expenditures are not only a function of the actual workload,
but they are also a function of planned expenditures. This
phenomenon was explained in detail in Section V.3. Thus, by
allocating more to the testing activity, the testing effort
will expand even though the workload itself might not. -What
our experiment's results is therefore suggesting, is that we
"accomodate" this phenomenon of organizational behavior
(rather than fight it). In other words, since the testing
effort will expand anyhow (as a result of management's
increased allocation to testing), it makes sense to also
increase the workload itself and, in a sense, reap the most
return from the increased investment in testing. And this,
of-course, would be achieved by decreasing the investment in
QA. (Note: the 11% allocation to QA is still within the
range of QA expenditures reported both in the literature and
in the organizations we studied. See Chapter III.)
The second project variable we will consider concerns
software development productivity. Recall that in our
formulation of productivity we made a clear distinction
between two sets of factors that can affect how productive
424,1
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people will be on a software project. The first set included
those factors that affect productivity dynamically throughout
the development of a single project. These, included:
workforce experience, learning, motivation, and
communication. The second set included environmental factors
which tend to remain invariant during the life of a single
project. This set included factors such as: availability of
software tools, computer-hardware characteristics,
programming language, product complexity, ... etc. Because
this second set of factors does not play any dynamic role
during the life of a single project, we were able to capture
them through a single parameter, namely, the project's
"Nominal Potential Productivity." What we would like to
investigate here is the following: The effect on the optimal
QA expenditure of changes in potential productivity (i.e.,
due to changes in the software development environment).
In Section V.2., we set project EXAMPLE's "Nominal
Potential Productivity" to 60 DSI/man-day. (Actually, it was
set to 1 Task/man-day, where a task was then defined to be 60
DSI.) This was done to conform to the TRW software
development environment. In this, Experiment #2, we examine
the effect of increasing the value of "Nominal Potential
Productivity" by 25% i.e., to become 75 DSI/man-day. Notice
that such an increase only affects the productivity of
software development. Such an increase has no direct effect
on the productivity of processing errors (i.e., detecting
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them and correcting them). Of course, one could argue that
there is some correlation between the two productivities
e.g., higher quality people would be both more productive in
producing code and in detecting and correcting errors. And
that we, therefore, need to make corresponding adjustments to
the error processing productivities in the model. While
perfectly feasible to do, such adjustments would, however,
defeat the purpose of this experiment, and which we can now
elaborate in more precise terms: We would like to examine
the effects of increasing the differential between
development productivity and error-processing productivity in
an organization.
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure V.25.
That is, an increase in development productivity warrants an
increase in QA expenditures relative to development
expenditures. Higher development productivities mean that
each man-day expended on the development of software will
yield more software. As a result more QA effort would be
required to handle this increased output. It is important to
note here this increased output will not, in and of itself,
trigger adjustments in the amount of QA expended. And that
the required increases in QA must, therefore, be explicitly
planned for. The reason for this has to do with the
"Parkinsonian" execution of the QA activity. As was
discussed in Chapter III, both our own findings as well as
findings reported in the literature, suggest that the QA rate
427
is often independent of the QA effort allocated. What
usually happens is that the QA effort is planned and
allocated, usually in the form of a fixed schedule of
periodic group-type functions (Mitchell, 1980). For example,
a 2-hour walkthrough for the 5 members of team (A) is
scheduled for every Friday. During these periodic "QA
Windows," all tasks developed since the previous one are
supposed to be processed. And what we were surprised to find
was that, in an almost perfect realization of Parkinson's
Law, irrespective of how many tasks need to to be processed
within the specified "QA Window" they almost always do. No
backlogs, therefore, develop in the QA pipeline. Even when
QA activities are relaxed or suspended because of schedule
pressure, no backlogs develop. That is, when walkthroughs
are suspended for a while on a project, the requirement for a
"walkthrough" is also suspended, not .postponed (Hart, 1982).
We can propose an explanation for how and why this
happens. Since the objective of the QA activity is to detect
invisible errors, invisible that is until they are detected,
it becomes almost impossible to tell whether the QA job was
completely done (i.e., all those invisible errors were in
fact detected). By the same token, it is as difficult to
tell that the job has not been completely done (except much
later in the life cycle). Under such circumstances it
becomes quite easy to rationalize both to oneself and to
management that the QA job that was possible to do, was not
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insufficient. Furthermore, the QA effort that is possible to
expend (i.e., in terms of available time and effort), is
usually what is expended and not more (e.g., even if called
for due to a larger than expected workload of developed
tasks) because there seems to be no significant incentives to
do otherwise. Firstly, at the psychological level, there are
actually disincentives for working harder at QA, since it
only "exposes" more of one's mistakes (Weinberg, 1971). And
secondly, at the organizational level there are seldom any
award mechanisms in place that promote quality or
quality-related activities (Cooper and Fisher, 1979).
V.6. Staffing: Brook's Law Revisited
Our objective in this section is, in some sense, the
reverse of that of the previous section. In Section V.5.
Our aim was to generate new results that are generalizable.
In this section, on the other hand, we will be questioning
the generalizability of an old "result," namely, "Brooks'
Law."
Brooks' Law was first publicized in Dr. Fred Brooks'
1975 book titled The Mythical Man-Month: Essays on Software
Engineering. The book embodies a number of insights into the
management of large software projects gained through Brooks'
experience in managing the development of IBM's OS/360.
Paraphrasing Brooks (1978):
429
After leaving IBM in 1965 to come to Chapel Hill as
originally agreed when I took over OS/360, I began to
analyze the OS/360 experience to see what management and
technical lessons were to be learned ...
My own conclusions are embodied in the essays that
follow, which are intended for professional programmers,
professional managers, and especially professional
managers of programmers.
Brook's Law is stated as follows: "Adding manpower to a
late software project makes it later" (Brooks, 1978).
The lack of interchangeability between men and months
was recognized by Brooks as being caused by two factors,
training and intercommunication overheads:
Each worker must be trained in the technology, the goals
of the effort, the overall strategy, and the plan of
work. This training cannot be partitioned, so this part
of the added effort varies linearly with the number of
workers.
Intercommunication is worse. If each part of the task
must be separately coordinated with each other, the
effort increases as n(n-1)/2. Three workers require
three times as much pairwise intercommunication as two;
four require six times as much as two ...
Since software construction is inherently a systems
effort ... an exercise in complex interrelationships
... communication effort is great ... Adding more men
then lengthens, not shortens, the schedule (Brooks,
1978).
Since its "enactment," Brooks' Law has been widely
endorsed in the literature (e.g., see (Synnott and Gruber,
1981), (Paretta and Clark, 1976), (Pressman, 1982), (Jensen
and Tonies, 1979), and (Boehm, 1981).) Furthermore, it has
often been endorsed indiscriminately i.e., for not only
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large, but also small projects, and not only systems
programming type projects, but also applications software
systems. This, even though Brooks was quite explicit in
specifying the domain of applicability of his insights,
including his Brooks' Law, i.e., to what he calls "Jumbo"
systems programming projects. For example, Pressman (1982)
extends Brooks' Law to 6-10 man-year projects, while in
(Jensen and Tonies, 1979) and (Synnott and Gruber, 1981) it
is extended to the domain of applications software systems,
Interestingly, this wide-spread endorsement of Brooks'
Law has taken place, even though the "law" has not been
formally verified. Our objective in this section is to do
just that. Specifically we will investigate whether Brooks'
Law does apply to the environment of "medium-sized
applications projects developed in a familiar, in-house
development environment," i.e., to our prototype project
EXAMPLE.
As we have seen in Section V.2., project EXAMPLE's size
is (as are many such software projects) initially
under-estimated. As a result the project experiences
scheduling problems, and does in fact overshoot its original
schedule. (The reader is advised to refer to the detailed
description furnished in Section V.2.) We also saw that when
the project's scheduling problems surface management first
reacts by adjusting the project's workforce level i.e.,
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adding more people. However, as the project proceeds towards
its final stages, with its scheduling problems still
persisting, management becomes increasingly reluctant,
because of workforce stability considerations, to add more
people, and as a result reacts instead by adjusting the
project's schedule.
Management's policy on how to balance workforce and
schedule adjustments is captured in the model through the
formulation of the variable "Willingness to Change
Workforce."- Through adjusting this variable we can,
therefore, examine the impact of more aggressive manpower
acquisition policies on the project's cost and duration.
That is, examine whether a policy (A) in which management
continues adding more people to project EXAMPLE even as the
project proceeds towards the end of its system testing phase,
results in a larger schedule overshoot than does a policy (B)
in which management refrains from adding more people much
earlier e.g., towards the end of the development phase.
Brooks' Law suggests that policy (A) would produce a longer
project duration.
In 'the base case (and based on discussions with
(Lombardi, 23), (Garett, 24) and (Nichols, 25)), the
"Willingness to Change Workforce" is formulated in terms of a
time parameter that is the sum of the "Hiring Delay" and the
"Assimilation Delay." Specifically, in the early stages of
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the project when "Time Remaining" would generally be much
larger than the sum of the "Hiring Delay and the
"Assimilation Delay" management would be willing to adjust
the workforce level to meet the project's scheduled
completion date. As the number of days perceived remaining
drops below 1.5 * ( Hiring Delay + Assimilation Delay),
though, management starts becoming reluctant, and
increasingly so, to increase workforce level. In the base
case the values of the "Hiring Delay" and the "Assimilation
Delay" are 40 and 80 working days, respectively. Thus, as
"Time Remaining" drops below 180 days, management, in the
base case, starts becoming reluctant to hire new people, even
though the time and effort perceived remaining might imply
that more people are needed. The reluctance stems from the
realization that most of those remaining 180 days, would be
"wasted" in the hiring process and then in acquainting the
new people with the mechanics of the project, in integrating
them into the project team, and in training them in the
necessary technical areas. And when the "Time Remaining"
drops below 0.3 * (Hiring Delay + Assimilation Delay) i.e.,
below 48 working days, no more additions would be made to the
project's workforce i.e., the hiring rate falls to zero.
It should now be clear how we can model more aggressive
manpower acquisition policies through the "Willingness to
Change Workforce" formulation. We can do that simply by
decreasing the value of the time parameter. For example, if
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we set the time parameter to 30 working days (instead of its
base-case value of 40 + 80 = 120) we would be modeling a
situation where management's willigness to add to the
workforce continues until much later into the project. In
the base case, management starts becoming reluctant to
in6rease the workforce level when the perceived number of
days remaining to complete the project drops below 180 days,
and stops hiring completely when it drops below 48 working
days. Under the current more aggressive policy, management
starts becoming reluctant at 45 days and stops manpower
additions completely at 9 working days, or two weeks, before
the perceived completion date.
Thus, by adjusting the value of the time parameter we
are able to examine the scheduling consequences of a number
of manpower acquisition policies, ranging from the base-case
policy to the above (somewhat extreme) policy. The results
are depicted in Figure V.26.
As can be seen from the figure the results do not
support Brooks Law. What our results show is that adding
more people to a late project causes it to become more
costly, but not to complete later. The increase in the cost
of the project is caused by the increased training and
communication overheads, and which in effect decrease the
productivity of the average team member, and thus increase
the project's man-day requirements. For the project's
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schedule to also suffer, the drop in productivity must be
large enough to render an additional person's contribution to
the project to be, in effect, a negative contribution. Our
results indicate this is not the case in project EXAMPLE.
The conclusion that we can draw from our experiment's
results is that Brooks' Law does not universally apply to all
software development environments. And that, in particular,
it does not seem to apply to the EXAMPLE-type project
environment i.e., the medium sized application project
developed in a familiar, in-house development environment.
It is, therefore, not necessarily an invalidation of Brooks'
"Brooks's Law," but rather a disqualification of the notion
(implied not by Brooks but by the writings of others in the
literature) that "Brooks' Law" is a universal law of software
development.
The question, however, still remains: under what
conditions would Brooks' Law apply? While the complete
answer to this question lies beyond the scope of this
research, we are, however, able to present some preliminary
results. One of the advantages of simulation modeling is the
flexibility it provides in experimenting on the modeled
system under perturbed conditions. The results of one such
experiment i.e., on a "perturbed EXAMPLE" project, is shown
in Figure V.27.
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In this experiment, we guadrupled the training overhead
for project EXAMPLE. In the base case, a new hiree consumes
in training overhead, on the average, the equivalent of 20%
of -an experienced full-time employee's time for the duration
of a training period that extends for 4 months. In this
current experiment, a new hire consumes 40% of an experienced
full-time employee's time for a training duration that
extends for 8 months. Such an increase in the training
overhead, while admittedly somewhat extreme, is
never-the-less the kind of perturbation that we would need to
make if we were to model the software development environment
of large and complex systems programming software (Corbato
and Clingen, 1980), e.g., such as the IBM OS/360.
Notice that, even with such a large training overhead,
Brooks' Law does not always hold. It only holds, in this
experiment, when the Time Parameter is less than 50 working
days. As was explained earlier, a smaller Time Parameter
means that management's willingness to add more people to the
project is maintained until later in the project's life
cycle. Specifically, when the Time Parameter is set to 50
working days, management would be willing to add more people
up until the point in time when it is perceived that the time
remaining to complete the project is less than
0.3 * 50 = 15 working days i.e., 3 weeks. That is, until the
final stages of the testing phase. It is at such extremely
aggressive manpower acquisition policies that Brooks' Law
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holds for our "perturbed EXAMPLE" project.
There are several conclusions that we can draw from this
analysis:
* Adding more people to a late project does not
necessarily make it later.
* In particular, Brooks' Law does not seem to apply to
the EXAMPLE-type software project environment i.e., the
medium sized application project developed in a
familiar, in-house development environment.
* In such an environment, adding more people to late
project does, however, make it more costly.
* But even in a particular software development
environment, our results indicate that adding more
people to a late project may or may not make the project
later. It depends on where in the project's life cycle
the people are added.
V.7. Summary:
In this chapter we used our integrative system
dynamics model of software project management as an
experimentation vehicle to study/predict the dynamic
implications of an array of managerial actions,
policies, and procedures pertaining to the development
of software. Four areas were studied: (1) Scheduling;
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(2) Controlling; (3) Quality Assurance; and (4)
Staffing.
Three experiments were conducted in the software
scheduling area. We examined the impact that schedules
have on project performance in the first experiment, the
portability of the quantitative software estimation
tools in the second, and in the third experiment we
investigated the long-term impact of the "estimation by
analogy method."
In the area of project control, we examined the "90
% Syndrome" phenomenon, and provided an analysis of its
causes, namely, the lack of visibility and
underestimation.
The third area of investigation concerned the
economics of software quality assurance. Two sets of
experiments were conducted in this area. The objective
of the first set was to investigate, not whether QA was
justified, but how much QA was justified. In the second
set of experiments, we examined the sensitivity of the
derived "optimal" QA expenditure level, to two project
variables, namely, the project's planned effort
distribution profile, and the software development
productivity.
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Finally, in the area of project staffing, we tested
the applicability of Brooks' Law to our prototype
project environment (i.e., to the domain of medium-sized
applications projects developed in a familiar, in-house
development environment).
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The purpose for a concluding chapter is to provide the
opportunity for the researcher to look back in order to
assess what has been accomplished, and at the same time, to
furnish an occasion for the researcher to look ahead in order
to suggest future avenues for prospective research. These
activities, while of different orientation, are closely
interrelated; any statement of what has been done invites
inquiry as to what remains to be done. This chapter, coming
at *the culmination of the research, provides the vantage
point from which the researcher can fulfill these express
purposes. The following sections of the chapter entitled
"Summary of Results" and "Suggestions for Future Research"
provide the "look back" and "look ahead," respectively.
VI.1. Summary of Results:
The objective of this research effort is to enhance our
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understanding of, and gain insight into, the general process
by which software development is managed. To achieve this
objective we accomplished the following three tasks:
1. Developed an integrative system dynamics model of
software development project management.
2. Conducted a case study to test the model.
3. Used the model as an experimentation vehicle to
study/predict the dynamic implications of an array of
managerial policies and procedures.
In the remaining part of this section, we will elaborate
further on the above three research accomplishments.
Model Development:
The development of the integrative system dynamics model
of software development project management constitutes the
following set of accomplishments:
1. The model integrates our knowledge of the micro
components of software development project management
(e.g., programming, prductivity, planning, controlling,
...etc.) into an integrated continuous view of the
software development process.
A major defect in much of the research to date has been
its inability to integrate our knowledge of such micro
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components for deriving implications about the behavior
of the organization in which the micro components are
embedded (Thayer, 1979). Paraphrasing Jensen and Tonies
(1979):
There is much attention on individual phases and
functions of the software development sequence, but
little on the whole life cycle as an integral,
continuous process --- a process that can and
should be optimized.
Clearly, this "micro-oriented" type of work is a useful
beginning in helping us obtain a better understanding of
the software development activity. However, before we
can say that we have a complete understanding of any
such activity, "... it is necessary to show that our
knowledge of the individual components can be put
together in a total system, i.e., an organization can be
synthesized, which allows for the interactions of all
the relevant variables and all the structural
components" (Cohen and Cyert, 1965).
In addition to the benefit of helping us achieve overall
understanding, an integrative perspective is useful in
two more "tactical" ways: problem diagnoses and
solution evaluation. The interactions and
interdependicies which characterize our management
systems, will similarly characterize the problems that
beset such systems (Cleland and King, 1975). In Brooks'
words: "... no one thing seems to cause the difficulty
(in software projects) ... But the accumulation of
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simultaneous and interacting factors..." (Brooks,
1978). An integrative perspective is, therefore, useful
because it both "prompts" as well as "facilitates" the
search for the multiple, and potentially diffused, set
of factors that are interacting to cause software
development problems. An example of this is the
schedule overshoot problem, which, as was shown in
Chapter V, can arise, not only because of schedule
underestimation, but also as a result of management's
hiring/firing policies.
Again, because of the interactions and interdependencies
that characterize management systems, managerial
intervention (e.g., to solve a perceived problem) often
leads to second- and third-order consequences and newly
.created problems (Weick, 1979). By providing us with a
comprehensive world view, the model is a useful tool to
fully assess such second- and third-order consequences.
An example of this has been our analysis of the "Safety
Factor Policy" in scheduling software projects. It was
shown that while such a policy "succeeds" in producing
more accurate project estimates, the intended
consequence of the policy, it also tended to "create"
more costly projects, which is both an unintended and a
dysfunctional consequence.
2. The model identifies feedback mechanisms, and uses
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them to structure and clarify relationships in software
project management. While the significance and
applicability of the feedback systems concept to the
study of managerial systems has been substantiated in a
large number of studies outside software engineering, it
still remains largely foreign to the software
engineering project management community. We,
therefore, view our work as having an "educational"
value to the software engineering community.
3. The mathematical formulation of a system dynamics
model forces explication i.e., structural relationships
between variables must be explicitly and precisely
defined. As such, the model sets the foundation for the
development of a theory of software project management.
Paraphrasing Dubin (1971):
A theory is the attempt of a man to model some
aspects of the empirical world ... A theory tries
to make sense out of the observable world by
ordering the relationships among 'things' that
constitute the theorist's focus of attention in the
world 'out there' ... The process of putting
things or units together in lawful relation to each
other. establishes the fundamental building blocks
out of which a theory is constructed.
4. The high degree of explication required in the model
helped us ferret out "knowledge gaps" in the literature.
And a set of 27 interviews with software development
managers in 5 organizations helped us fill these
knowledge gaps. The model, therefore, incorporates new
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findings about the management of software project
management (e.g., on manpower acquisition policies under
different scheduling considerations).
Case Study:
The model was developed on the basis of both an
extensive review of the literature and information gathered
through the set of 27 interviews. After the model was.
developed, we then conducted .a case-study in a sixth
organization, namely, the Systems Development Section of
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. The objective of the
case-study was to examine the model's ability to reproduce
the dynamic behavior patterns of a completed software
project.
The DE-A project was selected for the case-study by
NASA. This project was selected so as to satisfy three
criteria (furnished by us): (1) to be medium in size; (2)
recent; and (3) "typical" i.e., one that would be considered
as having been developed in a familiar in-house software
development environment.
To simulate the DE-A project, the model was first
parameterized. The process involved setting 14 model
parameters that capture the *particular DE-A project
environment. The parameter values were obtained from two
sources, namely, interviews at NASA and project
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documentation. The 14 model parameters that were set (e.g.,
"Hiring Delay," "Turnover Rate," ... etc.), it is important
to note, do dot involve any changes in the formulation of the
model's policy structures. The parameter set merely defines
the (DE-A) environment within which the policies are
exercised. This is significant, since the dynamic behavior
patterns generated are largerly a result of the interaction
of the model's (unchanged) policy structures.
The model was highly accurate in reproducing the actual
development history of the DE-A software project.
Specifically, it accurately reproduced the dynamic behavior
patterns of the project's completion-date estimates, man-day
estimates, cost in man-days, and workforce loading.
Experimentation:
If "understanding" is the intellectual outcome of a
theoretical model, then "prediction" is its practical outcome
(Dubin, 1971). The model was used as an experimentation
vehicle to study/predict the dynamic implications of an array
of managerial policies and procedures. Three areas were
studied:
1. Software cost and schedule estimation. Three
experiments were conducted in this area. In the first,
we examined the impact that schedules have on project
performance. We showed that "a different schedule
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creates a different project." An important implication
that follows from this is that both the project manager
as well as the student of software estimation should
reject the notion that a software estimation model can
be adequately judged on the basis of how accurately it
can estimate historical projects. Because of the
significant influence that a schedule has on the
behavior of a software project, the only real test of an
estimation method is to try it. Furthermore, an
estimation method should not be judged only on how
accurate it is, but in addition it should be judged on
how costly the projects it "creates" are.
The second experiment concerned the portability of
quantitative software estimation tools. Evidence in the
literature indicates that the portability of the
currently available quantitative software estimation
tools (i.e., from the companies in which they were
developed to another) is poor (e.g., see (Boehm, 1981)
and (Benbasat and Vessey, 1980)). A primary reason for
this is that almost all the current models fail to
explicitly account for the managerial characteristics of
the software producing organization, and which tend to
vary significantly from one organization to another
(Mohanty, 1981). A major stumbling block has,
heretofore, been the inability to quantify the impact of
managerial-type factors on the cost of software
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development. In this experiment we take a first step
towards rectifying this situation. Specifically, we
identified four aspects of a company's managerial
environment (manpower acquisition, manpower allocation,
effort distribution, and QA. allocation) that
significantly impact the cost of software development,
and we quantified that impact. Because the four areas
identified are variables that the project manager can
objectively evaluate at the beginning of a software
project, it should be feasible to incorporate them
explicitly in future cost estimation models. This, we
feel, will improve both the accuracy as well as the
portability of such models.
The third and final experiment in this area
concerned the analogy method of software estimation.
The experiment generated two interesting insights.
First, it revealed that there are inherent factors in
the management of a software project (resulting from the
interaction of manpower acquisition policies and
personnel turnover) that would cause it to over-run even
what would amount to be a "perfect" schedule estimate.
The second, more interesting finding, is that because of
this inherent tendency to overshoot, the use of the
analogy method in estimating would inject a bias in the
scheduling process, a bias that generates, in the
long-run longer (than necessary) project schedules.
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2. The economics of quality assurance (QA). Two sets
of experiments were conducted in this area. The
objective of the first set was to investigate, not
whether QA is justified, but how much QA is justified.
To do this we first examined the relationship between
the QA effort expended and the % of errors detected
during development. A significant feature of this
relationship is the "diminishing returns" of QA
exhibited as QA expenditures extend beyond 20-30% of
development effort. We then derived the "optimal" QA
expenditure level i.e., that level that minimizes total
project cost. The "optimal" QA effort expenditure level
(for our prototype project) was found to be 16% of the
development man-days. What, in our opinion, is really
significant about this result is not its value, since
this cannot be generalized beyond the type of project
used in our experiment, but rather the process of
deriving it, namely, our integrative system dynamics
approach. Beyond controlled experimentation (which is
too costly and time consuming to be practically
feasible) this model, as far as we know, provides the
first capability to quantitatively analyze the
costs/benefits of QA policy for software production.
And this, it is encouraging to note, is generalizable,
in the sense that one can customize models for different
software development environments to derive
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environment-specific optimality conditions. The results
of this first set of QA experiments have also clearly
demonstrated that QA policy does have a significant
impact on total project cost. That is, QA expenditures
that are significantly lower or significantly higher
than the "optimal" can result in a significant increase
in the project's total cost. At low values of QA
expenditures this increase in cost results from the
large cost of the testing phase. On the other hand, at
high values of QA expenditures, the excessive QA
expenditures are themselves the culprit.
The objective of the second set of QA experiments
we conducted was to examine the sensitivity of the above
results to two project variables, namely, the project's
planned effort distribution profile (i.e., how
management plans the distribution of effort among the
development versus testing phases of the project), and
the software development productivity. The findings
constitute "rules-of-thumb" that organizations can use
to adapt published results, or results from other
organizations, to their own environment.
3. Staffing. Our objective in this, the third and
final area of investigation, was to test the
applicability of Brooks' Law to the domain of
"medium-sized applications projects developed in a
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familiar, in-house development environment."
Since its "enactment," Brooks' Law has been widely
endorsed in the literature (e.g., see (Synnott and
Gruber, 1981), (Paretta and Clark, 1976), (Pressman,
1982), (Jensen and Tonies, 1979), and (Boehm, 1981)).
Furthermore, it has often been endorsed indiscriminately
i.e., for not only large, but also small projects, and
not only systems programming type projects, but also
applications software systems. For example, Pressman
(1982) extends Brooks' Law to 6-10 man-year projects,
while in (Jensen and Tonies, 1979) and (Synnott and
Gruber, 1981) it is extended to the domain of
applications software systems. Brooks was quite
explicit in specifying the domain of applicability of
his Brooks' Law to what he calls "Jumbo" systems
programming projects.
Our experimental results do not support Brooks'
Law, for the type of project studied in this research.
What our results show is that adding more people to a
late project causes it to become more costly, but not to
complete later.
The conclusion that we can draw from our
experiment's results is that Brooks' Law does not
universally apply to all software development
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environments. And that, in particular, it does not seem
to apply to the medium sized appliction project
developed in a familiar, in-house development
environment. It is, therefore, not necessarily an
invalidation of Brooks' "Brooks' Law," but rather a
disqualification of the notion (implied not by Brooks
but by the writings of others in the literature) that
"Brooks' Law" is a universal law of software
development.
In a follow-up experiment, we re-tested Brooks' Law
after quadrupling the training overhead in the project.
Such an increase in the training overhead, while
admittedly somewhat extreme, is never-the-less the kind
of perturbation that we would need to make if we were to
approximate the software development environment of
large and complex systems programming software (Corbato
and Clingen, 1980), e.g., such as the IBM OS/360. Under
such conditions Brooks' Law applies, sometimes. The key
is where in the life cycle people are added. Adding
manpower to a late project can make it later only (our
results indicate) if this takes place towards the end of
the project's testing phase.
VI.2. Suggestions for Future Research:
According to Nobel Prize Winner Alfred Kastler "All
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knowledge is provisional --- never final." This is certainly
the case in this field where research is in the infancy
stage. It is believed that this research has pointed up
several areas requiring more intensive research.
Model Enhancements:
Further research needs to be performed within the
framework of the existing model. We propose the following
set of model extensions:
1. Incorporating the requirements definition/analysis
phase into the model's life cycle. "The technology of
defining the requirements for a software system is an
area in most urgent need for improvement and itself
constitutes a major portion of the so-called
'software-bottleneck'" (Bacon, 1982). Many in the field
have hypothesized about the disruptive effects of
changes in system requirements on software production,
and on the direct link between such disruptions and
cost/schedule slippages (Boehm, 1981). The system
dynamics modeling approach provides a viable vehicle to
test out such hypotheses, and to furnish a quantitative
assessment of the claims made.
2. Extend the model to capture the development of
multiple projects e.g., two software projects developed
in parallel. In such an environment project competition
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for company resources becomes a significant dimension,
presenting an opportunity to examine the effects of
various resource allocation policies e.g., of the
manpower resource.
3. Extending the model to other project environments.
Particularly interesting (and challenging) would be an
extension to the larger DOD-type software projects
(e.g., projects that are more than 1 million lines of
code in size). Such an extension would entail a number
of enhancements to the model. The development phase
would be disaggregated into "finer" phases e.g.,
preliminary design, detailed design, and coding, with a
set of formal milestones separating the phases e.g.,
preliminary design review, critical design review, ...
etc. Interesting questions to investigate here are the
cost/benefits of such milestones e.g., administrative
overhead versus visibility benefits. It would be also
of interest to investigate how and when serially planned
phases are overlapped under schedule pressures, and the
effects of such unplanned overlapping on the project.
Another needed enhancement would be to restructure the
QA activity, which in such projects tends to be
conducted by an independent organization. As a third
enhancement, it would be useful to capture the deep
vertical structures that characterize the management of
such "jumbo" projects, representing the communication
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paths within the organization and including the various
levels of information filtering and processing and of
decision making.
4. Another interesting extension would be to capture
the quality of the produced software product. The first
issue to address here is formulating the measure(s) of
software quality (e.g., usability, maintainability, ..
etc.). A valuable resource to tap in this area is the
work done in the software metrics field e.g., see Perlis
et al, Software Metrics (1981). A number of model
enhancements would then be required. For example,
software errors could be disaggregated into different
types, some more serious than others. Another more
challenging enhancement would be to capture the effects
of motivational factors on quality. For example,
experiments have shown that explicit project goals
(e.g., "produce code as fast as you can" versus "produce
maintainable code") significantly impact project
behavior e.g., productivity, error rates, ... etc.
(Weinberg and Schulman, 1974). This motivational issue
is particularly interesting because the different
software development objectives conflict with each other
in practice. For example, pure concentration on
minimizing the software development budget and schedule
is likely to have negative effects on.software quality,
and vice versa (Boehm, 1981).
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New Modeling Applications:
Rather than continuing to focus on software development
projects per se, the system dynamics modeling approach
outlined in this thesis could be extended to investigate a
broader set of issues pertaining to the software development
organization. That is, rather than trace the lifecycle(s) of
one or more software projects, one would focus, instead, on
the operations of a software development department as a
continous stream of software products are developed, placed
into operation, and maintained. A number of research
questions are "ripe" for investigation, including: (1) the
efficacy of different organizational structures (e.g.,
project, functional, amd matrix) in different software
development environments; (2) Personnel turnover, its costs
(e.g., recruiting and training overheads), its benefits
(e.g., access to new ideas and methodologies), and its causes
(i.g., schedule pressures, maintenance load, ... etc.); (3)
The impact of such management approaches as Management By
Objectives (MBO) in both the short-term and the long-term (a
system dynamics study in the R & D area showed that the
short-run effect of MBO on increasing motivation and
productivity may be reversed in the long-run if social
interaction and communication are allowed to erode); and (4)
the organizational/environmental determinants of productivity
e.g,, standards, software tools, use of librarians,
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documentation requirements ... etc. Again, one needs to
investigate both short-term as well as long-term
implications. For example, because the software industry is
unique in that we develop our own production tools, an
investment in developing powerful software development tools
(e.g., compilers, automated testing tools, ... etc.), while
it might hamper productivity in the short-run, often leads to
better software, which in turn could lead to even more
powerful tools.
THE END
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APPENDIX:
MODEL DOCUMENTATION
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* BASE.5 / BASE MODEL: VERSION 5
NOTE
NOTE *****~~~*******
NOTE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
NOTE *********~~***
NOTE
L WFNEW.K=WFNEW.J+DT*(HIRERT.JK-ASIMRT.JK-NEWTRR.J)
NOTE NEW WORKFORCE (PEOPLE)
N WFNEW=O
R HIRERT.KL=MAX(O,WFGAP.K/HIREDY)
NOTE HIRING RATE (PEOPLE/DAY)
C HIREDY=40
NOTE HIRING DELAY (DAYS)
A WFGAP.K=WFS.K-TOTWF.K
NOTE WORKFORCE GAP (PEOPLE)
A NEWTRR.K=MIN(TRNFRT.K,WFNEW.K/DT)
NOTE NEW EMPLOYEES TRANSFER RATE OUT (PEOPLE/DAY)
A TRNFRT.K=MAX(O,-WFGAP.K/TRNSDY)
NOTE TRANSFER RATE OF PEOPLE OUT OF PROJECT (PEOPLE/DAY)
C TRNSDY=1O
NOTE TIME DELAY TO TRANSFER PEOPLE OUT (DAYS)
R ASIMRT.KL=WFNEW.K/ASIMDY
NOTE ASSIMILATION RATE OF NEW EMPLOYEES (PEOPLE/DAY)
C ASIMDY=80
NOTE AVERAGE ASSIMILATION DELAY (DAYS)
A DMPTRN.K=WFNEW.K*TRPNHR
NOTE DAILY MANPOWER FOR TRAINING (MAN-DAYS/DAY)
C. TRPNHR=O0.2
NOTE NUMBER OF TRAINERS PER NEW EMPLOYEE (DIMENSIONLESS)
L CMTRMD.K=CMTRMD.J+DT*DMPTRN.J
NOTE CUMULATIVE TRAINING MAN-DAYS
N CMTRMD=O
L WFEXP.K=WFEXP.J+DT*(ASIMRT.JK-EXPTRR.J-QUITRT.JK)
NOTE EXPERIENCED WORKFORCE (PEOPLE)
N . WFEXP=WFSTRT
NOTE INITIAL VALUE OF EXPERIENCED WORKFORCE LEVEL
A EXPTRR.K=MIN(WFEXP.K/DT,TRNFRT.K-NEWTRR.K)
NOTE EXPERIENCED EMPLOYEES TRANSFER RATE (PEOPLE/DAY)
R QUITRT.KL=WFEXP.K/AVEMPT
NOTE EXPERIENCED EMPLOYEES QUIT RATE (PEOPLE/DAY)
C AVEMPT=673
NOTE AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT TIME (DAYS)
A FTEXWF.K=WFEXP.K*ADMPPS
NOTE FULL-TIME-EQUIVALENT EXPERIENCED WF (MEN)
A CELNWH.K=FTEXWF.K*MNHPXS
NOTE CEILING ON NEW HIREES (MEN)
C MNHPXS=3
NOTE MOST NEW HIREES PER EXPERIENCED STAFF (MEN/MEN)
A CELTWF.K=CELNWH.K+WFEXP.K
NOTE CEILING ON TOTAL WORKFORCE (PEOPLE)
A WFS.K=MIN(CELTWF.K,WFNEED.K)
NOTE WF SOUGHT (PEOPLE)
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A TOTWF.K=WFNEW.K+WFEXP.K
NOTE TOTAL WF LEVEL (PEOPLE)
A FTEQWF.K=TOTWF.K*ADMPPS
NOTE FULL TIME EQUIVALENT WF (EQUIVALENT PEOPLE)
A FRWFEX.K=WFEXP.K/TOTWF.K
NOTE FRACTION OF WF THAT IS EXPERIENCED (DIMENSIOLESS)
NOTE
NOTE *****~~~*******
NOTE SOFTWARE PRODUCTION SUSBSYSTEM
NOTE *********~~****
NOTE
NOTE (A) MANPOWER ALLOCATION SECTOR
NOTE
A TOTDMP.K=TOTWF.K*ADMPPS
NOTE TOTAL DAILY MANPOWER (MAN-DAYS/DAY)
C ADMPPS=1
NOTE AVERAGE DAILY MANPOWER PER STAFF (DAY/DAY)
L CUMMD.K=CUMMD.J+DT*TOTDMP.J
NOTE CUMULATIVE MAN-DAYS EXPENDED (MAN-DAYS)
N CUMMD=.0001
A DMPATR.K=TOTDMP.K-DMPTRN.K
NOTE DAILY MANPOWER AVAILABLE AFTER TRAINING (MAN-DAYS/DAY)
A AFMPQA.K=PFMPQA.K* (+ADJQA.K)
NOTE ACTUAL FRCATION OF MANPOWER FOR QA (DIMENSIONLESS)
N AFMPQA=PFMPQA
C QO=O
NOTE QUALITY OBJECTIVE ... NORMAL QO = 0
A PFMPQA.K=TABHL(TPFMQA,PJBAWK.K,O,1,.1)*(I+QO/100)
NOTE PLANNED FRACTION OF MANPOWER FOR QA (DIMENSIONLESS)
T TPFMQA=.15/.15/.15/.15/.15/.15/.15/.15/.15/.15/O
A ADJQA.K=TABHL(TADJQA,SCHPR.K,O,.5,.1)
NOTE % ADJUSTMENT IN PFMPQA (%)
T TADJQA=O/-.025/-.15/-.35/-.475/-.5
A DMPQA.K=MIN((AFMPQA.K*TOTDMP.K),.9*DMPATR.K)
NOTE DAILY MANPOWER ALLOCATED FOR QA (MAN-DAYS/DAY)
L CMQAMD.K=CMQAMD.J+DT*DMPQA.J
NOTE CUMULATIVE QA MAN-DAYS (MAN-DAYS)
N CMQAMD=O
A DMPSWP.K=DMPATR.K-DMPQA.K
NOTE DAILY MANPOWER FOR SOFTWARE PRODUCTION (MAN-DAYS/DAY)
A DESECR.K=DTCERR.K/DESRWD
NOTE DESIRED ERROR CORRECTION RATE (ERRORS/DAY)
N DESECR=O
C DESRWD=15
NOTE DESIRED REWORK DELAY (DAYS)
A DMPRW.K=MIN((DESECR.K*PRWMPE.K),DMPSWP.K)
NOTE DAILY MANPOWER ALLOCATED FOR REWORK (MAN-DAYS/DAY)
N DMPRW=O
L PRWMPE.K=PRWMPE.J+(DT/TARMPE) (RWMPPE.J-PRWMPE.J)
NOTE PERCEIVED REWORK MANPOWER NEEDED PER ERROR (MAN-DAYS/ERROR)
N PRWMPE=.5
C TARMPE=10
NOTE TIME TO ADJUST PRWMPE (DAYS)
L CMRWMD.K=CMRWMD.J+DT*DMPRW.J
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NOTE CUMULATIVE REWORK MAN-DAYS (MAN-DAYS)
N CMRWMD-O
A DMPDVT.K=DMPSWP.K-DMPRW.K
NOTE DAILY MANPOWER FOR DEVELOPMENT/TESTING (MAN-DAYS/DAYS)
L CMDVMD.K=CMDVMD.J+DT*DMPDVT.J*(I-FREFTS.K)
NOTE CUMULATVE DEVELOPMENT MAN-DAYS (MAN-DAYS)
N CMDVMD-O
NOTE
NOTE (B) SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT SECTOR
NOTE
R SDVRT.KL=MIN((DMPSDV.K*SDVPRD.K) ,TSKPRM.K/DT)
NOTE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT RATE (TASKS/DAY)
N SDVRT=O
A DMPSDV.K=DMPDVT.K*(1-FREFTS.K)
NOTE DAILY MANPOWER FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT (MAN-DAYS/DAY)
A FREFTS.K=TABHL(TFEFTS,TSKPRM.K/PJBSZ.K,O,.2,.04)
NOTE FRACTION OF EFFORT FOR SYSTEM TESTING (DIMENSIONLESS)
T TFEFTS-1/.5/.28/.15/.05/O
A SDVPRD.K=POTPRD.K*MPDMCL.K
NOTE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY)
A POTPRD.K=ANPPRD.K*MPPTPD.K
NOTE POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVTY (TASKS/MAN-DAY)
A ANPPRD.K=FRWFEX.K*NPWPEX+(1-FRWFEX.K)*NPWPNE
NOTE AVERAGE NOMINAL POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY)
C NPWPEX=1
NOTE NOMINAL POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVITY OF EXP EMPLOYEE (TSK/M-D)
C NPWPNE=0.5
NOTE NOMINAL POTENTIAL PROD OF.NEW EMPL. (TSK/M-D)
A MPPTPD.K=TABHL(TMPTPD,PJBAWK.K,O,1,.1)
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVITY DUE TO LEARNING (DIMENSIONLESS)
T TMPTPD=1/1.0125/1.0325/1.055/1.09/1.15/1.2/1.22/1.245/1.25/1.25
A MPDMCL.K=AFMDPJ.K*(1-COMMOH.K)
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO PRODUCTIVITY DUE TO MOTIVATION & COMM LOSSES (DIMENSIONLESS
A COMMOH.K=TABHL(TCOMOH,TOTWF.K,O,30,5)
NOTE COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD (DIMENSIONLESS)
T TCOMOH=O/.015/.06/.135/.24/.375/.54
C NFMDPJ=.6
NOTE NOMINAL FRACTION OF A MAN-DAY ON PROJECT (DIMENSIONLESS)
L AFMDPJ.K=AFMDPJ.J+DT*WRADJR.JK
NOTE ACTUAL FRACTION OF A MAN-DAY ON PROJECT (DIMENSIONLESS)
N AFMDPJ=NFMDPJ
R WRADJR.KL=(WKRTS.K-AFMDPJ.K)/WKRADY.K
NOTE WORK RATE ADJUSTMENT RATE (1/DAY)
A WKRADY.K=NWRADY.K*EWKRTS.K
NOTE WORK RATE ADJUSTMENT DELAY (DAYS)
A NWRADY.K=TABHL(TNWRAD,TIMERM.K,O,30,5)
NOTE NORMAL WORK RATE ADJUSTMENT DELAY (DAYS)
T TNWRAD=2/3.5/5/6.5/8/9.5/10
A EWKRTS.K=CLIP(1,.75,WKRTS.K,AFMDPJ.K)
NOTE EFFECT OF WORK RATE SOUGHT (DIMENSIONLESS)
A WKRTS.K=(1+PBWKRS.K)*NFMDPJ
NOTE WORK RATE SOUGHT (DIMENSIONLESS)
N MAXMHR=1
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NOTE MAXIMUM BOOST IN MAN-HOURS (DIMENSIONLESS)
A PBWKRS.K=CLIP((MDHDL.K/(FTEQWF.K*(OVWDTH.K+.0001))),
X (MDHDL.K/(TMDPSN.K-MDHDL.K+.0001)),PMDSHR.K,O)
NOTE % BOOST IN WORK RATE SOUGHT (%)
A MDHDL.K=CLIP(MIN(MAXSHR.K,PMDSHR.K),-EXSABS.K,PMDSHR.K,O)*CTRLSW
NOTE MAN-DAYS THAT WILL BE HANDLED OR ABSORBED (MAN-DAYS)
C CTRLSW=1
NOTE CONTROL SWITCH ... ALLOWS US TO TEST POLICY OF NO OVERWORK (0 OR 1)
A EXSABS.K=MAX(0,(
X TABHL(TEXABS,TMDPSN.K/MDRM.K,O,1,.1)*MDRM.K-TMDPSN.K))
NOTE MAN-DAY EXCESSES THAT WILL BE ABSOBED (MAN-DAYS)
T TEXABS=O/.2/.4/.55/.7/.8/.9/.95/1/1/1
A MAXSHR.K=(OVWDTH.K*FTEQWF.K*MAXMHR) WTOVWK.K
NOTE MAXIMUM SHORTAGE IN MAN-DAYS THAT CAN BE HANDLED (MAN-DAYS)
A WTOVWK.K=CLIP(1,0,TIME.K,BRKDTM.K+RLXTMC.K)
NOTE WILLINGNESS TO OVERWORK (0 OR 1)
L BRKDTM,K=MAX(BRKDTM.J,SWITCH((TIME.J+DT) ,O,OVWDTH.K))
NOTE TIME OF LAST EXHAUSTION BREAKDOWN
N BRKDTM=-1
L RLXTMC.K=RLXTMC.J*SWITCH(O,,0OVWDTH.K)+DT*
X CLIP(I,-RLXTMC.J/DT,EXHLEV.K/MXEXHT,.I)
NOTE VARIABLE THAT CONTROLS TIME TO DE-EXHAUST
N RLXTMC=O
A OVWDTH.K=NOVWDT.K*MODTEX.K
NOTE OVERWORK DURATION THRESHOLD (DAYS)
A NOVWDT.K=TABHL(TNOWDT,TIMERM.K,O,50,10)
NOTE NOMINAL OVERWORK DURATION THRESHOLD (DAYS)
T TNOWDT=0/10/20/30/40/50
A MODTEX.K=TABHL(TMODEX,EXHLEV,K/MXEXHT,O,1,.1)
NOTE EFFECT OF EXHAUSTION ON OVERWORK DURATION THRESHOLD (DIMENSIONLESS)
T TMODEX=1/.9/.8/.7/.6/.5/.4/.3/.2/.1/O
L EXHLEV.K=EXHLEV.J+DT*(RIEXHL.JK-RDEXHL.JK)
NOTE EXHAUSTION LEVEL (EXHAUST UNITS)
N EXHLEV=O
R RIEXHL.KL=TABHL(TRIXHL,(I-AFMDPJ.K)/(1-NFMDPJ),.
X -0.5,1,.1)
NOTE RATE OF INCREASE IN EXHAUSTION LEVEL (EXHAUST UNITS/DAY)
T TRIXHL=2.5/2.2/1.9/1.6/1.3/1.15/.9/.8/.7/.6/.5/.4/.3/.2/0/0
R RDEXHL.KL=CLIP(EXHLEV.K/EXHDDY,O,O,RIEXHL.JK)
NOTE RATE OF DEPLETION IN EXHAUSTION LEVEL (EXHAUST UNITS/DAY)
C EXHDDY=20
NOTE EXHAUSTION DEPLETION DELAY TIME (DAYS)
C MXEXHT=50
NOTE MAXIMUM TOLERABLE EXHAUST!ON (EXHAUST UNITS)
NOTE
NOTE (C) QUALITY ASSURANCE AND REWORK SECTOR
NOTE
R QART.KL=DELAY3(SDVRT.JK,AQADLY)
NOTE FOR QA.RATE (TASKS/DAY)
L TSKWK.K=TSKWK.J+DT*(SDVRT.JK-QART.JK)
NOTE TASKS WORKED (TASKS)
N TSKWK=O
C AQADLY=1O
NOTE AVERAGE DELAY FOR QA (DAYS)
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L CUMTQA.K=CUMTQA.J+DT*(QART.JK-TSRATE.JK)
NOTE CUMULATIVE TASKS QA'ED (TASKS)
N CUMTQA=O
A ANERPT.K=MAX(PTDTER.Kt(TSKWK.K+.0001) ,0)
NOTE AVERAGE # OF ERRORS PER TASK (ERRORS/TASK)
A QAMPNE.KmNQAMPE.K*(1/MPDMCL.K)*MDEFED.K
NOTE QA MANPOWER NEEDED TO DETECT AVERAGE ERROR (MAN-DAYS/ERROR)
A NQAMPE.K=TABHL(TNQAPE,PJBAWK.K,O,1,.1)
NOTE NOMINAL QA MANPOWER NEEDED TO DETECT AVERAGE ERROR (MAN-DAYS/ERROR)
T TNQAPE=.4/.4/.39/.375/.35/.3/.25/.225/.21/.2/.2
A MDEFED.K=TABHL(TMDFED,ERRDSY.K,O,1O,1)
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO DETECTION EFFORT DUE TO ERROR DENSITY (DIMENSIONLESS)
T TMDFED-50/36/26/17.5/1i/4/1.75/1.2/1/1/1
A ERRDSY.K=ANERPT.K*IO00/DSIPTK
NOTE ERROR DENSITY (ERRORS/KDSI)
A PERDRT.K-DMPQA.K/QAMPNE.K
NOTE POTENTIAL ERROR DETECTION RATE (ERRORS/DAY)
A ERRDRT.K=MIN(PERDRT.K,PTDTER.K/DT)
NOTE ERROR DETECTION RATE (ERRORS/DAY)
L CMERD.K=CMERD.J+DT*ERRDRT.J
NOTE CUMULATIVE ERRORS DETECTED (ERRORS)
N CMERD=O
A PRCTDT.K=100*CMERD.K/(CUMERG.K+.001)
NOTE PERCENT ERRORS DETECTED (PERCENT)
A ERRSRT.K=QART.JK*ANERPT.K
NOTE ERROR ESCAPE RATE (ERRORS/DAY)
L CMERES.K=CMERES.J+DT*ERRSRT.J
NOTE CUMULATIVE ERRORS THAT ESCAPED (ERRORS)
N CMERES=O
L PTDTER.K=PTDTER.J+DT*(ERRGRT.JK-ERRDRT.J-ERRSRT.J)
NOTE POTENTIALLY DETECTABLE ERRORS (ERRORS)
N PTDTER=O
R ERRGRT.KL=SDVRT.JK*ERRPTK.K
NOTE ERROR GENERATION RATE (ERRORS/DAY)
A ERRPTK.K=NERPTK.K*MERGSP.K*MERGWM.K
NOTE ERRORS PER TASK (ERRORS/TASK)
A NERPTK.K=NERPK.K*DSIPTK/1000
NOTE NOMINAL # OF ERRORS COMMITTED PER TASK (ERRORS/TASK)
A NERPK.K=TABHL(TNERPK,PJBAWK.K,O,1,.2)
NOTE NOMINAL # OF ERRORS COMMITTED PER KDSI (ERRORS/KDSI)
T TNERPK=25/23.86/21.59/15.9/13.6/12.5
A MERGSP.K=TABHL(TMEGSP,SCHPR.K,-.4,1,.2)
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO ERROR GENERATION DUE TO SCHEDULE PRESSURE (DIMENSIONLESS)
T TMEGSP=.9/.94/1.05/1.05 /1.24/1.36/1.5
A MERGWM.K=TABHL(TMEGWM,FRWFEX.K,O,1,.2)
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO ERROR G NERATION DUE TO WORKFORCE MIX (DIMENSIONLESS)
T TMEGWM=2/1.8/1.6/1.4/1.241
L CUMERG.K=CUMERG.J+DT*ERRGRT.JK
NOTE CUMULATIVE ERRORS GENERATED DIRECTLY DURING WORKING (ERRORS)
N CUMERG=O
L DTCERR.K=DTCERR.J+DT*(ERRDRT.J-RWRATE.JK)
NOTE DETECTED ERRORS (ERRORS)
N DTCERR=O
R RWRATE.KL=DMPRW.K/RWMPPE.K
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NOTE REWORK RATE (ERRORS/DAY)
A RWMPPE.K=NRWMPE.K/MPDMCL.K
NOTE REWORK MANPOWER NEEDED PER ERROR (MAN-DAYS/ERROR)
A NRWMPE.K=TABHL(TNRWME,PJBAWK.K,O,1,,.2)
NOTE NOMINAL REWORK MANPOWER NEEDED PER ERROR (MAN-DAYS/ERROR)
T TNRWME=.6/.575/.5/.4/.325/.3
L CMRWED.K=CMRWED.J+DT*RWRATE.JK
NOTE CUMULATIVE REWORKED ERRORS DURING DEVELOPMENT (ERRORS)
N CMRWED=O
NOTE
NOTE (D) SYSTEM TESTING SECTOR
NOTE
L UDAVER.K=UDAVER.J+DT*(AEGRT.JK+AERGRT.JK-AERRRT.JK-DCRTAE.JK)
NOTE UNDETECTED ACTIVE ERRORS (ERRORS)
N UDAVER=O
R AEGRT.KL=(ERRSRT.K+BDFXGR.K)*FRAERR.K
NOTE ACIVE ERRORS GENERATION RATE (ERRORS/DAY)
A BDFXGR.K=RWRATE.JK*PBADFX
NOTE BAD FIXES GENERATE RATE (ERRORS/DAY)
C PBADFX=.075
NOTE PERCENT BAD FIXES (FRACTION)
A FRAERR.K=TABHL(TFRAER,PJBAWK.K,O,1,.1)
NOTE FRACTION OF ESCAPING ERRORS THAT WILL BE ACTIVE (DIMENSIONLESS)
T TFRAER=1/1/1/1/.95/.85/.5/.2/.075/O/0
R AERGRT.KL=SDVRT.JK*SMOOTH(AERRDS.K,TSAEDS)*MAERED.K
NOTE ACTIVE ERRORS REGENERATION RATE (ERRORS/DAY)
A MAERED.K=TABHL (TMERED,SMOOTH(AERRDS.K*1000/DSIPTK,TSAEDS) ,, 100,10)
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO ACTIVE ERROR REGENERATION DUE TO ERROR DENSITY (DIMENSIONLE
SS)
T TMERED=1/1.1/1.2/1.325/1.45/1.6/2/2.5/3.25/4.35/6
C TSAEDS=40
NOTE TIME TO SMOOTH ACTIVE ERROR DENSITY (AERRDS) (DAYS)
A AERRDS.K=UDAVER.K/(CUMTQA.K+.1)
NOTE ACTIVE ERROR DENSITY (ERRORS/TASK)
R AERRRT.KL=UDAVER.K*AERRFR.K
NOTE ACTIVE ERRORS RETIRING RATE (ERRORS/DAY)
A AERRFR.K=TABHL(TERMFR,PJBAWK.K,O,1,.1)
NOTE ACTIVE ERRORS RETIRING FRACTION (I/DAYS)
T TERMFR=O/O/O/O/.01/.02/.03/.04/.1/.3/1
R DCRTAE.KL=MIN(TSRATE.JK*AERRDS.K,UDAVER.K/DT)
NOTE DETECTION/CORRECTION RATE OF ACTIVE ERRORS (ERRORS/DAY)
L UDPVER.K=UDPVER.J+DT*(PEGRT.JK+AERRRT.JK-DCRTPE.JK)
NOTE UNDETECTED PASSIVE ERRORS (ERRORS)
N UDPVER=O
R PEGRT.KL=(ERRSRT.K+BDFXGR.K)*(1-FRAERR.K)
NOTE PASSIVE ERRORS GENERATION RATE (ERRORS/DAY)
R DCRTPE.KL=MIN(TSRATE.JK*PERRDS.K,UDPVER.K/DT)
NOTE DETECT/CORRECT RATE OF PASSIVE ERRORS (ERRORS/DAY)
L CMRWET.K=CMRWET.J+DT*(DCRTPE.JK+DCRTAE.JK)
NOTE CUMULATIVE ERRORS REWORKED IN TESTING PHASE (ERRORS)
N CMRWET=O
A ALESER.K=UDAVER.K+UDPVER.K+CMRWET.K
NOTE ALL ERRORS THAT ESCAPED AND WERE GENERATED (ERRORS)
A DMPTST.K=DMPDVT.K*FREFTS.K
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NOTE DAILY MANPOWER FOR TESTING (MAN-DAYS/DAY)
L CMTSMD.K=CMTSMD.J+DT*DMPTST.J
NOTE CUMULATIVE TESTING MAN-DAYS (MAN-DAYS)
N CMTSMD=O
R TSRATE.KL=MIN(CUMTQA.K/DT,DMPTST.K/TMPNPT.K)
NOTE TESTING RATE (TASKS/DAY)
A TMPNPT.K=(TSTOVH*DSIPTK/1000+TMPNPE.K*(PERRDS.K+AERRDS.K)
X )/MPDMCL.K
NOTE TESTING MANPOWER NEEDED PER TASK (MAN-DAYS/TASK)
C TSTOVH=1
NOTE TESTING EFFORT OVERHEAD (MAN-DAYS/KDSI)
C TMPNPE=.15
NOTE TESTING MANPOWER NEEDED PER ERROR (MAN-DAY/ERROR)
A PTKTST.K=CUMTKT.K/PJBSZ.K
NOTE % OF TASKS TESTED (%)
A PERRDS.K=UDPVER.K/(CUMTQA.K+.0001)
NOTE PASSIVE ERROR DENSITY (ERRORS/TASK)
L CUMTKT.K=CUMTKT.J+DT*TSRATE.JK
NOTE CUMULATIVE TASKS TESTED (TASKS)
N CUMTKT=O
A ALLERR.K=PTDTER.K+DTCERR.K+CMRWED.K+UDAVER.K+
X UDPVER.K+CMRWET.K
NOTE ALL ERRORS (ERRORS)
A ALLRWK.K=CMRWED.K+CMRWET.K
NOTE ALL ERRORS REWORKED ... IN DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING (ERRORS)
NOTE
NOTE ***********~~**
NOTE CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
NOTE ******~********
NOTE
L CMTKDV.K=CMTKDV.J+DT*SDVRT.JK
NOTE CUMULATIVE TASKS DEVELOPED (TASKS)
N CMTKDV=O
A PJBAWK.K=CMTKDV.K/RJBSZ
NOTE % OF JOB ACTUALLY WORKED (%)
A PJDPRD.K=TSKPRM.K/(MDPRNT.K+.1)
NOTE PROJECTED DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY)
A MDPRNT.K=MAX(O,MDRM.K-MDPNRW.K-MDPNTS.K)
NOTE MAN DAYS PERCEIVED REMAINING FOR NEW TASKS (MAN-DAYS)
A MDPNRW.K=DTCERR.K*PRWMPE.K
NOTE MAN DAYS PERCEIVED NEEDED FOR REWORKING ALREADY DETECTED ERRORS (MD)
A ASSPRD.K=PJDPRD.K*WTPJDP.K+PRDPRD.K*(1-WTPJDP.K)
NOTE ASSUMED PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY)
A PRDPRD.K=CMTKDV.K/(CUMMD.K-CMTSMD.K)
NOTE PERCEIVED DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY)
A WTPJDP.K=MPWDEV.K*MPWREX.K
NOTE WEIGHT TO PROJECTED DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY (DIMENSIONLESS)
A MPWDEV.K=TABHL(TMPDEV,PJBPWK.K/100,0,1,.1)
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO PRODUCTIVITY WEIGHT DUE TO DEVELOMENT (DIMENSIONLESS)
T TMPDEV=1/1/1/1/1/1/.975/.9/.75/.5/O
A MPWREX.K=TABHL(TMPREX,(1-MDPRNT.K/(JBSZMD.K-TSSZMD.K)),
X O,1,.1)
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO PRODUCTIVITY WEIGHT DUE TO RESOURCE EXPENDITURE (DIMENSIONL
ESS)
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T TMPREX=1/1/1/1/1/1/.975/.9/.75/.5/O
A MDPNNT.K=TSKPRM.K/ASSPRD.K
NOTE MAN DAYS PERCEIVED STILL NEEDED FOR NEW TASKS (MAN-DAYS)
A TMDPSN.K=MDPNNT.K+MDPNTS.K+MDPNRW.K
NOTE TOTAL MAN DAYS PERCEIVED STILL NEEDED (MAN-DAYS)
A MDPNTS.K-TSTPRM.K/PRTPRD.K
NOTE MAN DAYS PERCEIVED STILL NEEDED FOR TESTING (MAN-DAYS)
A TSTPRM.K=PJBSZ.K-CUMTKT.K
NOTE TASKS REMAINING TO BE TESTED (TASKS)
A PRTPRD.K=SMOOTH((CLIP(PLTSPD.K,ACTSPD.K,O,CUMTKT.K)),TSTSPD)
NOTE PERCEIVED TESTING PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY)
C TSTSPD=50
NOTE TIME TO SMOOTH TESTING PRODUCTIVITY (DAYS)
A PLTSPD.K=PJBSZ.K/TSSZMD.K
NOTE PLANNED TESTING PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY)
A ACTSPD.K=CUMTKT.K/(CMTSMD.K+.001)
NOTE ACTUAL TESTING PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY)
A PMDSHR.K=TMDPSN.K-MDRM.K
NOTE PERCEIVED SHORTAGE IN MAN DAYS (MAN-DAYS)
A SHRRPT.K=PMDSHR.K-MDHDL.K
NOTE SHORTAGE REPORTED (MAN-DAYS)
A MDRPTN.K=MDRM.K+SHRRPT.K
NOTE MAN DAYS REPORTED STILL NEEDED (MAN-DAYS)
A SCHPR.K=(TMDPSN.K-MDRM.K)/MDRM.K
NOTE SCHEDULE PRESSURE (DIMENSIONLESS)
A PTRPTC.K=SMOOTH((100-(MDRPTN.K/JBSZMD.K)*100),RPTDLY)
NOTE % OF TASKS REPORTED COMPLETE (%)
N PTRPTC=O
C RPTDLY=1O
NOTE REPORTING DELAY (DAYS)
A PDEVRC.K=SMOOTH(MAX((100-((MDRPTN.K-MDPNTS.K)/(JBSZMD.K-TSSZMD.K)
X )*100),PDEVRC.K),RPTDLY)
N PDEVRC=O
NOTE % DEVELOPMENT PERCEIVED COMPLETE %
L UNDJTK.K=UNDJTK.J-DT*RTDSTK.JK
NOTE UNDISCOVERED JOB TASKS (TASKS)
N UNDJTK=RJBSZ-PJBSZ
N RJBSZ=RJBDSI/DSIPTK
NOTE REAL JOB SIZE IN TASKS (TASKS)
R RTDSTK.KL=UNDJTK.K*PUTDPD.K/100
NOTE RATE OF DISCOVERING TASKS (TASKS/DAY)
A PUTDPD.K=TABHL(TPUTDD,PJBPWK.K,0,100,20)
NOTE PERCENT OF UNDISCOVERED TASKS DISCOVERED PER DAY (1/DAY)
T TPUTDD=0/0.4/2.5/5/10/100
A PJBPWK.K=(CMTKDV.K/PJBSZ.K)*100
NOTE % OF JOB PERCEIVED WORKED (M)
R RTINCT.KL=DELAY3(RTDSTK.JK,DLINCT)
NOTE RATE OF INCORPORATING DISCOVERED TASKS INTO PROJECT (TASKS/DAY)
L TKDSCV.K=MAX((TKDSCV.J+DT*(RTDSTK.JK-RTINCT.JK)),0)
NOTE TASKS DISCOVERED (TASKS)
N TKDSCV=O
C DLINCT=10O
NOTE AVERAGE DELAY IN INCORPORATING DISCOVERED TASKS (DAYS)
L PJBSZ.K=PJBSZ.J+DT*RTINCT.JK
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NOTE CURRENTLY PERCEIVED JOB SIZE (TASKS)
N PJBSZ=PJBDSI/DSIPTK
A TSKPRM.K=PJBSZ.K-CMTKDV.K
NOTE NEW TASKS PERCEIVED REMAINING (TASKS)
A PSZDCT.K-TKDSCV.K/ASSPRD.K
NOTE PERCEIVED SIZE OF DISCOVERED TASKS IN MAN DAYS (MAN-DAYS)
A RSZDCT.K=PSZDCT.K/(MDPRNT.K+.0001)
NOTE RELATIVE SIZE OF DISCOVERED TASKS (DIMENSIONLESS)
A FADHWO.K=TABHL(TFAHWO,RSZDCT.K/(MSZTWO+.001),O,2,.2)
NOTE FRACTION OF ADDITIONAL TASKS ADDING TO MAN-DAYS
T TFAHWO=O/O/OO/O/O/.7/.9/.975/1/1
C MSZTWO=.O1
NOTE MAXIMUM RELATIVE SIZE OF ADDITIONS TOLERATED W/O ADDING TO PROJECT'S MAN-
DAYS
R IRDVDT.KL=(RTINCT.JK/ASSPRD.K)*(FADHWO.K)
NOTE RATE OF INCREASE IN DEVELOPMENT MAN-DAYS DUE TO DISCOVERED TASKS (MD/D)
L TSSZMD.K=TSSZMD.J+DT*IRTSDT.JK+ARTJBM.K*CLIP(1,0,FREFTS.J,.9)
NOTE PLANNED TESTING SIZE IN MAN-DAYS ... BEFORE WE START TESTING
N TSSZMD=TSTMD
R IRTSDT.KL=(RTINCT.JK/PRTPRD.K)*(FADHWO.K)
NOTE RATE OF INCREASE IN TESTING MAN DAYS DUE TO DISCOVERED TASKS (MD/D)
L JBSZMD.K=JBSZMD.J+DT*(IRDVDT.JK+IRTSDT.JK+ARTJBM.JK)
NOTE TOTAL JOB SIZE IN MAN DAYA (MAN-DAYS)
N JBSZMD=DEVMD+TSTMD
R ARTJBM.KL=(MDRPTN.K+CUMMD.K-JBSZMD.K)/DAJBMD.K
NOTE RATE OF ADJUSTING THE JOB SIZE IN MAN-DAYS (MAN-DAYS/DAY)
A DAJBMD.K=TABHL(TDAJMD,TIMERM.K,O,20,20)
NOTE DELAY IN ADJUSTING JOB'S SIZE IN MAN DAYS (DAYS)
T TDAJMD=.5/3
A MDRM.K=MAX(.0001,JBSZMD.K-CUMMD.K)
NOTE
NOTE *****~~~*******
NOTE PLANNING SUBSYSTEM
NOTE
NOTE *****~~~*******
NOTE
NOTE MAN DAYS REMAINING
A TIMEPR.K=MDRM.K/(WFS.K*ADMPPS)
NOTE TIME PERCEIVED STILL REQUIRED (DAYS)
A INDCDT.K=TIME.K+TIMEPR.K
NOTE INDICATED COMPLETION DATE
L SCHCDT.K=SCHCDT.J+DT*(INDCDT.J-SCHCDT.J)/SCHADT.K
NOTE SCHEDULE COMPLETION DATE
N SCHCDT=TDEV
A SCHADT.K=TABHL(TSHADT,TIMERM.K,O,5,5)
NOTE SCHEDULE ADJUSTMENT TIME (DAYS)
T TSHADT=.5/5
A TIMERM.K=MAX(SCHCDT.K-TIME.K,O)
NOTE TIME REMAINING (DAYS)
A WFINDC.K=(MDRM.K/(TIMERM.K+.001))/ADMPPS
NOTE INDICATED WORKFORCE (PEOPLE)
A WFNEED.K=MIN((WCWF.K*WFINDC.K+(]-WCWF.K)*TOTWF.K),WFINDC.K)
NOTE WORKFORCE LEVEL NEEDED (PEOPLE)
A WCWF.K=MAX(WCWFI.K,WCWF2.K)
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NOTE WILLINGNESS TO CHANGE WORKFORCE LEVEL (DIMENSIONLESS)
A WCWF1.K=TABHL(TWCWF1,TIMERM.K/(HIREDY+ASIMDY),O,3,.3)
NOTE WILLINGNESS TO CHANGE WORKFORCE (1) (DIMENSIONLESS)
T TWCWFI=0/0/.1/,4/.85/1/1/1/1/1/1
A WCWF2.K=TABHL(TWCWF2,SCHCDT.K/MXTLCD,.86,1,.02)
NOTE WILLINGNESS TO CHANGE WF (2) (DIMENSIONLESS)
T TWCWF2O0/.1/.2/.35/.6/.7/.77/.80
N MXTLCD=MXSCDX*TDEV
NOTE MAXIMUM TOLERABLE COMLETION DATE (DAYS)
C MXSCDX=1E6
NOTE MAX SCHEDULE COMPLETION DATE EXTENSION (DIMENSIONLESS
NOTE
NOTE ***************
NOTE INITIALIZATION
NOTE ***************
NOTE
NOTE THE REAL JOB SIZE = 64,000 DSI
NOTE FROM BOEHM PAGE 90:
NOTE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT BY PHASE IS:
NOTE DESIGN (39%), PROGRAMMING (36%), INT TESTING (25%)
NOTE FROM BOEHM PAGE 64-65:
NOTE EFFORT = 2.4*(KDSI)**1.05
NOTE = 190 MM
NOTE = 190 * 19 = 3592 MAN-DAYS
NOTE DEVELOPMENT kFFORT = 75 %
NOTE = 2695 MAN DAYS
NOTE GROSS DEV PRODUCTIVITY = 64,000/2695 = 24 DSI/MD
NOTE
NOTE SCHEDULE = 2.5 * (MM)**.38
NOTE = 18 MONTHS
NOTE = 348 DAYS
NOTE
NOTE AVERAGE STAFF SIZE = 3592/348
NOTE = 10
NOTE
NOTE GROSS PRODUCTIVITY INCORPORATES: DEV, FOR QA, & REWORI
NOTE ASSUMING 25% OF EFFORT GOES INTO QA & REWORKING
NOTE 25% OF 2695 MAN DAYS = 674 MAN DAYS
NOTE DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY = 64,000/(2695-674)
NOTE = 31 DSI/MAN-DAY
NOTE
NOTE ASSUME LOSSES IN PRODUCTIVITY = 50 %
NOTE THEREFORE POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVITY = 31 * 2 = APPROX 60
NOTE DEFINE 1 TASK = 60 DSI
C DSIPTK=60
NOTE DSI PER TASK
C RJBDSI=64000
NOTE REAL JOB SIZE IN DSI
C UNDEST=O
NOTE TASKS UNDERESTIMATION FRACTION (FRACTION)
N PJBDSI=RJBDS I*(1-UNDEST)
NOTE PERCEIVED JOB SIZE IN DSI
N TOTMD=MDSWCH*(((2.4*EXP(1.05*LOGN (PJBDSI/1000))) *19) *(
X +(1-MDSWCH)*TOTMDI
)
KING
DS I/MD
(1-UNDESM))
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NOTE TOTAL MAN DAYS
C UNDESM=O
NOTE MAN-DAYS UNDERESTIMATION FRACTION (FRACTION)
N DEVMD=DEVPRT*TOTMD
NOTE DEVELOPMENT MAN DAYS
C MDSWCH=1
NOTE SWITCH 0 OR 1
C TOTMDI=O
NOTE TOTAL MANDAYS
C DEVPRT-O.80
NOTE % OF EFFORT ASSUMED NEEDED FOR DEVELOPMENT
N TSTMD=(1-DEVPRT)*TOTMD
NOTE TESTING MAN DAYS
N WFSTRT=TEAMSZ*INUDST
NOTE TEAM SIZE AT BEGINNING OF DESIGN (MEN)
C INUDST=.5
NOTE INITIAL UNDERSTAFFING FACTOR (DIMENSIONLESS)
N TDEV=SCSWCH*((19*2.5*EXP(O.38*LOGN(TOTMD/19)))*SCHCOM)
X +(1-SCSWCH)*TDEV1
NOTE TOTAL DEVELOPMENT TIME (DAYS)
C SCHCOM=1
NOTE SCHEDULE COMPRESSION FACTOR (DIMENSIONLESS)
C SCSWCH=1
NOTE SWITCH 0 OR 1
C TDEVI=O
NOTE TIME TO DEVELOP
N TEAMSZ=(TOTMD/TDEV)/ADMPPS
NOTE
NOTE **************
NOTE VII. CONTROL STATEMENTS
NOTE ********~******
NOTE
SPEC DT=.5,MAXLEN=1000,PLTPER=10
A LENGTH.K=CLIP(TIME.K,MAXLEN,PTKTST.K,.99)
A PRTPER.K=LENGTH.K
PRINT TOTMD,DEVMD,TSTMD,TDEV
PRINT TOTWF,CUMMD,CMQAMD,CMRWMD,CMTSMD,CUMERG,CMERES,CMRWET,PRCTDT
PLOT TOTWF=W(0,20)
PLOT PDEVRC=1(0,100)
PLOT PJBSZ=J,CMTKDV=1,CUMTKT=T(0,1500)/CUMMD=C,JBSZMD=D (0,
X 5000)/SCHCDT=S(200,600)/PTRPTC=R,PDEVRC=V(0, 100)
PLOT AFMDPJ=F(0,2.4)
PLOT CUMERG=G,CMERD=D,CMERES=S (0,4000)/PRCTDT=P (0,100)
PLOT AFMDPJ=F (0,2.4)/EXHLEV=X,OVWDTH=V (0,100)/MDHDL=H,PMDSHR=P
X (-500,500)/SHRRPT=1 (-500,500)/SCHPR=S (-1,1)/
X JBSZMD=D,CUMMD=C(0,5000)/SHRRPT=1(-200,200)
